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Preface 
As Murray Forman said in 2004, one hot minute with an Internet search engine 
can easily reveal the ever-increasing amount of hip-hop related undergraduate courses 
and graduate seminars in American colleges and universities.1  The veritable mixtape of 
classes being offered on the subject spans the disciplines of African-American Studies, 
English, sociology, cultural studies, communications, and others.  Conspicuously missing 
in Forman’s own list of disciplines in which hip-hop is finding a home are philosophy 
and education.  This is, in part, the argument of this preface, that hip-hop inquiry 
deserves a place in foundations or philosophy of education like Kanye deserved an 
American Music Award in ’04 (which is to say, it is overwhelmingly deserved).  I will 
make my own version of the “hip-hop belongs in academia” argument with a special 
emphasis on its rightful place in philosophy/educational foundations.  First, however, it 
seems necessary to address my own connection with and participation in hip-hop culture.  
A white scholar writing about hip-hop could be accused of appropriating, co-opting; of 
being an opportunist, or a “wanksta.”  Richard Shusterman was aware of criticisms of this 
nature when he wrote the essay “The Fine Art of Rap,” included in his Pragmatist 
Aesthetics.  Schusterman’s eloquent argument for why he, a white scholar, should find it 
appropriate to write about hip-hop is tucked away in a footnote.  It is worth repeating in 
its entirety here. 
As a white middle-class Jew, I realize that my interest in rap may be criticized as 
exploitative and not “politically correct,” that I have no right to advocate or 
study a cultural form whose formative ghetto experience I lack.  But though 
rap’s roots lie firmly in the black urban ghetto, it aims (as we shall see) to reach 
a far wider audience; and its protest against poverty, persecution, and ethnic 
prejudice should be comprehensible to many groups and individuals who have 
experienced such things outside the black ghetto.  In any case, I think it 
                                                
1 Murray Forman and Mark Anthony Neal, That's the Joint!: The Hip-Hop Studies Reader (New York: 
Routledge, 2004). 
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politically more incorrect to ignore rap’s importance for contemporary culture 
and aesthetics by refusing to treat it simply because of race and socio-economic 
background.2 
 
Hip-hop culture (including hip-hop scholarship)3 has grown in complexity and 
sophistication since Schusterman’s article, and the transracial possibilities with which 
hip-hop is currently brimming make his language feel a bit outdated, but the basic 
argument for folks outside the ghetto, even white scholars, taking an interest in hip-hop 
remains reasonable.  However, while Schusterman’s story, that of a white scholar who 
likes hip-hop, defends the legitimacy of its aesthetic sensibilities and finds it acceptable 
for white scholars to be writing on the subject, mine is a different story.  My story is 
much less a defense of the appropriateness of a white scholar taking interest in a cultural 
phenomenon whose primary roots are in the experience of Black and Brown people and 
more about how I have found myself “thrown” (in the Heideggerian sense) into hip-hop 
and hip-hop scholarship, that is to say, it is much more personal than Schusterman’s.   
  With that in mind, I have chosen to begin by telling that personal story about my 
journey to hip-hop as a white kid from a small city in Indiana.  This autobiographical 
account is meant to depict my deeply felt connection with African-American people and 
culture (with an emphasis on various musical expressions) and how that connection led 
me into a deep and lasting romance with hip-hop. 
 
Confronting Racist Roots 
My maternal great-grandfather was a Ku Klux Klan member.  I never met him 
and only became aware of this fact through a story my grandmother told less than ten 
                                                
2 Richard Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 321. 
3 Forman and Neal, That's the Joint! : The Hip-Hop Studies Reader. 
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years ago.  As the story goes, my grandmother sat with her mother in what must have 
been a small country church, since everything in my grandmother’s native southern 
Indiana town was small and country, and watched stoically as the Klan marched in.  
Though identities were shielded behind those cowardly white hoods, my grandmother’s 
mother recognized her husband’s shoes beyond doubt.  My grandmother finished the 
story in her typical placating manner, asserting, “the Klan was about good things back 
then.  If a man wasn’t treating his wife right, they’d rough him up.”  I wondered aloud 
why a man would have to keep such an honorable membership a secret from his own 
wife if this were so (not to mention the blatant hypocrisy in the method of “correction”).  
Although hearing the truth of my ancestry from the lips of the lone living representative 
of that generation of my family fueled a kind of anger (embarrassment?) in me, it was by 
no means a complete surprise.  As a teenager I had already sensed the racist roots of my 
maternal family tree and rebelled against it – once to the tune of declaring to my 
grandmother that between him and Abraham Lincoln, Malcolm X was the more heroic 
American.  Given the story above, it is easy to imagine my grandmother’s reaction. 
  And so it was that my felt connection with African-Americans and Black 
American culture in general became vivid against the backdrop of racism in my lineage.  
I suppose my assertion about Malcolm X and my subsequent reaction to my 
grandmother’s story could be dismissed as some kind of sophomoric white liberal guilt.  
Indeed, guilt might accurately describe my emotional state at certain points in my quest 
to grapple with my own white privilege and broach honest conversations about race in 
America.  Yet, I hope the story of my journey to hip-hop culture makes it difficult to 
dismiss my reactions with a phrase like “white liberal guilt.” 
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Black Is Beautiful 
Growing up in a small northern Indiana city with only a handful of non-white 
residents, most of my early interactions with Black culture were through media.  One of 
my first heroes was comedian, Eddie Murphy.  As an elementary school-aged kid I 
couldn’t get enough of his sketches on “Saturday Night Live.” I mimicked his acts such 
as “Mr. Robinson’s Neighborhood” (a ghettoized Mr. Rogers) and “James Brown’s 
Celebrity Hot Tub.”  Far and away, my favorite SNL Eddie Murphy sketch involved Joe 
Piscopo and guest host, Stevie Wonder.  The premise of the sketch is Eddie Murphy as 
the promoter of the “Miss Black Teenage America Contest” struggling to find a star act 
for entertainment.  Joe Piscopo drags Stevie Wonder (portraying a nerdy Stevie Wonder 
imitator) into Eddie Murphy’s office and tries to convince Murphy to hire “Alan, the 
Stevie Wonder Experience.”  Murphy is reluctant but agrees to hear “Alan’s” act.  When 
Stevie Wonder as “Alan” launches into a ridiculous, unrecognizable version of “Living 
for the City,” Eddie Murphy, in reality known for his dead-on imitation of Stevie 
Wonder, responds by showing “Alan” how to “do” Stevie Wonder by singing a much 
more Stevie-sounding version of “My Cherie Amour.”  I was fond of mimicking this 
sketch and did so at a neighborhood friend’s house one day.  Upon hearing my Eddie 
Murphy version of “My Cherie Amour,” my friend’s dad came into the room and stared 
at me blankly for a moment.  “You really sound like Stevie Wonder,” he said.  I was 
trying to sound like Eddie Murphy.  But he was right.   
That little nudge from my neighbor friend’s father was all I needed to realize that 
my efforts that resulted in sounding like Stevie Wonder also meant that I really liked his 
music, and within months I was completely immersed in my emulation of his vocal 
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performances.  Far from a kind of caricaturing, when I sang like Stevie Wonder, I was 
doing it out of an ever-increasing admiration.  While we teetered on the edge of 
pubescence, my peers were buying cassette tapes of hair metal bands like Poison and Ratt 
as I spent countless hours in my bedroom with  “Songs in the Key of Life.”   I digested 
everything from “Fingertips Part II” to “Part-Time Lover” and along the way I inevitably 
encountered the larger corpus of Motown from the smooth harmonies and steps of the 
Temptations and Four Tops to the socially conscious vocal stylings of Marvin Gaye and a 
blockbuster act of five brothers whose hometown was just an hour or so up the road from 
my house.  It wasn’t just the music that interested me.  What started as an interest in 
Stevie Wonder’s music grew into biographical studies of the most prominent Motown 
artists and reading everything I could about Berry Gordy, Jr., and the history of Detroit’s 
most recognizable contribution to American music.   
My immersion in all things Motown began to lead me to the brink of social issues 
that were not topics broached in my social studies class or at my family’s dining room 
table.  Soon after the campaign to make Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s birthday a national 
holiday finally succeeded, Stevie Wonder hosted a three-city television gala to celebrate 
the bill’s passing into law.  I was, of course, glued to the television and even had the 
VCR cued to record the event for posterity.  I was mostly interested in watching Stevie 
and other musical headliners perform, but the three hour show quickly came to be about 
much more than music as I was introduced to an all-star lineup of celebrity civil rights 
activists.  Stevie Wonder introduced testimonials by Harry Belafonte, Dick Gregory, 
Cicely Tyson, Ben Vereen, Dionne Warwick, Bill Cosby, Debbie Allen, and others.  
Some of these were names I had scarcely heard of, yet their words moved me.  Woven 
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through the live testimonials were video clips of Dr. King delivering speeches.  I had 
heard of Martin Luther King well before that evening, but I had never actually heard him 
before.  Even white kids from northern Indiana knew about “I Have a Dream,” but we 
were largely ignorant of the details and the delivery.  I found myself wiping away tears as 
I got my first substantive glimpse into the civil rights struggle and the passionate and 
prophetic words of its harbinger.  It was the first time in my life I had ever been so moved 
by words and ideas. 
After that night I became more explicitly cognizant of my felt connection with 
African-American cultural products and social issues.  I had precious little opportunity to 
be around Black folks, but when I was in the presence either of the two black families my 
parents had a relationship with, I would invariably soak up all they would tell me about 
their experiences, and I always wanted to have conversations about Black American 
music with them.  I cherished these moments, but for the most part, my education came 
from the music.   
By the time I was transitioning out of junior high and into high school, I already 
had a robust aesthetic appreciation not just for Motown and Stevie Wonder, but also for 
what we now call “classic soul” and gospel and R&B.  At some point, though, it became 
about more than just the aesthetics, more than about loving the music and performing 
Stevie Wonder songs in school talent shows.  It was inevitable.  I had to know what “You 
Haven’t Done Nothin’” and “Master Blaster (Jammin’)” were about.  It was Stevie 
Wonder who gave me my first accurate introduction to South African apartheid (“It’s 
Wrong”), and that eventually brought me to an understanding of the life and work of 
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Nelson Mandela, and the related insidious Reagan Administration policies.  This was an 
education that I was not getting at school. 
 
Eazy-E Goes to Football Camp 
My first hip-hop experiences were in the 1980s around my junior high/high 
school transition.  Growing up in a predominantly white, small Midwestern city, I was 
completely ignorant of hip-hop’s live East Coast beginnings with Kool Herc and Afrika 
Bambaataa in the 1970s that Tricia Rose (1994) and Jeff Chang (2005) have written so 
eloquently about.  I had heard and fell in love with Herbie Hancock’s “Rockit” in 1983 
(which introduced me and a whole lot of other Midwesterners to “scratchin’”) but hip-
hop fully entered my world in 1985 in the form of the film, Breakin’ and I instantly 
connected with the music and the breakdancing.  My basement became my training 
ground for bustin’ moves at the nearby dancehall that summer.4  Just a minute after 
Breakin,’ they paired 1970s rockers with hip-hop and made it more palatable for some 
white folks.  But in 1986 I was less taken with “Walk This Way” than I was “Proud to Be 
Black,” “My Adidas,” and “You Be Illin,’” mostly because I perceived those tracks as 
expanding my Black culture vocabulary.  My best friend and I made our own music 
videos to nearly all of the cuts from Run-DMC’s Raisin’ Hell and wrote little raps to 
reflect our own pubescent realities using “It’s Tricky” and “Dumb Girls” as templates.   
From 1985 to 1988 my musical experiences and taste continued to revolve around 
Motown and contemporary R&B with the addition of hip-hop.  While Stevie Wonder was 
                                                
4 While I don’t think I ever gained real b-boy skills, I had enough moves to draw a crowd at the almost 
exclusively white teenage dance hall that was popular with kids from my the surrounding high schools.  I 
recall one time dancing there when the lone Black person approached and “battled” me.  I took it as a sign 
of respect even though I think he probably danced circles around me that night. 
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introducing me to political realities that my social studies teachers weren’t, I was mostly 
aesthetically drawn to the music I was listening to, including my early experiences with 
hip-hop.  There was, however, a kind of exposure to a new and unfamiliar world when I 
heard Run-DMC and saw them rock their Adidas with no shoelaces or when I sat in my 
room with headphones on imagining the “Bristol Hotel” listening to my cassette of LL 
Cool J (“The Bristolllll Hotel!  Room 515.  The Bristolllll Hotel!  Where dat at?  Jamaica, 
Queens!”).  Without hip-hop, in no way would I have ever seen East Coast street styles or 
know about a place called Jamaica, Queens.  These were not the typical kinds of 
acculturative lessons an Indiana teenager learned.  My early high school years produced 
the Run-DMC and LL Cool J lessons.  It was in 1989, though, that I got my real hip-hop 
education. 
  Involvement in athletics in high school afforded me the opportunity to be around 
students not from my school as I attended summer camps and played in tournaments 
away from home. This invariably exposed me to new things, often music.  I heard 
N.W.A. (Niggaz with Attitude) for the first time at football camp.  One of the campers in 
my dorm had a mixtape of West Coast rap.  I had never heard of N.W.A. and didn’t know 
much of anything about Compton, and I certainly hadn’t been exposed to the kind of raw, 
in your face rebellion and misogyny that I heard from Eazy-E, Dr. Dre, Ice Cube and MC 
Ren.  This was another tape I’d end up listening to through headphones.  I knew my 
parents wouldn’t understand or have sympathy for “Fuck tha Police.”  I was fascinated by 
the styles, language, and bravado, and I was sympathetic to “Fuck tha Police.”  It made 
me pay close attention to stories of racist police conduct even though I could never access 
such stories through my local news media.  Though it was qualitatively different, I found 
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myself connecting to the anger against racist police practices in a way that reminded me 
of my affective response to my first real exposure to the speeches of Martin Luther King, 
Jr. and Malcolm X. 
Later that year I purchased a cassette of music from Spike Lee’s movie, Do the 
Right Thing (not to be confused with the original soundtrack which is comprised of 
Branford Marsalis jazz compositions).  I had not yet seen the film, but I bought the tape 
because of the recognizable R&B and hip-hop artists featured.  I remember the exact 
moment when I put the tape in my Walkman and heard Flavor Flav and Chuck D trading 
lines like (and also unlike) Michael and Jermaine in an old Jackson 5 vamp: 
Awwwwwwwww Nineteen eighty NINE!  
The number, another summer.  Sound of the funky drummer.   
Music hittin’ your heart ‘cause I know you got ‘sould’ (brothers and sisters!) … 
 
Got to give us what we want  
Gotta give us what we need  
Our freedom of speech is freedom or death   
We got to fight the powers that be5 
 
 
 The power of Public Enemy’s words motivated me to see my first Spike Lee Joint 
(again, small town Indiana was not a place one was likely to serendipitously catch School 
Daze (1988) or She’s Gotta Have It (1986) even though they had been successful Spike 
Lee films prior to Do the Right Thing) and his classic tale of the hottest day of summer in 
Bed-Stuy was the most sophisticated and artistic statement on race in contemporary 
America that I had witnessed, by far.  Do the Right Thing is a hip-hop film in that it 
features hip-hop in its soundtrack, a number of its characters are certainly hip-hop kids 
most notably, “Radio Raheem” played by young Bill Nunn, and it deals with issues that 
have been and continue to concern hip-hop culture.  Without a doubt, Public Enemy’s 
                                                
5 Public Enemy “Fight the Power,” from Fear of a Black Planet, Def Jam Records, 1990. 
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“Fight the Power” and Spike Lee’s Do the Right Thing were seminal parts of my hip-hop 
education.  Almost no one I knew had seen the movie.  Very few of my peers were down 
with P.E. 
 
Majority/Minority 
Some might describe my consumption of hip-hop as a kind of “cultural safari” in 
which I was able to peer into certain kinds of Black experience with the privilege of 
retreating back into my comfortable white world after an imaginative tour of the exotic 
street culture.  No doubt I have so characterized some examples of white fascination with 
hip-hop.  Yet, I felt a connection to Black music in a variety of forms before and after I 
came to hip-hop and that connection was more like a discovering of something that fit 
what was inside me and not as if I was looking through the glass at some exotic other.   
My college years were spent at a predominantly white institution, but there were 
more Black folks there than at my high school, and my path crossed with most of them 
and I befriended many, mostly through performing.  I had stopped playing football and 
concentrated on performing in college.  I can’t remember a time when I wasn’t passionate 
about music and while I deeply felt hip-hop in the late 1980s, my performance skills were 
mostly concentrated in singing ability.  My vocal style was crafted through countless 
hours of trying to emulate not just Stevie Wonder, but also Marvin Gaye, David Ruffin, 
Sam Cooke, and others.  After a few performances on campus, I was asked to join the 
gospel choir.  As a kind of “front man” for the gospel choir over the following three 
years, I built friendships with many Black students and faculty and was graciously 
embraced by the Black community on campus.  I was invited to and extended a kind of 
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honorary membership in the Minority Student Organization as practically all of its 
members were friends of mine and I was certainly interested in the group’s concerns.  
The director of the gospel choir took me under his wing and gave me individual 
instruction as well as offering a supportive friendship.  My experience with the Black 
community on campus during my undergraduate years was by all means gracious and 
affirming but lest this part of the story begin to bear too much resemblance to the 
Pollyannish television version of Jim Gregory’s time at Grambling, it is necessary to say 
that spending so much time in spaces where I was the lone white person did not happen 
without some anxiety and less than desirable consequences.  Reflecting back, I wonder if 
my involvement in the Minority Student Organization was appropriate despite being 
invited by its members.  It seems likely that there were grumblings that never reached my 
ears.  My involvement in the gospel choir eventually got me kicked out of the university 
chorale, an auditioned choir that performed sacred and classical music.  After hearing me 
perform many times in gospel style, the chorale director told me that I “could not sing 
[anymore]” and that I was “washed up.”   Also, there was the constant threat of being 
perceived as an appropriator or as being engaged in a kind of co-opting, and I thought it 
was certainly reasonable for Black folks on campus to hold this kind of doubt about my 
participation in certain groups.  Yet, my central motivation to be around African-
American people was to build friendships with those with whom I sensed shared 
interests.  I am quite sure some people in the gospel choir and in the Minority Student 
Organization did not sense shared interest with me, but many did and extended 
friendships to me.  For the first time in my life, I was experiencing friendships and 
identifying with groups that really shared my musical and sartorial style and taste, and as 
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these friendships and group identifications grew, I continued to learn and take to ways of 
communicating and interacting that were often distinct from my friendships with white 
folks and that in general felt more genuine. 
One of these growing relationships was with my gospel choir director whom I 
will call “Marcus” here.  Under Marcus’s tutelage, I learned to develop that Black gospel 
style that I discovered inside me the first time I heard a Sam Cooke record.  Marcus and I 
ate a lot of soul food together and made a lot of music together.  In that process, Marcus 
took me into a number of places where I was literally the only white person in the room.  
Most of these places were churches.  Marcus knew almost all the music ministers in the 
Black churches in the city near my college and he took me to sing at many of them.  I 
came to expect the looks of disbelief when it was announced to the congregations that I 
had come to sing, and I completely understood those who raised an eyebrow of suspicion 
at my appearance.  But I also soon became familiar with the affirming responses of those 
who were feeling (read: appreciating) my performances (there’s no place a singer can go 
to get more immediate feedback than a Black church!).  I was often greeted afterwards 
with complimentary messages like, “You sang!” and sometimes the compliments were 
laced with reminders of my whiteness, such as, “I don’t know what kind of burdens you 
bearin’ child, but you sure can sing!”  I understood that kind of compliment.  These folks 
kept it real.   
Singing Black gospel music and spending so much time in social groups that were 
predominantly Black was, to a meaningful degree, constitutive of my identity in a way 
that has lasted well beyond those college years when I was hanging out with Marcus and 
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singing in all of his friends’ churches.  It was a salient part of discovering, developing, 
and acting on my felt connection to Black culture.   
That connection was originally discovered through music.  From Stevie Wonder, 
to the whole of Motown, to R&B and soul, to gospel, and to hip-hop, I found aesthetic 
sensibilities, styles in dress (I will never forget my man, Tony, a salesman in an urban-
style clothing store at my local mall, without whom I would not have been nearly as fly 
during my high school days!), and socio-political ideas that resonated in ways quite 
distinct from any of my other life experiences.  What started with trying to copy Eddie 
Murphy’s Stevie Wonder imitation became a discovery of myself.  “My Cherie Amour” 
opened my ears to a sound that had a prodigious effect on me and eventually brought me 
to “Village Ghetto Land,” “Living for the City,” and “Black Man,” which opened my 
eyes to realities that had a profound influence and directed me toward a kind of education 
different from what I was receiving at school or home.  I consider hip-hop to be a 
continuation of that education.  Starting with the film, Breakin’ and continuing with Run-
DMC, Public Enemy, LL Cool J, and N.W.A. through headphones in my bedroom, I was 
introduced to a whole world that was connected to my education through Stevie Wonder, 
Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X, but was also new in important ways.   
My hip-hop education that started in the 1980s is still happening today.  Like 
Richard Shusterman, I am a white scholar who likes hip-hop and finds it an appropriate 
location for academic inquiry.  Unlike Schusterman, I cannot stop there.  My experience 
with hip-hop is tethered to a life of discovering a profound connection to Black culture 
and Black people.  Music is constitutive of that connection.  So, this white scholar finds it 
not only appropriate to write about hip-hop but imperative.   
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Hip-Hop and Philosophy of Education 
Murray Forman’s list of current locations of the subdiscipline of “hip-hop 
studies” in university departments begins with the obvious African-American studies and 
includes American studies, cultural studies, communications and media studies, English, 
and sociology.6   While there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that some hip-hop courses 
are being taught in schools of education, Forman’s list is evidence that hip-hop studies 
has not carved out as much space in education as it has in a number of other academic 
disciplines.  One purpose of this study is to assert the idea that one of hip-hop’s most 
natural locations as a subdiscipline is, in fact, philosophy of education as it takes only a 
cursory examination of hip-hop culture to determine that a number of ideas of interest to 
those who study philosophy/education are coursing through it. 
Most obviously, hip-hop culture is predicated on the efficient transfer of 
knowledge.  The constant cultural innovations that are made in hip-hop (which, among 
other things, applies explicitly to vernacular and style) suggest that learning is a salient 
feature of the culture.  In fact, to understand or participate in hip-hop culture, one must 
learn a whole lexicon that is driven by fluidity and innovation. 
In addition to transferring knowledge with regard to a constantly changing 
lexicon, hip-hop culture provides deep insights into identity formation and development.  
Scholars of education are certainly interested in identity formation and hip-hop is an 
appropriate location of inquiry about identity.  Indeed, hip-hop contributes a sophisticated 
scene of identity development as hip-hoppers are continually claiming identities and 
producing cultural innovations as they do so. 
                                                
6 Forman and Neal, That's the Joint! : The Hip-Hop Studies Reader. 
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All of this suggests that hip-hop can be viewed as a pedagogical site and a fruitful 
area of inquiry for scholars of education.  Further, there are philosophical insights that 
emanate from this pedagogical site, making hip-hop culture a copiously beneficial locus 
of study for philosophers of education.  
In chapter one I explore the connection between hip-hop and 
philosophy/philosophy of education and argue that this is most fruitfully done through an 
examination of American pragmatism, specifically Cornel West’s “prophetic 
pragmatism.”  I also take up Richard Shusterman’s “pragmatist aesthetics” and his 
discussion of hip-hop/rap music.  I add to Shusterman’s aesthetic categories that he 
applies to hip-hop and I reveal the limitations of pragmatist aesthetics for inquiry into 
hip-hop culture.   
Chapter two articulates the methodological orientation of the study.  I call the 
approach “critical ethnographic philosophy,” a kind of inquiry that uses critical 
qualitative research as a means to produce philosophical insights.  It leans on insights 
from Habermas and Carspecken and it takes on Paul Willis’s critical ethnography, 
Learning to Labor (1977) as a kind of template.  This critical ethnographic philosophy is 
not only an effective way to “do philosophy” through critical qualitative research but it 
also provides a way to articulate the deep connection between philosophy and hip-hop 
through examination of the real artistic process as it happens “on the ground,” and 
therefore, it fills in gaps in the emergent scholarship of hip-hop.  Toward the end of the 
chapter I introduce the so-called underground hip-hop artists who serve as the subjects of 
the study. 
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The ethnographic portion of the study begins in chapter three where I begin reporting the 
results of the critical ethnographic analysis.  That is to say, the remaining chapters 
examine and elucidate the philosophical insights that the data from the ethnography 
produced.  With prophetic pragmatism as the philosophical underpinning, chapter three 
explores the nexus of identity and prophetism and identity and organic intellectualism as 
they are found in hip-hop artists of this study.  Chapter four explores, in general, the 
spiritual ideas laced through all the subjects’ experience in hip-hop culture.  Specifically, 
it connects reformulated praxis theory, the “special status of the identity claim” 
(Carspecken 1999) and how this helps us understand spirituality and identity in hip-hop.  
Then, in chapter five, I use Richard Shusterman’s “pragmatist aesthetics” (as discussed in 
chapter one) and reformulate it to include prophetism, thereby turning it into prophetic 
pragmatist aesthetics.  I also add to Shustermsn’s categories, kinetic consumption.  I then 
explore the relationship between the aesthetics and constructions of the self. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xxv
Christopher (Kip) Kline 
 
REPRESENT!:  HIP-HOP AND THE SELF-AESTHETIC RELATION 
 
Hip-hop culture has been consistently marginalized, to a significant extent vilified, in 
dominant cultural discourse.  At the same time, it continues to increase its prodigious influence 
over youth culture, broadly speaking.  This study claims that inflamed rhetoric about hip-hop 
culture is based on misinformation and shortsighted notions and therefore seeks to make inquiry 
into the culture in such a way as to oppose the mainstream conversation about hip-hop with more 
complete and authentic understandings.  In so doing, it seeks to practice philosophy through the 
use of critical ethnography.  This method is rooted in Paul Willis’s Learning to Labor  (1977), a 
critical ethnographic study that articulated philosophical ideas, albeit implicitly. 
The study makes use of philosophy and critical ethnography in two ways.  One, it 
uncovers the deep connections between philosophy and hip-hop culture, at least as philosophy is 
recast in Cornel West’s project of “prophetic pragmatism.”  Two, it uses ethnography of local, so-
called underground hip-hop artists in Chicago to address, more overtly than Willis, philosophical 
questions about the construction and maintenance of a self, specifically how the self is 
constructed and maintained through hip-hop aesthetics. 
This philosophical and ethnographic examination of hip-hop culture has yielded 
important insights with regard identity formation, organic intellectualism, praxis theory, and 
spirituality and how these notions interact with hip-hop’s particular aesthetic sensibilities.  It is of 
interest to all theorists with an interest in identity, urban youth culture, and education. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
Hip-Hop and Prophetic Pragmatism:  Practicing Philosophy in the Streets 
 
I think that philosophy is still rude and elementary. It will one day be taught by 
poets. 
      Ralph Waldo Emerson 
 
My own feeling is that the idea of the Hip-Hop Generation brings together time 
and race, place and polyculturalism, hot beats and hybridity.  It describes the 
turn from politics to culture, the process of entropy and reconstruction.  It 
captures the collective hopes and nightmares, ambitions and failures of those 
who would otherwise be described as “post-this” or “post-that.” 
 
So, you ask, when does the Hip-Hop Generation begin?  After DJ Kool Herc and 
Afrika Bambaataa.  Whom does it include?  Anyone who is down.  When does it 
end?  When the next generation tells us it’s over. 
 
      Jeff Chang 
       
 Philosophy belongs in the streets.  Or so says William James.1  And KRS-ONE.2 
In so far as it is concerned with confronting the human condition “on the ground,” 
philosophy has a multifarious connection with hip-hop culture, a connection that has 
reached some level of legitimacy in the academy if we take as evidence a book on the 
subject co-edited by a Harvard professor.3  In general, this philo-sophia can be found at 
every stage of the hip-hop generation’s proliferation from the earliest trenchant 
pronouncements of Afrika Bambaataa’s “Zulu Nation” to the so-called “Golden Age” of 
hip-hop when Chuck D and Public Enemy sketched the template for socio-politically 
conscious rap.  When hip-hop culture continued to grow in sophistication and 
manifestation in the 1990s, adding spoken word poetry to its growing list of expressions, 
the love of wisdom expanded along with it, bound up in vocal packages of wit and 
                                                
1 Derrick Darby and Tommie Shelby, Hip Hop and Philosophy : Rhyme 2 Reason, Popular Culture and 
Philosophy ; V. 16 (Chicago: Open Court, 2005). 
2 See especially the “Urban Inspirational Metaphysics” chapter in K. R. S. One and Tavis Smiley, 
Ruminations, 1st ed. (New York: Welcome Rain Publishers, 2003). 
3 Tommie Shelby, co-editor of the earlier footnoted, Hip Hop and Philosophy (2005) is John L. Loeb 
Associate Professor of the Social Sciences at Harvard University. 
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witness, incisiveness and irony, satire and syncopation, all a cappella style.  More 
recently, hip-hop culture’s philo-sophia can be witnessed in its internal critiques by Saul 
Williams, Dead Prez, Sarah Jones, and others, along with so-called underground scenes 
that tell the stories of the local realities of Sly Stone’s “Everyday People.”  Growing is 
the number of panel discussions, conferences, book and poetry readings, group 
discussions on hip-hop, inside and outside of the academy, while the number of 
university courses with previously implausible titles that include “Tupac,” “rap,” “hip-
hop,” or “hip-hop culture” is expanding in a variety of academic disciplines.  Discursive 
pursuit of wisdom is not hip-hop culture’s only manifestation of a connection with 
philosophy.  The plurality in hip-hop’s expressive idioms (from its early days, MCing, 
DJing, breakdancing, and graffiti art were all constitutive of “hip-hop”) reveals a collage 
of performative action that unveils insight into the self-aesthetic relation through 
repetition and representation, techne, and technology.  
 I am not suggesting that the American popular art form known as hip-hop is, in 
effect, identical to the American academic philosophy in which John Dewey was among 
the first to receive a PhD at Johns Hopkins University.  However, it is reasonable to 
characterize hip-hop culture as being animated, in large part, by philo-sophia.  Further, 
American pragmatists like Dewey sought to reconceptualize philosophy as cultural 
criticism and production, or put another way, to take it to the streets.  Cornel West takes 
up this reconceptualization in his prophetic pragmatism.  It is this specific brand of 
neopragmatism that can best serve as the underpinning for examining hip-hop culture.  
This chapter examines prophetic pragmatism by mining the roots of both its pragmatism 
and prophetism and then it will consider hip-hop culture through the lens of prophetic 
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pragmatism, its origins and trajectory, some seminal figures and events, the emerging 
corpus of hip-hop scholarship including Richard Shusterman’s work of applying his 
pragmatist aesthetics to rap. 
 
Prophetic Pragmatism 
Cornel West’s The American Evasion of Philosophy:  A Genealogy of 
Pragmatism (1989) is arguably less a genealogy and more a quilting of handpicked 
American ideas that culminate in West’s own prophetic pragmatism.  In fact, West 
admits his text is “a social history of ideas” that 
does not purport to be a comprehensive account of American pragmatism.  
Rather, it is a highly selective interpretation of American pragmatism in light of 
the present state (or my reading) of American society and culture.4   
 
Indeed, The American Evasion of Philosophy is West’s articulation of his brand of 
neopragmatism, which is rooted in the ideas of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, 
and (especially) John Dewey, highly influenced by Emersonian transcendentalism and 
Gramscian Marxism, and rounded out by the realist social critiques of theologian 
Reinhold Niebuhr and the international perspective of W.E.B. Du Bois.  Prophetic 
pragmatism is primarily a political project that employs the pragmatist evasion of 
epistemology-centered philosophy as it attempts to reconceptualize philosophy as a form 
of cultural criticism and a call to social action. 
 It is generally accepted that pragmatism, both historically and in its more 
contemporary iterations, resists strict definitional parameters.5  Yet, scholars of 
                                                
4 Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy:  A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison, WI:  
University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 6. 
5 See especially Richard J. Bernstein, “American pragmatism:  the conflict of narratives.”  In Herman 
Saatkamp (ed.), Rorty and Pragmatism:  The Philosopher Responds to His Critics (Nashville, TN:  
Vanderbilt University Press, 1995). 
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pragmatism are generally agreed upon a number of its core themes, and West’s prophetic 
pragmatism clearly draws on the most widely accepted motifs of antifoundationalism, 
thoroughgoing fallibilism, the social nature of the self and the necessity of a community 
of inquirers, radical contingency, and plurality.6  While prophetic pragmatism 
acknowledges and adopts these general themes, it is set apart from other manifestations 
of neopragmatism in its highlighting of Perice’s agapism while criticizing his veneration 
of scientific method, its critique of James’s individualism and gradualism, and its prizing 
Deweyan creative democracy and critical intelligence while claiming that Dewey’s 
project was truncated due to his avoidance of real professional risk.  But more than 
anything else, prophetic pragmatism separates itself from other forms of neopragmatism 
by its inclusion of DuBois, Niebuhr, and Gramsci, names that do not frequently appear in 
retellings of the tradition of pragmatism.  But, as Alasdair MacIntyre has said of tradition, 
“[it] not only embodies the narrative of an argument, but is only recovered by an 
argumentative retelling of that narrative which will itself be in conflict with other 
argumentative retellings.”7 
 
The Pragmatist Roots in Prophetic Pragmatism 
The philosophical base of prophetic pragmatism begins with an exploration of 
Emerson.  This is an apt starting point for West’s project and the title of the opening 
chapter of the text suggests Emersonian ideas as a “prehistory” to American pragmatism. 
West also claims there is a discernable moral and political continuity between Emerson 
                                                
6 This particular articulation of pragmatism’s main themes leans on Richard J. Bernstein, “Pragmatism, 
Pluralism, and the Healing of Wounds,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 
Association, Vol. 63, No. 3. (Nov., 1989), 5-18. 
7 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Epistemological Crisis, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science,” Monist 
60 (1977), 461. 
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and Dewey.8  Specifically, The American Evasion of Philosophy emphasizes Emersonian 
provocation.  In fact, West says the “primary aim of Emerson’s life and discourse is to 
provoke.”9 (emphasis added)  He locates this provocation in Emerson’s moral critiques of 
market culture.  West discusses Emerson as an organic intellectual, which becomes 
important as prophetic pragmatism is a call to social action and as such seeks to speak, in 
addition to the specialized language of the academy, the language of the grassroots.10 
West finds that Emerson “not only prefigures the dominant themes of American 
pragmatism but … enacts an intellectual style of cultural criticism that permits and 
encourages American pragmatists to swerve from mainstream European philosophy.”11  
These dominant Emersonian themes that contribute to West’s project include theodicy, 
moralism, and an emphasis on human agency.  Perhaps more important than these 
specific themes that come to influence prophetic pragmatism is Emerson’s adumbration 
of American pragmatism through the general critique of epistemology-centered 
philosophy.  Though Emerson was criticized for a lack of method and denigrated by 
some critics as a mere writer of aphorisms, he was, at least in one particular case, 
defended as a philosopher and lauded for his critique of philosophy.  John Dewey was so 
taken with Emerson’s attempt to recast philosophy that, according to Cornel West, in an 
essay on Emerson12, “his [Dewey’s] typical bland sentences become lively sparks of 
expression; his glib formulations, vivacious evocations; his flat logical constructions, 
                                                
8 Rosemary Cowan, Cornel West: The Politics of Redemption, (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), 39. 
9 Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy : A Genealogy of Pragmatism, The Wisconsin Project 
on American Writers (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989)., 25. 
10 Rosemary Cowan, Cornel West: The Politics of Redemption, (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), 44. 
11 West, The American Evasion of Philosophy : A Genealogy of Pragmatism., 9. 
12 John Dewey, “Emerson – The Philosopher of Democracy,” in The Collected Works of John Dewey 
(1882-1953), electronic version, (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press). 
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dancing, staccato metaphors and tropes.”13  It was Emerson’s imprint on him that 
provided the impetus for Dewey’s reconceptualization of philosophy, as we shall see 
below. 
 After this Emersonian “prehistory” Charles Sanders Peirce and William James 
provide the “historical emergence of American pragmatism.” West de-emphasizes 
Peirce’s mathematical logic and semiotics in favor of his more speculative ideas on 
ethics, politics, and religion and indeed claims that from Peirce’s own perspective, the 
more technical side is “inseparable from his more speculative views.”14  The text 
emphasizes Peirce’s version of “evolutionary love” or agapism, the idea that social 
evolution is not powered by a Darwinian mechanical necessity nor what he refers to as 
“the Gospel of Greed,” rather, the confluence of mechanical necessity with chance and 
most important, love, by which Peirce means “the ardent impulse to fulfil another’s 
highest impulse” as exemplified by Jesus Christ of the Christian gospels.15 
West’s highlighting of Peirce’s agapism operates as a precursor to his own 
iteration of pragmatism that contains a prophetic component, which is discussed below.  
But this emphasis also uncovers a question about the coexistence of contingency and 
revisablity with regard to scientific inquiry and tradition and dogma with regard to ethics 
and religion that must be resolved in interpreting Peirce’s pragmatism.  “The Fixation of 
Belief” (1877) and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878) were the first two essays in a 
six-part series published by Peirce in The Popular Science Monthly.  In them, we find 
what William James later called “the principle of Peirce” or the principle of scientific 
                                                
13 West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism, 72. 
14 Ibid, 42. 
15 Charles Sanders Peirce, from “Evolutionary Love.” In Louis Menand (ed.), Pragmatism, (New York:  
Vintage Books, 1997), 52. 
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inquiry.  In short, these essays begin articulating the ideas of American pragmatism that 
James would soon popularize.16  The principle of scientific inquiry that Peirce offered as 
the preferred means of “fixing” our belief was a direct criticism of the act of satisfying 
the “irritation of doubt” by clinging to the most readily available beliefs that are arrived 
at through expedience, appeals to authority, or a priori reasoning, the indubitability of 
which Peirce continually rebelled against.17   
Alongside Peirce’s commitment to scientific method is an equal commitment to 
contingency and revisability that portrays the convergence of the scientific community on 
the real as a regulative ideal that is never reached, and therefore we are to accept the best 
available version, subject to revision.18  How do we reconcile this championing of 
openness and revision in scientific inquiry with the commitment to tradition and dogma 
in religion and ethics found in Peirce’s agapism?  West answers this question with a 
biographical account of the context in which Peirce’s ideas sprout.  While, on the one 
hand, Peirce is a true “fearless intellectual pioneer” committed to the life of the mind and 
is drawn in by the possibilities of scientific inquiry including its revisability and 
contingency, on the other hand, he does not enjoy the successful academic life of his 
peer, William James -- quite the contrary.  Peirce came face-to-face with human crises in 
modern America, including homelessness and loneliness.  He was quite troubled by the 
ill effects of industrialization and professional specialization.  These modern American 
troubles become the breeding ground for Peirce’s inclusion of ideas about love and 
community in his pragmatic thought.  West concludes, 
                                                
16 See Pragmatism, ed. Louis Menand (New York:  Vintage Books, 1997) and Cornel West, The American 
Evasion of Philosophy:  A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison, WI:  University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). 
17 Charles Sanders Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” in Pragmatism, ed. Louis Menand (New York:  
Vintage Books, 1997), 7-25. 
18 West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism, 51. 
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Given this context, his personal temperament, and his burning intellectual 
vocation, Peirce embraces the Episcopal church, castigates the individualism, 
professionalism, and Americanism of his day, and thoroughly devotes himself to 
the life of the mind and the ideas of community and love.19 
 
The explanation of Peirce’s ostensive paradox does not end with this description 
of his response to industrialization, professionalization, and other modern American 
social ills.  There is an explanation offered by Peirce himself in a footnote added in 1893 
to his discussion of transubstantiation in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.”  Peirce uses the 
Catholic/Protestant debate over the Eucharist as an illustration of the importance of 
effects in the process of “fixing” our beliefs.   
It is foolish for Catholics and Protestants to fancy themselves in disagreement 
about the elements of the sacrament, if they agree in regard to all their sensible 
effects, here and hereafter. 
It appears, then, that the rule for attaining this third grade of clearness of 
apprehension is as follows:  Consider what effects, that might conceivably have 
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.  Then, our 
conception of these effects is the whole conception of the object.20 
 
This passage, especially the second paragraph, is a hallmark of early pragmatist thought, 
but it is the subsequently added footnote that lends explanation to Peirce’s simultaneous 
commitment to revision in science and tradition in religion.   
Before we undertake to apply this rule, let us reflect a little upon what it implies.  
It has been said to be a sceptical and materialistic principle.  But it is only an 
application of the sole principle logic which was recommended by Jesus; “Ye 
may know them by their fruits,” and it is very intimately allied with the ideas of 
the gospel.  We must certainly guard ourselves against understanding this rule in 
too individualistic a sense.  To say that man accomplishes nothing but that to 
which his endeavors are directed would be a cruel condemnation of the great 
bulk of mankind, who never have leisure to labor for anything but the necessities 
of life for themselves and their families.  But, without directly striving for it, far 
less comprehending it, they perform all that civilization requires, and bring forth 
another generation to advance history another step.  Their fruit, therefore, 
collective; it is the achievement of the whole people …”21 
 
                                                
19 Ibid, 48. 
20 Charles Sanders Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” in Pragmatism, ed. Louis Menand (New York:  
Vintage Books, 1997), 36. 
21 West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism, 50. 
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Here we see that the pragmatic emphasis on effects is derived by Peirce from the “logic 
of Jesus” and his underscoring of community is related to the Christian gospel.  This 
means that his agapism is not the only part of his pragmatism that draws on religious 
tradition.  Yet Peirce is aware that drawing on the principles of Jesus in order to criticize 
Darwinism would seem inconsistent to his colleagues as he claims in “Evolutionary 
Love” that “Such a confession will probably shock my scientific brethren.”22  West 
concludes that Peirce’s weaving together of Christian tradition and contingency in 
science is, in fact, what breeds American pragmatism.   
Peirce’s double consciousness of experimental inquiry and common human 
sentiments and his dual allegiance to scientific method and Christian faith serve 
as the soil upon which the seeds of American pragmatism sprout.23 
 
 It is arguable whether or not Peirce’s “dual allegiance to scientific method and 
Christian faith” was the breeding ground for American pragmatism, especially 
considering that Dewey, described by West as “The Coming-of-Age of American 
Pragmatism,”24 exchanged Christian faith for “A Common Faith” at the height of the 
articulation of his pragmatism.25  But it is clear that this kind of dual commitment forms 
the foundation of West’s pragmatism.  West is fond of Peirce’s pragmatism because his 
agapism is congruent with West’s own commitment to prophetic Christianity and, like 
Peirce, West’s Christian commitment is coupled with a pragmatic dedication to 
revisability and contingency and Emersonian evasion of epistemology-centered 
philosophy. 
                                                
22 Charles Sanders Peirce, from “Evolutionary Love” in Pragmatism, ed. Louis Menand (New York:  
Vintage Books, 1997), 55. 
23 West, The American Evasion of Philosophy : A Genealogy of Pragmatism. 49. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Steven C. Rockefeller, 
John Dewey : Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).  
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James figures into West’s work as the  
exemplary Emersonian embodiment of intellectual power, provocation, and 
personality.  He is first and foremost a moralist obsessed with heroic energies 
and reconciliatory strategies for individuals.26 
 
 
James is important for West because his professional success allowed him to become 
pragmatism’s popularizer (a role not available to Peirce due to his professional failures) 
and champion of the evasion of epistemology-centered philosophy.  Yet James’s 
pragmatism diverges from Peirce in that James’s emphasis is on individual heroic 
energies as opposed to Peirce’s commitment to the communal.  Also, while “Peirce 
applies Emersonian themes of contingency and revisability to the scientific method, 
James extends them to our personal and moral lives.”27  With regard to the latter 
difference, it is clear that West prefers James as he claims in a book published prior to 
American Evasion that one of the “major shortcomings” of American pragmatism is its 
“veneration of scientific method and the practices of the scientific community.”28  
However, West aligns himself with Peirce in the former difference as we shall see from 
his emphasis on the social in Dewey. 
 West is critical of James’s ideological centrism and gradualism.  He says that 
James “always ends by residing in the golden mean, between two extremes.”29  This is 
expressed in James’s rhetorical strategy of juxtaposing polar positions and attempting to 
collapse the differences by taking the best of both and doing away with whatever is 
leftover.  Yet, West points out that James’s “middle-of-the-roadism” relies on the 
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assumptions that reconciliation between two extremes is possible, that the compromise 
can be genial, and that such a genial compromise would be better than either extreme.30   
 It is in James’s pragmatic conception of truth that we find evidence of his 
gradualism.  West certainly adopts for his own prophetic pragmatism the Jamesian notion 
of open-endedness with regard to truth, the notion that the universe is incomplete.  West 
aligns himself with the notion of truth articulated in James’s Pragmatism. 
Truth happens to an idea, it becomes true, is made true by events.  Its verity is in 
fact an event, a process:  the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-
fication.  Its validity is the process of its valid-ation.31 
 
 With this much, West is in agreement.  However, it is James’s emphasis on 
continuity with regard to truth that West does not adopt.  James claims that a new idea 
preserves the older stock of truths with a minimum of modification, stretching 
them just enough to make them admit the novelty, but conceiving that in ways 
as familiar as the case leaves possible.  An outrée explanation, violating all our 
preconceptions, would never pass for a true account of a novelty.  We should 
scratch round industriously till we found something less eccentric.  The most 
violent revolutions in an individual’s beliefs leaves most of his old order 
standing.  New truth is always a go-between, a smoother-over of transitions.  It 
marries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a 
maximum of continuity.32 
 
It becomes clear in American Evasion that this fixation on continuity is not attractive for 
West.  It renders James politically impotent, and although he is as daring as Peirce by 
introducing revisability and contingency into his theory of truth, James’s gradualism 
leaves a bit of a sour taste in West’s mouth.  “Of course, new knowledge and truths must 
build on the old, but James’s preoccupation with continuity minimizes disruption and 
precludes subversion,” West claims.33 
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 This criticism is akin to another shortcoming West finds in James’s pragmatism, 
that is, that it is stuck in a kind of bourgeois panorama that prohibited James from seeing, 
and perhaps more importantly, addressing social ills that did not immediately bump up 
against his own middle class.  Put succinctly, West says, “James is no radical or 
revolutionary”34 and tells he tells us that this is due, in part, to James’s middle class 
experiences.   
James’s position is symptomatic of his class background, family upbringing, and 
personal temperament.  The crises he encountered were personal and existential, 
not political and economic … Therefore, James was preoccupied with the state 
of his and others’ souls, not the social conditions of their lives.35 
 
So, West applauds James as American pragmatism’s popularizer and credits him 
for following Peirce in his radical incorporation of revision and contingency in his theory 
of even though West points out the limitations of his individualism and gradualism.  It is 
curious, though, that West does not mention one of James’s most well known essays, 
“The Will to Believe.”  It is not simply the fact that the essay is among the most salient in 
James’s corpus that makes the omission noteworthy, since we have already established 
that West admits that his selections in American Evasion are handpicked for his purposes, 
rather, it is because it is easy to find traces of James’s argument in “The Will to Believe” 
sprinkled around the very foundations of prophetic pragmatism. 
 “The Will to Believe” is James’s articulation and defense of fideism and a direct 
response to the intellectual caution of William Clifford.36  James constructs the “genuine 
option” that permits assent to a belief through our “passional nature” in the absence of 
intellectual grounds that Clifford requires for any belief.  James argues that in the absence 
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of such intellectual grounds, our will or “passional nature” may be invoked, provided the 
choice is “living” as opposed to “dead,” meaning that there is some level of appeal to the 
would-be believer, the choice is “forced” as opposed to “avoidable,” and it is 
“momentous” rather than “trivial.”37  Of course, for James, religious belief constitutes 
such a “genuine option,” and not too dissimilar from “Pascal’s Wager” is James’s 
conclusion that a bit of intellectual courage is called for in such matters.  The absence of 
“The Will to Believe” in American Evasion is perplexing because, to my reading, 
prophetic pragmatism clearly draws on the fideism James expresses in his essay.    
 Aptly, John Dewey is given a prominent place in the retelling of the narrative of 
American pragmatism in American Evasion as West labels Dewey “The Coming-of-Age 
of American Pragmatism” (in fact, he is fond enough of Dewey to call him “the 
American Hegel and Marx!”38).  West finds in Dewey a corrective to James’s 
individualism. Additionally, Dewey’s social and political engagement taken together with 
what West considers to be a prodigious moral dimension in Dewey becomes a template 
for prophetic pragmatism (though West is also critical of Dewey as we shall see below).39  
The level to which Dewey valued democracy is especially attractive for West’s program.  
Hilary Putnam claims that West finds in Dewey not just an emphasis on the value of 
democracy that is congruent with West’s own but also a sense of the vigilance that real 
democracy requires. 
[L]ike West, Dewey valued democracy while refusing to shut his eyes to the 
distance we have to travel if we are to achieve real democracy.  For real 
democracy, Dewey consistently taught, is not just a matter of counting votes; it 
is the ideal of real participation in the decision-making process by those affected 
by the decisions to be made, and it requires a new kind of education, a new way 
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of applying intelligence to social problems, and what he called a “democratic 
faith,” an attitude toward individuals that manifests itself in all of one’s personal 
relations and not just in “public life.” 40 
 
More pages are dedicated to Dewey in American Evasion than to any other 
thinker, and it is clear that this is due, at least in part, to the signal West takes from 
Dewey about epistemology-evasive philosophy.  West claims that 
John Dewey is the culmination of the tradition of American pragmatism.  After 
him, to be a pragmatist is to be a social critic, literary critic, or a poet – in short, 
a participant in cultural criticism and cultural creation.  This does not mean that 
Dewey provides panaceas for philosophical problems or solutions to societal 
crises.  Rather, Dewey helps us see the complex and mediated ways in which 
philosophical problems are linked to societal crises.41 
 
This passage probably says as much about West’s pragmatism as it does Dewey’s.  West 
sees Dewey’s metaphilosophy as serving the end of reconceptualizing philosophy into an 
activity bound up with cultural production and criticism.  Prophetic pragmatism clearly 
operates with this reconceptualization, and more will be said about this below.  
West’s retelling of Dewey’s place in the narrative of American pragmatism 
begins with an exploration of Dewey’s reading of Emerson.  The reconceptualization of 
philosophy that West finds in Dewey clearly has its roots in Dewey’s response to 
Emerson.  In his essay, “Emerson – The Philosopher of Democracy,” Dewey’s tone 
reaches a rare crescendo in his defense of Emerson’s status as philosopher.  After noting 
the “condescending patronage” of Emerson by literary critics, Dewey asserts, “Perhaps 
those are nearer right, however, who deny that Emerson is a philosopher, because he is 
more than a philosopher.”42  Dewey begins his defense of Emerson by articulating the 
critique leveled against him for lack of coherent method, reducing him, in the eyes of the 
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critic, to a mere “writer of maxims and proverbs.”43  The response to such 
characterizations is rather excessive but it is telling with regard to Dewey’s 
metaphilosophical aims. 
I am not acquainted with any writer, no matter how assured his position in 
treatises upon the history of philosophy, whose movement of thought is more 
compact and unified, nor one who combines more adequately diversity of 
intellectual attack with concentration of form and effect.44  
 
West knows Dewey’s characterization of Emerson is overstated, but the point, 
ultimately for prophetic pragmatism, is that Dewey’s pragmatism takes seriously the 
Emersonian evasion of epistemology-centered philosophy and in so doing recasts 
philosophy as an activity bound up with human activity, “on the ground.”  Emerson is not 
merely a writer of aphorisms, but systematic theoretician whose method happens to be 
tethered not to a priori foundations, but to dynamic human activity.   
This reading and defense of Emerson and the subsequent refashioning of 
philosophy has its first mature expression in Dewey’s “The Need for a Recovery of 
Philosophy” (1917).  Here Dewey begins by “bemoaning the fact that the cloistered and 
conservative character of modern philosophy has produced a cultural situation in which 
‘direct preoccupation with contemporary difficulties is left to literature and politics.’”45  
This essay is Dewey’s sophisticated articulation of his aim to “evade the epistemological 
problematic of modern philosophy and thereby emancipate philosophy from its arid 
scholasticism and cultural conservatism.”46 
In addition to the Emersonian influence, Dewey’s metaphilosophy emphasizes the 
role of critical intelligence in human affairs.  This critical intelligence, for Dewey, is 
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simply the application of the scientific attitude to human problems.  Dewey makes a 
distinction between the scientific attitude and scientific method.  Critical intelligence 
distances itself from dogmatism by operating with a kind of epistemological pluralism.  It 
is not the sole property of scientific method.  Its aims are to solve human problems and 
realize potentialities.  West highlights two points with regard to Dewey and critical 
intelligence.  First, he notes that “critical intelligence is available to all peoples; it is 
neither the birthright of the highbrow nor the property of the professional.”47  Second, 
although critical intelligence makes good use of scientific method, “the results of science 
do not constitute disclosure of the real.”48  For West’s prophetic pragmatism, Dewey’s 
metaphilosophy is paramount.  Prophetic pragmatism takes up Dewey’s Emersonian 
recasting of philosophy in America and the emphasis on critical intelligence as a means 
of avoiding dogmatism with regard to scientific method. 
With this foundation, it is possible to next examine how prophetic pragmatism 
specifically employs a critical evaluation of Emerson, Peirce, James, and Dewey, and 
also how it makes use of Gramsci, Du Bois, and Niebuhr.   
Clearly, West is drawn to antifoundationalism in Emerson.  He also makes use of 
Emerson’s idea that human beings have “Promethean possibilities.”  He describes 
Emerson’s contribution to prophetic pragmatism as:  
themes of the centrality of the self’s morally laden transformative vocation; the 
necessity of experimentation to achieve the self’s aims of self-mastery and 
kinship with nature; and, the important self-creation and self-authorization.49 
 
Yet, West also says that these impulses need to be reworked with a Deweyan conception 
of creative democracy and Du Bois’s critiques of capitalist democracy.  It is this political 
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potency that West finds missing in pragmatism’s “prehistory” (Emerson) and in its 
historical emergence (Peirce and James).  However, for West, Dewey remained too tied 
to “the professional and reformist elements of the middle class” that was “seduced by two 
strong waves of thought and action; managerial ideologies of corporate liberalism and 
bureaucratic control, and Marxist ideologies of class struggle.”50  In the end, West claims 
that Dewey’s project “never really got off the ground” for these reasons.  As Putnam puts 
it, “[West’s] criticism is that Dewey called for social change from below, but did not, in 
fact, pay any real attention to that ‘below,’ to mass movements and political 
developments outside of the white American middle class.”51 
 W.E.B. Du Bois provides prophetic pragmatism with the impulse to move beyond 
these Deweyan limitations.  In fact, West claims that Du Bois offers American 
pragmatism “what it sorely lacks,” namely, an international perspective and alignment 
with the plight of the “wretched of the earth.”  Du Bois acknowledged hurdles to 
Emersonian radical democracy that Peirce, James, and Dewey did not.  West claims that 
Du Bois was influenced by American pragmatism, but by virtue of being an intellectual 
of African descent, he viewed America through different lenses than Peirce, James, and 
Dewey.  According to West, Du Bois’ work,  
illustrates the blindness and silences in American pragmatist reflections on 
individuality and democracy.  Although none of the pragmatists were fervent 
racists themselves – and most of them took public stands against racist practices 
– not one viewed racism as contributing greatly to the impediments for both 
individuality and democracy.52 
 
The attraction to pragmatism, for Du Bois, was largely animated by his sense of its 
relevance for the plight of African Americans found in the Emersonian evasion of 
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epistemology-centered philosophy.53  Du Bois, like Peirce, rebelled against a priori 
reasoning, though, for different reasons.  Du Bois claims, in his magnum opus, The Souls 
of Black Folk, that, “most Americans answer all queries regarding the Negro a priori, and 
the least that human courtesy can do is listen to evidence.”54  Here, Du Bois sees the 
privileging of a priori reasoning as a tool of oppression, the antidote for which is 
pragmatism.  This, then, leads to Du Bois’s contribution to the prophetic pragmatist 
ethos, that is to say, application of evasion of epistemology-centered philosophy to the 
plight of the wretched of the earth. 
Antonio Gramsci, not unlike Du Bois, covers what prophetic pragmatism sees as a 
blind spot in American pragmatism.  Gramsci, like West after him, saw the need to bring 
political struggle to popular cultural forms and institutions.  This leads West to comment, 
in praise of Gramsci: 
For Gramsci, ideologies of secularism or religions are less sets of beliefs and 
values, attitudes and sensibilities and more ways of life and ways of struggle 
manufactured and mobilized by certain sectors of the population in order to 
legitimate and preserve their social, political, and intellectual powers.  Hence, 
the universities and churches, schools and synagogues, mass media and mosques 
become crucial terrain for ideological and political contestation.55 
 
According to West, Gramsci suggests that philosophers are merely more conscious of 
their involvements in these “battles.” 
 For West, prophetic pragmatism occupies the discursive space between Dewey 
and Gramsci.  By this he means that Dewey’s socialism, while building upon and even 
going beyond liberalism, suffers from his failure to adequately engage Marxist ideals, 
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while Gramsci’s grip on Marxism remains tight even where it fails in politics and 
culture.56 
 Finally, Reinhold Niebuhr makes a salient contribution to prophetic pragmatism 
since West labels him “The Jamesian Cultural Critic” and claims he articulated a 
“Christian pragmatism,” the latter of which means West views him as having “one foot in 
evangelical liberal Protestantism and another in American pragmatism.” Niebuhr’s 
specific contribution to prophetic pragmatism is his “tragic perspective … as an impetus 
to moral critique of and heroic struggle in corporate liberal America.” 57  This sense of the 
tragic makes a salient contribution to prophetic pragmatism by setting it apart from 
American pragmatism and providing a means through which to temper Emersonian 
theodicy and the belief in Promethean possibilities for human beings.  Niebuhr’s 
contribution of the tragic sense in prophetic pragmatism also has specific implications for 
educational philosophy as discussed below. 
  
The Philosophical Roots of the Prophetic in Prophetic Pragmatism 
It is difficult to make exact distinctions between the pragmatist and the prophetic 
philosophical roots in West’s program.  Du Bois, Dewey, Niebuhr, and Gramsci (and 
arguably Peirce) contribute to the prophetism found in prophetic pragmatism.  However, 
in order to be more explicit about this prophetic component, it is important to consider 
what West means by the term “prophetic.”  Putnam suggests that West means the 
“language of prophecy” that one might find in “the transcendentalist sermons” by which 
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he means “the language of moral vision and absolute moral exhortation.”58  While 
Putnam’s is an accurate description of prophetic language, West’s conception of the 
prophetic begins with what he calls “prophetic thought” which he articulated in a speech 
published a few years after American Evasion.  
 There are four basic components to “prophetic thought” as Cornel West 
conceives of it.  The first, discernment, refers to a nuanced sense of history, one that 
eschews “pure traditions or pristine heritages” in favor of a “deep analytical grasp of the 
present in light of the past” that recognizes every culture as a result of “the weaving of 
antecedent cultures.”  Connection, the second component, focuses on human empathy, or 
“never losing sight of the humanity of others.”  The third component is tracking 
hypocrisy, a process that is both external and internal as it seeks to accentuate the gap 
between rhetoric and reality while maintaining a self-critical posture as well.  Finally, the 
fourth component is hope.  Here West makes a distinction.  Hope is not to be conflated 
with optimism.  He recognizes that we are “world-weary” and that we may have 
“misanthropic skeletons hanging in our closet,” but we face them by reminding ourselves 
that history is incomplete and the future is open-ended.59  
This “prophetic thought” is certainly tied to the language of moral vision that 
West finds in African American religious culture.  However, the roots of the prophetic 
are not limited to this formative part of his heritage.  Before American Evasion he 
uncovers prophetic sensibilities in the confluence of African American Christianity and 
Gramscian Marxism in Prophesy Deliverance! (1982).  More recently in his work aimed 
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at a more popular audience, he refers to the “Jewish invention of the prophetic 
commitment to justice” that happens to also be “central to both Christianity and Islam” 
and he calls this prophetism “one of the great moral moments in human history.”60  
Rosemary Cowan (2003) detects another location of the roots of the prophetic in West’s 
project.  She claims that although he only makes cursory mention of the Social Gospel 
movement in his discussions of the prophetic, there is a clear, continuous line from 
Walter Rauschenbusch (the liberal theologian central to the Social Gospel movement and 
Richard Rorty’s maternal grandfather) to West.61  She says, “Rauschenbusch believed 
that his form of social Christianity could constitute the soul of a worldwide movement for 
democracy, and in so doing he prefigures West’s attempt to use a Christian-derived 
morality to attack social evil and call for liberation and justice.”62 
With this said, locating the idea of the prophetic in West’s project is still 
somewhat of an onerous task.  His four components of prophetic thought may serve as a 
kind of heuristic device for discerning the influence of prophetism on West’s worldview, 
but it seems to fall short of fully situating the prophetic within prophetic pragmatism.  
The task becomes even more difficult as West’s corpus after American Evasion 
increasingly targets popular audiences and, as such, fails to systematically or explicitly 
build on the project of prophetic pragmatism.  After the publication of American Evasion 
in 1989, West’s work scarcely mentions “prophetic pragmatism.”  Perhaps the most 
fecund places in West’s work to mine for indications of the roots of prophetism are the 
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references to the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions of “the prophetic.”  John D. 
Caputo is helpful here as he discusses the notion of the prophetic in On Religion. 
But by “prophetic” I do not mean perfecting our predictive powers about the 
future-present, foreseeing what the future holds – as if being religious were 
something like being a weatherman.  I am referring to what is called in the 
Jewish and Christian traditions “messianic” hope and expectation, which looks 
forward to the peace and justice of the messianic age.63  
 
This messianic hope and expectation that seeks peace and justice is quite clearly 
congruent with West’s prophetism.  What gives Caputo’s articulation of the prophetic 
even more resonance with West’s project is its (perhaps surprising) use of Marx.   
Even Karl Marx, who fancied himself a cold-hearted scientist who was 
dispassionately exposing the futility of religious illusion in the name of 
revolutionary historical progress, had a bit of the wild-eyed Jewish prophet 
about him.  As anyone who knows anything about prophetic religion can see, 
Marx’s “science” of political economy … was a proscription of prophetic 
passion, of a prophetic longing for the messianic age (while he thought he was 
debunking religion).  Marx was praying and weeping for an age in which the 
rich stop feeding off the poor and making their fortunes off the bent backs of the 
defenseless people in our society, off minorities and immigrants, women and 
children.  That is the best side of Marx, the most enduring side …64 
 
West and Caputo seem to read Marx consanguineously, perhaps owing to their 
scholarship in and personal experience with religion.  Caputo’s use of Marx in his 
articulation of the prophetic meshes with prophetic pragmatism not only because West 
makes use of Marx in his project but also because, while West makes clear that he comes 
to the prophetic via prophetic Black Christianity, he also makes clear that the prophetism 
in prophetic pragmatism is available to those without a religious foundation, even while it 
is compatible with certain religious worldviews.65 
   Certainly West is interested in applying the notion of the prophetic, be it rooted 
in African American progressive Christianity, Marxism, Judaism, or the Social Gospel, to 
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an effort to energize creative democracy.  Toward this end he lists the “Jewish invention 
of the prophetic commitment to justice” as one of the three crucial traditions (the others 
are the Socratic tradition and the tragicomic tradition, the latter of which he finds in 
Anton Chekov and the blues) that can ameliorate what he views as the deterioration of 
American democratic energies and the rise of an ugly imperialism.66  Yet, regardless of 
how closely we can trace the roots of West’s prophetism or how succinctly we can 
articulate its aims in real world effects, an argument remains regarding the 
appropriateness of linking prophecy with philosophy, specifically pragmatism.  Both 
Clevis Headly67 and Richard Rorty68 reject the connection.  Headly’s objection to 
prophetic pragmatism mostly echoes Rorty’s, so I will examine the teacher’s challenge to 
the student’s project here.   
Rorty’s brilliant review of American Evasion has all the markings of a mutual 
admiration between teacher (Rorty) and former student (West).  He praises West’s 
prophetic tone and decries the American intellectual Left for being unreceptive to such a 
tone.  Yet, Rorty cannot accept the idea of the philosopher as prophet.  One reason West 
is a professor of religion and not philosophy, according to Rorty, is that, “within both 
British and American philosophy departments, people who start acting like critics are 
viewed as ‘not really philosophers.’”69  This reality is taken in stride by Rorty who 
positions himself as powerless to challenge it and without motivation to do so.  Prophets 
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are good and necessary, but they gain no advantage by being philosophers at the same 
time.  The best philosophers can do for the prophets is to act as some sort of auxiliary.  
“Pragmatist philosophy professors like Quine, Putnam, Davidson, Bernstein, and myself 
can play a social role only if they can find some prophet to whom to attach themselves.”70  
Rorty takes his cue for this modest view of the role of the philosopher from the multiple 
iterations of the analogy of clearing away the rubbish that lies in the path of clear 
thought.  It was appropriate for Dewey to marry prophetism and pragmatism because of 
the particular political and social milieu of Dewey’s time.   
[A]t the turn of the century, the intellectual right was still trying to justify 
repressive institutions in either religious or rationalist terms.  So bringing 
pragmatist arguments to bear against religious or rationalist arguments for 
political conservatism was a useful thing for James and Dewey to do.  It is less 
clear that any such arguments have a function in the United States today … 
Nowadays nobody even bothers to back up opposition to liberal reforms with 
argument.  People merely say that taxes are too high, that their brother-in-law 
would have had a better job had it not been for his company’s affirmative action 
program, and that it is time for the poor and weak to start looking after 
themselves.71 
 
Rorty criticizes West for being “enamored of the idea that his own academic 
discipline – philosophy – is somehow more closely linked to prophetic vision than are, 
say, anthropology, literary criticism, economics or art history.”72  Instead of attempting to 
marry pragmatism with prophetism, we should let philosophers clean up the rubbish and 
leave the prophetic imagination to the prophets.  “I think that it will be easier to 
encourage such [social] protest if we toss aside the last remnants of Marxist thought, and 
in particular the desire for a general theory of oppression.”73  West responded to these 
criticisms in an interview with George Yancy in 1998 by claiming that Rorty was wrong 
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to accuse him of privileging philosophy over other disciplines with regard to their linkage 
with prophetic vision.  Instead West claims that no discipline has a monopoly on 
prophetic imagination but that, “we’ve got to be able to give some fallible yet persuasive 
explanations of wealth, power and the state of weapons in our institutional and individual 
struggles to overcome forms of social misery.”74  Philosophy is one among several 
disciplines that can and should provide such explanations (West admits that he is tempted 
to make a case for art as being more closely tied to prophetism, but he is not quite willing 
to fully commit to that idea).  This answer indicates that West is neither willing nor able 
to shed his Marxist influence, as Rorty would have him do.  West agrees with Rorty that 
a general theory of oppression is not necessary but the Marxist “remnants” are 
indispensable for keeping track of social miseries.  West is able to maintain his 
pragmatist evasion of general theory by embracing Gramsci’s historicist Marxism.  “I 
think one can talk about a Gramscian strand within the Marxist tradition that is suspicious 
of general theory, which resonates with Rorty’s suspicion of general theory, but it’s still 
not a question of eliminating the remnants of Marxism per se.”75 
What is ultimately at stake here is not whether or not pragmatism and propehtism 
are congruent, but rather, what constitutes philosophy.  Rorty thinks 
professional/academic philosophy has only an auxiliary role to play in prophetic vision.  
West might even agree with this as he admits he has “a deep suspicion” of academic 
philosophy.76  Further, West does not consider himself a “professional philosopher.”77  
But he clearly does think he is “doing” philosophy, where philosophy is understood to be 
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“a certain cultural response to the world and trying to come up with holistic views, 
synoptic visions and synthetic images of how things hang together.”78  Put another way, 
Rorty’s criticisms do not seem to appreciate that West has fully committed to what he 
sees as the Jamesian and Deweyan reconceptualization of philosophy based on 
Emersonian evasion of epistemology.  Suspicion of “professional” philosophy is part and 
parcel of the Emersonian evasion that West sees James and Dewey as bringing into full 
articulation, even as they did not fully realize, in effect, that articulation.  In this way, 
prophetic pragmatism, with its inclusion of Du Bois’s alignment with the wretched of the 
earth, its adoption of a Niebuhrian sense of the tragic, and its acceptance of Gramscian 
Marxism as a kind of prophetism, is the completion of the truncated 
Emersonian/Jamesian/Deweyan recasting of philosophy.  In West’s view, to call him a 
“cultural critic” is not to exclude him from the ranks of those doing philosophy.  In fact, 
cultural production and criticism is prophetic pragmatism’s preferred mode of philo-
sophia. 
This examination of the philosophical roots of prophetic pragmatism reveals that 
West seeks to create a program that evades epistemology-centered philosophy in order to 
create cultural criticism and a call for social action.  This is evident through West’s 
highlighting the cultural critiques of Emerson, James, Dewey, Du Bois, and Niebuhr.  It 
also can be seen in West’s view of the use of theory.  In American Evasion, West rejects 
the notion that pragmatism’s antifoundationalism means that it must avoid all use of 
theory.  He views those who consider pragmatism as taking an anti-theory stance are 
simply confusing all theory with “grand theory,” which pragmatism does reject.  Instead 
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West suggests a reconceptualization of theory as a means to “deploy thought as a weapon 
to enable more effective action.”79  His whole project, as he sees it, depends on this use of 
theory.  “If prophetic pragmatism is ever to become more than a conversational subject 
matter for cultural critics in and out of the academy, it must inspire progressive and 
prophetic social motion.”80  Accenting the gap between rhetoric and reality, alignment 
with the disenfranchised, vigilantly and creatively working toward real democracy are 
constitutive of this social motion West wants prophetic pragmatism to inspire.  It is this 
notion that leads Putnam to say in response to American Evasion, the text in which 
prophetic pragmatism is unveiled,  
[T]o appreciate any of West’s contributions requires just what it requires to 
appreciate the contributions of the thinkers he writes about and (critically, to be 
sure) applauds … namely to experience the writing as a challenge, a challenge 
to one’s whole mode of life.” 81 (emphasis in original) 
 
 
 
Prophetic Pragmatism’s Tragic Sense and Philosophy of Education 
 “Prophetic pragmatism’s” tragic sense is especially useful as an educational 
philosophy.  Its emphasis on human agency makes it a helpful corrective to conceptions 
of the tragic sense of education that go so far in tempering utopian impulses or 
Promethean possibilities that they leave those involved in educational processes 
handcuffed primarily to chance and only the occasional volitional impact.82  The sense of 
the tragic in prophetic pragmatism begins with the assertion that “tragic” is a term with 
many meanings.  For “prophetic pragmatism,” the idea of tragedy is set apart from the 
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Greek notion in which “the action of ruling families generates pity and terror in the 
audience” and is rather tethered to “a society that shares collective experience of common 
metaphysical and social meanings.”83   “Prophetic pragmatism’s” sense of the tragic 
emanates from what West calls the modern context of tragedy “… in which ordinary 
individuals struggle against meaninglessness and nothingness” within “a fragmented 
society with collapsing metaphysical meanings.”84  This adaptation of tragedy to the 
modern context provides the criterion by which prophetic pragmatism accepts or rejects 
the sense of the tragic found in the various thinkers in American pragmatism. 
 West is critical of Emersonian pragmatism’s optimistic theodicy.  He admits that 
Emerson did have a sense of the tragic, but “the way he formulated the relation of human 
powers and fate, human agency and circumstances, human will and constraints made it 
difficult for him … to maintain a delicate balance between excessive optimism and 
exorbitant pessimism regarding human capacities.”85  West argues that only “the early 
[Sidney] Hook and Niebuhr –their work in the early thirties – maintain the desirable 
balance.”86  This balance is important for West since without it there is no way to 
confront what he calls “the complex relations between tragedy and revolution, tradition 
and progress.”87  Prophetic pragmatism recognizes historical human atrocities and 
brutalities as well as “present-day barbarities.”  In fact, it is this recognition that requires 
of prophetic pragmatism a conception of the tragic.  It must not avoid these facts of the 
human condition.  Yet, the conception of the tragic for the “prophetic pragmatist” is 
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rooted in the modern context of tragedy, and for West this means not only the context of 
a fragmented society with collapsing metaphysical meanings, but also, and “more 
pointedly, the notion of the ‘tragic’ is bound to the idea of human agency, be the agent a 
person of rank or a retainer, a prince or a pauper.”88    
 West’s sense of the tragic is both critical of Emersonian theodicy and yet gives 
primacy to the agency of all persons.  He claims that the Reinhold Niebuhr of the 1930’s 
best exemplifies this complex sense of the tragic.  Niebuhr’s 
struggle with liberal Protestantism … forced him to remain on the tightrope 
between Promethean romanticism and Augustinian pessimism.  In fact, Niebuhr 
never succumbs to either, nor does he ever cease to promote incessant human 
agency and will against limits and circumstances.89  
 
 Thus, it is primarily from the early Niebuhr that prophetic pragmatism derives its sense 
of the tragic.  What makes West’s treatment of the Niebuhrian “strenuous mood” (and 
consequently the prophetic pragmatist conception of the tragic) useful for philosophers of 
education is that it is unwilling to sidestep real and unavoidable human atrocities, some 
of which are admittedly not transformable; while at the same time maintaining “utopian 
impulses” through an unfettered belief in the agency of all persons.  West anticipates that 
this may make his sense of the tragic seem a bit schizophrenic – a Sisyphean outlook in 
which human resistance to evil fails on the one hand, and the promotion of a quest for 
utopia on the other.  However, West claims that “prophetic pragmatism denies Sisyphean 
pessimism and utopian perfectionism.  Rather it promotes the possibility of human 
progress and the human impossibility of paradise.”90  This is a subtle but profound 
movement away from a navigation between excessive pessimism and a pie-in-the-sky 
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utopianism to a kind of paradigmatic shift which includes replacing the polar ideas with a 
singular conception of the evil in the world; an appreciable portion of which might be 
ameliorated through human agency, precisely because it is a product of human agency.   
Prophetic pragmatism is a form of tragic thought in that it confronts candidly 
individual and collective experiences of evil in individuals and institutions – 
with little expectation of ridding the world of all evil.  Yet, it is a kind of 
romanticism in that it holds many experiences of evil to be neither inevitable nor 
necessary but rather the results of human agency, i.e., choices and actions.91 
 
 So, prophetic pragmatism as a form of tragic thought is suitable as an educational 
philosophy as it admits that educators are always working with incomplete information 
and that some of the obstacles in the way of real educative experiences are not 
transformable. Yet, in the end, it claims we can hope for more than just the occasional 
chance educative impact while we maintain the tragic sense.  We can hope for real 
meliorative progress, even in the face of evils since some of those evils are human 
constructions.  Put another way, instead of rooting the sense of the tragic in the notion of 
the passive spectator of events caused by uncontrollable fate, West begins with the 
concept of the participant in events of which we are the partial cause.  This can be a lens 
through which we view Nel Noddings’ position on the educational mantra “all children 
can learn” about which she has reservations.  Although she understands and aligns herself 
with what she perceives to be the spirit of this declaration (that we should not siphon off 
students into categories of potential to learn based on race, gender, or social class), she 
insists that it can have rather pernicious effects when taken in a naively optimistic sense 
since not all individual children will be able to learn everything educators might like to 
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teach them.92  Prophetic pragmatism lends theoretical explanation to Noddings’ treatment 
of this idea by claiming a “third way” that is not naïve optimism, nor excessive 
pessimism; rather it is a form of tragic thought that takes seriously human failings and 
atrocities while maintaining an emphasis on human agency and what Dewey called 
“democratic faith.” 
 West gestures toward the idea of prophetic pragmatism as an educational 
philosophy in speeches delivered to audiences of teachers.  When addressing a group of 
educators in 2000 he opened by articulating his hope that he would say something that 
unnerved or unsettled them.   
Very much like the experience that we want with each and every one of our 
students for them to recognize that, if only for a second, their worldview rests on 
pudding.  That kind of existential vertigo, that kind of tragic qualm that goes 
hand in hand with the best kind of education.93 
 
This tragic qualm that West claims is constitutive of “the best kind of education” is 
congruent with the sense of the tragic in “prophetic pragmatism.”  An education that 
comes face-to-face with the fallibility of one’s parochial assumptions and the instability 
of one’s worldview is a prophetic pragmatist one.  It draws on pragmatist tradition of 
anti-foundationalism and adds the prophetic sense of the tragic, with its emphasis on 
human agency.  West summarizes what we might conceive of as a “prophetic pragmatist” 
theory of education in a speech to the National Council of Teachers of English. 
Good teaching is all about unsettling perspectives and unstiffening prejudices 
and allowing persons to be emancipated and liberated from whatever parochial 
cocoon they find themselves in at the moment.  Each and every one of us is 
always linked to some parochial cocoon; we are never free.  It is a perennial 
process that takes courage.94 
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Expanding Prophetic Pragmatism with a Theory of the Self:  Mead 
and West 
 
 It would be a mistake to suggest that the absence of George Herbert Mead in 
prophetic pragmatism is an oversight on West’s part since he is clear that the focus of his 
program is a call to political and social action/cultural criticism.  He certainly appreciates 
Mead’s contribution to American pragmatism as West mentions Mead in American 
Evasion as one whose omission from the text’s “highly selective interpretation” of the 
pragmatist tradition is not a negative statement on his importance.95  At the same time, 
prophetic pragmatism does seem loosely to suggest a theory of the self in the variety of 
ways it emphasizes human agency and social action.  Again, West’s project does not 
necessarily require the development of such a theory but such a move could be fruitful.   
 Mead’s dialogical theory of the self is not only appropriate for the 
reconceptualization of prophetic pragmatism as an educational philosophy because of 
Mead’s place in the history of American pragmatism, but also because educational 
theorists are often concerned with ideas about identity formation.  Mead’s theory is 
congruent with the major ideas that inform prophetic pragmatism and can contribute to 
this recasting of West’s project for educational philosophy. 
 Mead’s theory begins with the idea that the self develops out of social and 
symbolic interaction and that this interaction is constituted by the construction of and 
interaction with “the generalized other.”  Mead describes this by saying, “[it is] the 
organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of self.”  He 
illustrates this idea with the analogy of a baseball team.  Each individual player’s actions 
are influenced by the internalization of an expectation of how all other players playing 
                                                
95 West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism, 6. 
 33
the various other positions might act under a given set of circumstances.96  Phil 
Carspecken explains the process by saying that the formation of the “generalized other” 
develops in conjunction with gaining “consistent understandings of one’s self from the 
perspective of others.”97  This leads to a differentiation of the self into what Mead calls 
the “I” and the “me.”  The “me” reflects the “generalized other” and the “I’ is a kind of 
response to the “me.”  This “I/me” distinction reflects the dialectical relationship between 
the society and the individual.  So we can say that the “me” is the part of self that is 
capable of being objectivated in ways the “I” is not.  In fact, the act of objectivation 
requires distinction from the “I” which is, in part, the reason why the “I” cannot be 
objectivated since each objectivation has an “I” necessarily distinguished from it.  Put 
another way, the “I” is never an object of immediate experience.  We cannot observe the 
“I’ directly, we can only “know” it as an awareness of the past, never as the subject of 
present experience.  Mead says, “If you ask, then, where directly in your own experience 
the ‘I’ comes in, the answer is that it comes in as a historical figure.  It is what you were a 
second ago that is the ‘I’ of the ‘me.’"98   
 The “I” and the “me” must exist together, but once both are in place, the “I” is 
only a limit case to privileged access but is within privileged access only as a trace. 
One cannot even really notice or think of the “I” without actually bringing the “me” into 
play since the “I” is the pure subject that resists efforts to represent it.  In other words, the 
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“I” essentially has no qualities, once we begin to speak or think of it in any context, it 
instantly becomes the “me” and so the “I” behaves like Derrida’s “trace.” 
 The result of this “I/me” distinction with regard to identity formation is that since 
the “I” is more strongly distinguished from action, we can be more certain about the 
nature of our “me” than of our “I” (this applies to a sense of worth as well) and therefore 
there is always something fundamentally uncertain about the self.  This identity issue of 
uncertainty about the self and a sense of worth of the “I” alongside the more certain “me” 
that is the result of socio-symbolic interaction could be conceived of as theory of the self 
that is consistent with a tragic form of thought that acknowledges the “existential vertigo” 
that accompanies uncertainty of the self, the uncertainty of the worth of the “I” and as 
such fits prophetic pragmatist sensibilities.  Expanding prophetic pragmatism in order to 
include Mead’s dialogical theory of the self, then, is effective for recasting West’s project 
as an educational philosophy as it offers a way to think about identity formation that is 
informed by a prophetic pragmatist sense of the tragic and shares the emphasis on the 
social nature of human development. 
 
 
A Concern About Prophetic Pragmatism as an Educational Philosophy  
While prophetic pragmatism is suitable as an educational philosophy, there is a 
philosophical issue that is troubling when considering its reconceptualization for 
education theory.  While the idea of a clear moral vision and even the use of moral 
language may not be problematic for a field such as education that is largely tied to 
secular institutions, the prophetism in West’s project (and therefore the moral vision) is 
so tightly bound up in religious narratives that some work will have to be done in order to 
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make prophetic pragmatism more efficacious as an educational philosophy.  West is clear 
that his Christianity, rooted in the prophetic Black church is neither dogmatic nor 
infallible.  In fact, he admits that it is possible that he is being deluded with regard to his 
Christian faith.  So, by not committing his Christianity to absolutism, he is able to create 
a kind of “historicist prophetism” that clings to a skepticism and even an agnostic sense 
about what historical beings can know about the acts of a transhistorical God.  In the end, 
West’s Christianity is a faith, part belief, part doubt, that he uses as a tool for the 
amelioration of social justice.  Yet, for all the avoidance of dogmatism and narrowness 
(West even has an ecumenical sense in his work as he attempts to highlight congruence 
between Christianity, Islam, and Judaism) prophetic pragmatism remains steeped in 
religious narratives and unfortunately, while West explains his personal interaction with 
faith as being fallible, he does not fully work out a way for the religious narratives he 
draws upon to be intelligible outside the religious community.  This creates a problem for 
casting prophetic pragmatism as a public educational philosophy.  It seems that the 
prophetism in West’s project will have to be mediated in such a way that its prophetic 
sensibilities can be accessed by those who come from different religious backgrounds 
than West and nonreligious persons and communities as well.   
Michael Perry provides a template for mediating religious narratives into ideas 
intelligible to a wider audience with his work on religion and politics.  Perry’s project of 
carving out a place for religion and morality in American politics finds its practical 
expression in “ecumenical political dialogue.”  He establishes situational/contextual and 
existential prerequisites to such dialogue in chapter 6 of Love & Power.99  The most 
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salient situational/contextual prerequisite is the existence of political community.  Perry 
claims that, “[successful ecumenical political dialogue] surely depends on the extent to 
which [a person] enjoys such things as material well-being, personal security, educational 
attainment, and political freedom, including freedom of speech and freedom of 
religion.”100   
Beyond the situational/contextual prerequisites that seem to emphasize real 
democratic sensibilities, Perry articulates three categories of existential prerequisites for 
ecumenical political dialogue.  The first is a set of basic dialogic virtues, including 
cognitive competence, respect, empathy, honesty, and sincerity.101  Second are the 
attitudes of fallibilism and pluralism.  By fallibilism Perry means adherence to self-
critical rationality.  By pluralism he means the acceptance of the idea that variety deepens 
insight, which in this context means that moral pluralism can be more insightful than 
monism.  The third category includes the virtues of public intelligibility and public 
accessibility.  Perry’s public intelligibility involves articulating one’s position such that 
those who “speak a different religious or moral language” can understand the position 
which happens through the use of a “shared” or “mediated” language.  Public 
accessibility, then, is the result of successfully navigating one’s argument between the 
pitfalls of sectarianism and authoritarianism. Sectarian means a position that “relies on 
experiences or premises that have little if any authority beyond the confines of one’s own 
moral or religious community,” and authoritarian means a position that “relies on persons 
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or institutions that have little if any authority beyond the confines of one’s own 
community.” 102 (emphasis mine) 
In order for prophetic pragmatism to gain credence as an educational philosophy, 
it seems that its source of the prophetic sense, Christian and Jewish narratives, will have 
to be carefully submitted to something like Perry’s existential prerequisites for 
“ecumenical political dialogue.”  Without a kind of mediated language that can make the 
prophetism in West’s project intelligible to nonreligious or other alternative frameworks, 
it will be difficult for prophetic pragmatism as an educational philosophy to make 
complete sense to the whole of its intended audience.  That being said, it does seem 
possible that the work of mediation, attitudes of fallibilism and pluralism, public 
intelligibility and public accessibility could be applied to the religious narratives that are 
so strongly linked to West’s notion of the prophetic.  Once those narratives are reworked 
in this way, prophetic pragmatism can be recast as an educational philosophy that 
emphasizes antifoundatinalism, values real democracy, aligns itself with the plight of the 
disenfranchised and marginalized, articulates a clear moral vision and commitment to 
justice, and employs a sense of the tragic that tempers utopianism while maintaining an 
emphasis on human agency.  Indeed, the prophetic pragmatist educational philosophy is a 
kind of “democratic faith.” 
 
Hip-Hop and Philo-sophia 
Any serious attempt at defining hip-hop or hip-hop culture must resist monolithic 
descriptions of its artists, artifacts, and audience.  Mainstream media, politicians, 
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teachers, and academics alike are prone to articulate severely truncated notions of hip-
hop, the result of which has been a limited and dualistic discourse in the marketplace of 
ideas on popular culture.  On the one hand, alarmists accuse hip-hop of a deleterious 
influence on youth.  Hip-hop, to this way of thinking, valorizes violence and misogyny, 
derogates authority, and combines mindless lyrics with unoriginal music.  These opinions 
are, in most cases, informed exclusively by media images, rap music videos, stereotypes 
of racialized, hypersexual bodies, and cursory examination of rap lyrics from commercial 
radio.  On the other hand, progressives who defend hip-hop tend to limit their rhetoric to 
its counterhegemonic possibilities in socio-political terms.  These arguments are largely 
focused on “conscious rap” or “knowledge rap,” the lyrical content of which typically 
thematizes counterhegemony.  This subgenre is not typically commercially successful 
(although there are noted exceptions to this rule).  The so-called Golden Age of hip-hop 
(roughly the mid-1980s to the early 1990s) and “underground” artists are the focus of this 
type of defense of hip-hop.  This bifurcation of the discourse crowds out more complete 
examinations of hip-hop culture and serious aesthetic evaluation of its artifacts.103  
Richard Shusterman’s venerable “The Fine Art of Rap,” in his Pragmatist Aesthetics 
(2000) and Guthrie P. Ramsey, Jr.’s “Santa Claus Ain’t Got Nothin’ On This!: Hip-Hop 
Hybridity and the Black Church Muse,” in his Race Music (2003) are two such aesthetic 
examinations that should not get lost amidst the ubiquity of the more monolithic 
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treatments of hip-hop.104  I discuss both works below and adopt and expand Shusterman’s 
aesthetic categories for examining hip-hop as a postmodern art form. 
 
Hard Livin’ Mixed with Cristal Sippin’: Hip-Hop as Culture 
Examining hip-hop’s connection with philosophy must begin by avoiding the 
dualistic discourse and monolithic conceptions by making inquiry into hip-hop as a 
culture complete with multiple streams of style, rhetoric, values, socio-political 
commitments, and aesthetic sensibilities.  Part of hip-hop culture is, no doubt, 
reinscription of hegemony through impetuous patriarchy and misogyny, glorification of 
conspicuous consumption, and perpetuation of racialized stereotypes.  Another 
component of hip-hop culture is the counterhegemonic “conscious rap” complete with 
progressive and radical socio-political rhetoric.  However, limiting the discourse to these 
two sides of the same coin is to treat hip-hop merely as a set of products and doing so 
necessarily fails to fully appreciate the culture qua culture.  This mistake takes its most 
familiar form in the conflation of hip-hop culture and rap music.  Rap music is not 
reducible to hip-hop culture, though it is a product of the culture.  Other products have 
historically included graffiti tagging, breakdancing, and DJing, while later hip-hop 
became associated with so-called spoken word poetry as discussed below.  More 
important, hip-hop can be a description of something one does.  Much like the sport of 
basketball has as its most commodified form or “product,” the NBA (National Basketball 
Association), hip-hop culture has commercial rap music as its most recognized product.  
Yet, basketball is not limited to the product of the NBA since anyone can enjoy shooting 
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baskets or playing pick-up games at any local gym, park, or private residence with a 
hoop.  In the same way, hip-hop kids can carry notebooks and scribble rhymes on trains 
and spit them in the school lunchroom or locker room or headz can gather in ciphers and 
trade rhymes or spontaneously freestyle at a party, all of which may bear only a tenuous 
resemblance to commercial rap music.  Just like it is possible for people to enjoy playing 
basketball and be simultaneously critical of the NBA, there are hip-hoppers that are 
distinguishable from and are critical of commercial rap music. 
Hip-hop cannot be reduced to rap music or to one particular rhetorical stream.  
There is, in my view, an internal conversation in hip-hop culture that is constitutive of its 
resistance to simple characterizations.  Even within some commercially successful rap 
there are internal critiques of the misogyny and conspicuous consumption in hip-hop, or 
the general wackness of some MCs.  Shusterman, though he gives hip-hop its most 
sympathetic and sophisticated aesthetic analysis, characterizes this internal conversation 
as a set of “troubling contradictions.”105  Yet, I take this kind of internal dialogue that 
hip-hop operates with as a characteristic that fortifies its status as a culture.  Consider 
Brian Fay’s conception of culture from Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science:  A 
Multicultural Approach.106  Here Fay builds on Kenneth Burke’s (1957) idea of culture as 
conversation. 
Cultures are neither coherent nor homogenous nor univocal nor peaceful.  They 
are inherently polygot, conflictual, changeable, and open.  Cultures involve 
constant processes of reinscription and of transformation in which their diverse 
and often opposing repertoires are re-affirmed, transmuted, exported, 
challenged, resisted, and re-defined.  This process is inevitable because it is 
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inherent in what it means for active beings to learn and apply cultural meanings, 
and in the ideational nature of culture itself.107 
 
 We can also make sense of this internal and sometimes conflictual conversation in 
hip-hop through Anthony Giddens’ idea of “structuration.”  The theory states that when 
agents act they draw upon available cultural themes in the composition of their acts.  The 
resulting acts will often produce innovations with respect to the way these themes are 
configured and claimed.  The milieu from which actors draw is called “structure” by 
Giddens but at the same time, he says that “structure” is nothing but the outcome of 
actions.  Therefore, “structure” for Giddens is “the medium and outcome of action.”  
Finally, because structure is always undergoing innovation, he calls the process by which 
cultural structures are continuously drawn upon, reproduced, iterated, and modified 
“structuration.”108 
Fay’s conception of culture and Giddens’ theory of structuration help us to 
understand hip-hop in ways that reveal the criticisms above to be misplaced.  First of all, 
the internal conversation in hip-hop that is often conflictual shows that certain 
manifestations of hip-hop expression are indeed aimed at confronting those hip-hop 
iterations that would reinscribe various forms of hegemony.  Also, Giddens’ structuration 
makes sense of the way hip-hoppers constantly draw on a pool of cultural resources and 
produce innovations when they act.  These innovations manifest themselves in hip-hop’s 
rapid creation and trasnsmittance of new variations in vernacular and sartorial style.  This 
suggests that some criticisms leveled at hip-hop fail to recognize or appreciate its status 
                                                
107 Ibid, 61. 
108 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, (Berkley:  
University of California Press, 1986). 
 42
as a complex cultural system within which actors draw upon cultural themes and produce 
innovations when these themes are claimed.  
 
The Roots of Hip-Hop:  The Creation Myth 
So, what exactly is hip-hop culture and how did it begin?  The generally accepted 
story of the origin of what we now call hip-hop is traced in Tricia Rose’s seminal work 
on rap music and Black culture.109  Hip-hop was born out of a very specific leveling of 
power; the 1970s construction of the Cross Bronx Expressway chased black and Latino 
families from their homes and into the insidious hands of “slum lords” where they were 
left with little to no socio-economic and political resources.110  In turn, the local youth 
produced artistic responses that contributed to a kind of counterhegemonic culture 
consisting of what hip-hoppers now call “the elements”: "DJ-ing," "breaking," "MC-ing," 
and graffiti art.  Rose also contends that three central aesthetic concepts that began with 
these elements animate hip-hop culture; flow, layering, and ruptures in line.  More 
important, she claims that these concepts are a “blueprint for social resistance and 
affirmation:  creat[ing] sustaining narratives, accumulat[ing] them, layer[ing], 
embellish[ing] and transform[ing] them.”111   
Jeff Chang’s narrative of the hip-hop generation is a more detailed social history 
that mostly embraces Rose’s assertions and adds several layers of depth to the historical 
account.  Chang situates the proliferation of hip-hop culture within a variety of social, 
political, and cultural phenomena throughout the 1970s, ‘80s, and ‘90s including the 
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1977 World Series, the shooting of four Black teenagers on a train by self-appointed 
“subway vigilante,” Bernhard Goetz in 1984, the 1986 beating and murder of a young 
Trinidadian American in the Howard Beach area of Queens, and the infamous 1991 
Rodney King beating in Los Angeles.  But instead of beginning with the South Bronx, 
Chang traces hip-hop’s roots back to Jamaican “dub” music and the early experiences of 
Clive Campbell (known to hip-hoppers as DJ Kool Herc) in Trenchtown.  Chang claims 
that Trenchtown is to hip-hop what Mississippi is to the blues and New Orleans is to jazz 
and he quotes Herc as proclaiming, “Them said nothing good ever come outta 
Trenchtown.  Well, hip-hop came out of Trenchtown!”112   
Chang calls the story of Herc and his sister’s back to school party in the rec room 
of their apartment building on 1520 Sedgwick Avenue in the West Bronx in 1973, a 
“creation myth.”113  The Campbells had moved to New York from Jamaica 1967 and 
Herc’s father, Keith Campbell, was a sponsor for a local R&B band and had at his 
disposal a Shure P.A. system.  Herc figured out how to rig the system to get the most 
“juice” out of it and so impressed his father that soon Herc was DJing intermissions for 
his father’s band.  But Herc’s real path to fame, according to the creation myth, began 
with that Shure P.A. system at the back to school party in the rec room.  Herc’s sister 
came up with the idea for the party in order to earn some money for some fresh back to 
school clothes.  What neither Herc nor his sister knew was that the back to school party 
would beget the house party which would beget the block party and that this whole 
trajectory with the DJ cueing up multiple turntables to repeat the break beats and amping 
up the crowd with the microphones that eventually spawned the MC was the beginning of 
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hip-hop.  The first block party was in the summer of 1974.  After that, there was no going 
back to the rec room.114  Herc became famous in the Bronx for his DJing and continued 
to play larger and larger block parties while experimenting with what would eventually 
become known as “the elements” of hip-hop.  According to Chang 
Herc wanted to summon the same kind of excitement he felt as a pickney down 
yard.  Along with his immigrant friend Coke La Rock, he distinguished their 
crew from the disco DJs by translating the Kingstonian vibe of sound system 
DJs … Herc hooked up his mics to a Space Echo box, yard dance style.  They 
set off their dances by giving shout-outs and dropping little rhymes.  They 
developed their own slang.115 
 
 This Jamaican dub-influenced aesthetic would be rounded out with what became 
one of hip-hop’s most important animating features – the break beat.  By studying the 
dancers at the parties, Herc astutely noticed that people would get most hyped during 
instrumental breaks when the rhythm section of the band on the record was emphasized.  
As Chang says, “Forget melody, chorus, songs – it was all about the groove, building it, 
keeping it going.  Like a string theorist, Herc zeroed in on the fundamental vibrating loop 
at the heart of the record, the break.”116  So, Herc developed a DJing technique that he 
called “the Merry-Go-Round” using two copies of the same record and cueing them to 
extend the break beat.  This combination of block parties, large and powerful sound 
systems, DJing, MCing, new slang, and break beats has subsequently earned DJ Kool 
Herc the title, “The Father.” 
 
Black English, Black Expression, and the Linguistic Precursors of Hip-Hop 
 Guthrie P. Ramsey links hip-hop to other Black musical and stylistic antecedents.  
His list includes the typical connections with Black homiletics and jazz, but he also 
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includes double-dutch chants, scat singing and vocalese, and courtship rituals as 
constituting the roots of hip-hop style.117  Even more interestingly, Ramsey claims that 
Zora Neale Hurston adumbrated hip-hop aesthetic sensibilities as early as 1933 in her 
article, “Characteristics of Negro Expression.”   
These qualities and tendencies [that Hurston articulated that are constitutive of 
hip-hop] include a dramatic mode of presentation; the mimicry and revision of 
previous expressions; the will to ornament convention through improvisation; an 
additive approach to “languaging” that inspires dense narratives with dense 
layers of meanings; male braggadocio; angularity and asymmetry; frank 
approaches to sexuality; and the importance of local cultural space, among 
others.118 
 
While the inclusion of Zora Neale Hurston in a discussion of hip-hop is admittedly 
ostensibly anachronistic, this list of characteristics unequivocally applies to hip-hop 
forms of expression.  This means, of course, that hip-hop expression is bound up in Black 
American forms of expression broadly, and certainly in Black American language. 
Just a couple of years before hip-hop was first recorded and commercialized, 
Geneva Smitherman traced the roots and broke down the semantics and modes of 
discourse in Black English.119  Smitherman, who with this and her subsequent work has 
become a towering figure in sociolinguistics, claims that Black semantics flow from four 
traditions, “West African language background; servitude and oppression; music and 
‘cool talk’; the traditional black church.”120  Many common English words have 
etymological roots in Africa, and Smitherman points out some of the most recognizable 
examples like yam, cola, goober, jazz, and juke (as in juke-box).  In addition to the words 
that found their way from West African languages such as Wolof, Mandingo, Ibo, and 
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Yoruba to American Black English, linguistic processes of the West African sort can be 
found in Black English.   
An example would be the word bad meaning “good” in Black Semantics.  This 
linguistic reversal process, using negative terms with positive meanings, is 
present in a number of African languages … This kind of Black Idiom 
exemplifies words that are loan-translation (calques), in which the literal 
meaning of the African phrase is retained in Black English, though not always 
the exact word itself.121 
 
Black semantics are also rooted in the experience of servitude and oppression.  Put 
another way, Africans enslaved and oppressed in America had to create linguistic 
navigational tools to code or disguise speech in the presence of the white oppressor.  
Smitherman notes, “Since slaves were forced to communicate in the white man’s tongue, 
they had to devise ways of runnin it down that would be powerful and meaningful to the 
black listener, but harmless and meaningless to any whites who might overhear their 
rap.”122  The need to find new ways of “runnin down” English produced veiled usage 
most notably found in the coded language of some of the Negro spirituals.   Of course the 
spirituals are connected to a third source mentioned by Smitherman, the traditional Black 
church.  The language of the Black church is animated by a conception of soul that is 
preoccupied with the spiritual world vis-à-vis the material world.  Smittherman claims 
that the Black church was the location of a kind of language that articulated this soul that 
resulted from the confluence of African worldviews and sensibilities and the white man’s 
religion in which New World Africans found some measure of “home” as they 
appropriated it for their purposes.  The emphasis on spirit, long suffering, and hope (read: 
“gettin ovuh”) came to influence secular Black culture in addition to animating the 
worldviews of church folks.  Soul, as a result, influenced the language of the Black 
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church and that language affected Black English broadly.  As Smitherman masterfully 
illustrates, 
The belief that the human soul transcends material reality, the firm commitment 
to the triumph of the human spirit over adversity, the certainty that there’s a God 
on high who may not move the mountain, but will give you strength to climb – 
such are the fundamental propositions of the traditional African world view 
transposed to the African-American’s Judaeo-Christian context in the New 
World.  It is, after all, only a short distance from “sacred” Clara Ward’s “I’m 
climbin high mountains tryin to git Home’ to “secular” Curtis Mayfield’s “keep 
on pushin/cain’t stop now/move up a little higher/someway or somehow.”123 
 
Curtis Mayfield leads appropriately to a fourth tradition from which Black semantics 
flow – what Smitherman labels, “music and ‘cool talk.’”  This suggests (and Smitherman 
confirms) that “cool talk” mostly emanates from Black musical expression.  Words and 
phrases Black music has given to Black English include the aforementioned, jazz, hot, 
cool, cooking, doin it to death, gig, and funky.124  With hip-hop, arguably to a greater 
extent than either jazz or blues, musicians and artists continue to feed the Black English 
lexicon.  Words like bling, dope, word, and others that got their first public airing through 
hip-hop have now become completely incorporated into mainstream American slang. 
 Certainly hip-hop language draws not just on Black musical tradition but on all 
four of the traditions that feed Smitherman’s conception of Black semantics.  The loan-
translations of West African words, including the usage reversals are ubiquitous in hip-
hop (“not bad meaning bad but bad meaning good” in Run-DMC’s “Peter Piper” is an 
early and classic example).  The language and stylistic expressions of the Black church 
and their influence on hip-hop is well rehearsed in Ramsey and elsewhere.  The language 
rooted in the experience of oppression, while certainly informing it, takes a slightly 
different turn in hip-hop.  Hip-hop vernacular is rooted in the expression of Black and 
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Brown people, but it is also accessible by individuals of other groups who are down 
enough to immerse themselves in the culture.  The coding in hip-hop language, therefore, 
serves the purpose of talking past those who are not down.  It is also coded generationally 
as much as it is ethnically.   
 
And It Don’t Stop:  Contemporary Hip-Hop Culture 
 What we refer to as hip-hop culture today has evolved prodigiously since the 
days of the block parties in the South Bronx.  The combination of DJ-ing and MC-ing 
produced rap; once a strictly underground musical form that relied exclusively on live 
performance has today become a hyper-commodified, multi-billion dollar international 
phenomenon tethered to the recording and music video industries.  The bravado in early 
hip-hop manifested itself in tongue-in-cheek proclamations from ghetto people about one 
day having luxury cars and expensive jewelry that marked exorbitant contrasts from their 
lived realities.  The contemporary hip-hop bravado includes flaunting one’s real 
“cheddar,” “ice,” and “bling”; money, diamonds, jewelry, as well as cars and Cristal 
champagne.  Today, hip-hop artists of the commercially successful variety either really 
own these things or at least have access to them for the purposes of music videos.   
 However, the evolution of hip-hop from a localized seizing of public space for the 
purposes of “social resistance and affirmation” by disenfranchised youth to a powerful 
international corporate phenomenon is not a simple, linear move from resistance to 
commodification.  While commercially successful hip-hop artists often evince a more 
materialist textual direction than their predecessors through their meretricious flaunting, 
the counterhegemonic sensibilities are still alive and have arguably grown in 
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sophistication in the form of “conscious rappers,” “spoken word artists” (these categories 
sometimes describe the same person or group), and a thriving underground scene.  The 
culture is also complicated by the possibility that even the most commodified forms of 
hip-hop reflect a kind of guerilla entrepreneurialism that was a nascent part of hip-hop 
from the beginning.  Also, when hip-hop kids from ghettos get record deals and make 
“mad paper” they are essentially “flippin’ the script” (one of hip-hop earliest mantras) 
through the complete reversal of ghetto (mis)fortunes.   
There is more evidence that hip-hop culture has grown in complexity.  From the 
beginning, hip-hop has included a kind of patriarchy that, in its worst instances, has 
spiraled into misogyny.  Also, rap music, though rooted in the Black aesthetic 
tradition,125is consumed by ethnic groups across the board.   That white consumers 
account for about 80% of hip-hop music sales is almost a standard industry line, though 
this figure has been recently and rigorously contested.126  The culture has invaded the 
political arena. The Hip-Hop Action Network of mogul Russell Simmons (founder of Def 
Jam records) boasts gaudy numbers on its website (hhan.org) of new young voter 
registrations through its efforts in metropolitan areas around the country (114,000 in St. 
Louis is the most recent figure at the time of this writing).  Finally, the lines between hip-
hop culture and the larger youth culture have become blurred as its music dominates the 
Billboard charts and its style monopolizes youth fashion.  It has even found a home in 
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many daily newspapers as Aaron McGruder’s syndicated comic strip “The Boondocks” 
consistently deals with hip-hop themes and employs hip-hop sensibilities.  Contemporary 
hip-hop culture is a complex and powerful international phenomenon that cannot be 
captured by either shortsighted criticisms or naïvely celebratory responses. 
Paul Gilroy challenges some of the assumptions of the emergent corpus of hip-
hop studies.  He claims that hip-hop is a culture in which “liberation and justice are still 
demanded but have taken a back seat in recent years to revolutionary conservatism, 
misogyny, and stylized tales of sexual excess.”127  This statement is accurate inasmuch as 
it refers solely to hyper-commodified hip-hop, the strand of the culture that dominates 
BET and MTV with non-stop “booty shakin’” and materialistic swagger.  Yet, Gilroy 
ignores spoken word artists, less commercially successful hip hop artists like Jill Scott, 
Mos Def, The Roots, Dead Prez, and the underground scene that still places salience on 
counterhegemonic sensibilities.  He also suggests that hip-hop scholarship is obfuscated 
by a notion of ownership on the part of some black critics.   
Squeamish, “insiderist” critics do not want to face the extent to which, in a 
global market for these seductive products [pleasure and danger], white 
consumers currently support this black culture.  They retreat from the obvious 
possibility that the music’s transracial popularity might be significant in political 
struggles against white supremacism that undoubtedly lie ahead.128 
 
 This is an extension of Gilroy’s criticism of “absolutist definitions of culture.”  
However, artistic expressions can be rooted in a particular cultural stream and at the same 
time resist being tied to that stream exclusively. What hip-hop needs to deal with 
internally in a more rigorous fashion is what the real implications of the ownership 
question are now that it has attained such universal appeal.  Hip-hop scholarship is still in 
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its embryonic stages and the fluid nature of the culture has contributed to its failure, as 
yet, to deal fully with the implications of its transracial allure.   
 Finally, Gilroy questions whether contemporary hip-hop can be seen as marginal 
or revolutionary.  
[I]n what sense might hip-hop be described as marginal or revolutionary today?  
Anyone asserting the continuing marginality of hip-hop should be pressed to say 
where he or she imagines the center might now be.  I prefer to argue that hip-
hop’s marginality is now as official and routinized as its over-blown defiance, 
even if the music and its matching life-style are still being presented – marketed 
– as outlaw forms.129   
 
This leads him to characterize hip-hop as employing a “revolutionary 
conservatism that constitutes its routine political focus but that is over-simplified, 
mystified, or, more usually, just ignored by its academic celebrants.”130  
This statement is accurate inasmuch as it refers solely to hyper-commodified hip-
hop, the strand of the culture that dominates BET and MTV.  Yet, it is not clear why the 
more counterhegemonic hip-hop expressions have received less attention by Gilroy since 
not only do significant numbers of hip-hoppers center their corpus and worldview 
onliberatory ideas, but also there are plenty of individuals and groups within hip-hop that 
offer strident critiques of the very kind of hip-hop expression with which Gilroy finds 
fault.131  Gilroy’s example is another demonstration of the kind of truncated treatment 
hip-hop continually receives in a variety of literatures. 
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The Promise and Limits of Richard Shusterman’s Pragmatist Aesthetics for Hip-
Hop   
 Richard Shusterman claims that hip-hoppers are “down with Dewey.”132  By this 
he means that hip-hop operates with a pragmatist aesthetic that finds its most complete 
articulation in Dewey’s rebellion against compartmentalization that creates hard 
oppositions like art/science, emotion/cognition, form/content, pleasure/truth.  Hip-hop 
also aligns itself with Dewey’s disputing the traditional identification of art with its 
material objects that produces the “museum concept of art” that he criticized in Art as 
Experience.  These ideas are rounded out by the connection between hip-hop and other 
Deweyan ideas about art including the challenge to traditional hard line between high and 
popular art and his “challenge to the fetishization of art’s objects [that] redefine[d] art in 
terms of dynamic experience and process.”133   
 Shusterman creates four categories for hip-hop in order to locate its place in 
pragmatist aesthetics:  “appropriative sampling,” “cutting and temporality,” “technology 
and mass-media culture,” and “autonomy and distance.”134  In the same way that jazz 
created new art through the appropriation and metamorphosing of popular melodies, hip-
hop lifts sonic units from a variety of sources including not only an array of musical 
genres but clips from speeches and sampled nonmusical sounds.135  Yet, hip-hop 
appropriation, as Shusterman notes, divaricates from jazz in that it does not borrow “mere 
melodies or musical phrases – that is, abstract musical patterns exemplifiable in different 
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performances and thus bearing the ontological status of ‘type entities.’”136  Further, hip-
hop has, since its inception, emphasized, thematized, and celebrated its borrowing and 
sampling, thus challenging the fetishizing of the idea (or ideology) of originality.  It 
suggests a conception of art that celebrates the derivative and does not attempt to 
downplay or deny the idea that artists have always borrowed from one another.  The hip-
hop style of appropriation and creative metamorphosing suggests that “borrowing and 
creation are not at all in compatible.”137   
 This leads to the next category of cutting and temporality in which hip-hop’s 
sampling and appropriation undermines the conventional notion of artistic unity and 
integrity.  The emphasis in hip-hop is on open-ended continuation of artistic interaction 
with the object as evidenced by the endless collaboration, remixes, and reworkings found 
in hip-hop recordings.  Shusterman finds another Deweyan aesthetic connection here as 
hip-hop suggests that art is more about process than product.  This point is also illustrated 
by hip-hop’s propensity toward an open concept of artistic ownership.  In 2004, Wired 
magazine included a CD with its November issue that included tracks from hip-hop 
artists the Beastie Boys, Danger Mouse, and Chuck D released under the new “Creative 
Commons License” which makes it legal for anyone to manipulate the tracks for personal 
use.  All the tracks are now available through the Creative Commons website along with 
the claim, “These musicians are saying that true creativity needs to be open, fluid, and 
alive. When it comes to copyright, they are pro-choice. Here are 16 songs that encourage 
people to play with their tunes, not just play them.”138 
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 Hip-hop is at once dependent upon and appropriated by technology and media.  
Kool Herc’s use of commercial technology is part and parcel of the creation myth of hip-
hop.  Yet, it is this same technology that allowed hip-hop to be reified and commodified.  
One result of this complex connection is an internal conversation in hip-hop about the 
merits and demerits of commodification and the attendant debates regarding commercial 
forms of hip-hop versus the so-called underground iterations.  While some romanticize 
certain eras in hip-hop or its origins or characterize underground hip-hop as the culture’s 
purest form, there is also a well-known sentiment in hip-hop circles that an underground 
artist is simply another name for an artist without a record contract.  Hip-hop artists are, 
like others who produce popular art, mostly looking to get their work in the hands (or 
ears) of as many consumers as possible.  Another kind of technology, the Internet, has 
been used as a tool for innumerable underground artists to put their work “out there” and 
in particular, the advent of the massively popular Internet community, myspace.com, has 
become a vehicle for artists without contracts to promote themselves and their music.  
This relationship between hip-hop and technology is decidedly “postmodern” for 
Shusterman and the postmodern challenges to modern artistic conventions are prefigured 
by American pragmatism, Dewey specifically. 
 Finally, Shusterman’s category of autonomy is a further articulation of hip-hop’s 
rebellion against the kind of compartmentalization found in modern notions of separate 
cultural spheres and the autonomy of the aesthetic.  Hip-hop is replete with examples of 
artists who challenge this notion in their corpora.  KRS-ONE is emblematic of this 
category and Shusterman notes KRS’s simultaneous claims of status as teacher, poet, 
philosopher, and scientist.  Then he concludes, 
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Of course, the realities and truths which hip hop reveals are not the 
transcendental eternal verities of traditional philosophy, but rather the mutable 
facts and patterns of the material, socio-historical world.  Yet this emphasis on 
the temporally changing and malleable nature of the real … constitutes a 
respectably tenable metaphysical position associated with American 
pragmatism.139 
 
Shusterman’s categories and aesthetic analysis amount to one of the most fruitful 
treatments the academy has produced on hip-hop.  I adopt his categories for this study 
and add one more – kinetic consumption.  Hip-hop is meant to be felt and not just seen 
and/or heard.  Performances are animated either implicitly or explicitly by the question 
“[do] you feel me?” which is tantamount to asking an audience if it is connecting with the 
performer, if the text of the performance is resonating in deep ways with the audience.  
This connection, this feeling the performer or the performance unequivocally elicits some 
form of kinetic activity.  It could result in dancing.  It could manifest itself in intense 
vocal responses to the performance.  It nearly always involves rhythmic head nodding. 
This kinetic consumption is another form of pragmatist rebellion against passive, 
museum conceptions of art and the mind/body dualism. 
This study does much metaphorical head nodding to Shusterman’s pragmatist 
aesthetics as applied to hip-hop.  However, some of its limitations must be 
acknowledged.  While Shusterman does discuss the socio-political aspect of hip-hop in as 
much as it relates to his aesthetic analysis, it is not fully theorized in his work.  The 
connection between Deweyan metaphysics and hip-hop is a good start and to continue in 
such a direction it is necessary to add the concept of the prophetic to the analysis.  That is 
in part why this study is not content with an established connection between American 
pragmatism and hip-hop.  The prophetism in hip-hop must be examined fully and 
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prophetic pragmatism will allow for this as well as being congruent with the rest of 
Shusterman’s categories and analysis. 
 The other area in which Shusterman’s project must be expanded is related to the 
locus of his inquiry.  If pragmatist aesthetics reveals that hip-hop is “down with Dewey” 
in that it conceives of art as more fundamentally a process than a product, then inquiry 
into hip-hop culture must privilege an examination of process and not product.  No doubt, 
rap lyrics are an indispensable part of studying hip-hop.  Yet, Shusterman’s examination 
relies too much on his reading of these hip-hop products.  In order to move beyond this, it 
is necessary to examine closely process in hip-hop and that requires more than a detached 
study of what hip-hop artists produce.  In order to examine process, it will be necessary to 
live and walk with hip-hop artists, on the ground and in the streets.    
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Chapter Two 
 
Laboring to Learn: “Doing Philosophy” through Critical Ethnography 
 
 
In chapter one the connection between philosophy and hip-hop was explored 
through the lens of American pragmatism and specifically “prophetic pragmatism.”  At 
the close of the chapter, I suggested that a shortcoming of Richard Shusterman’s 
“pragmatist aesthetics” as applied to hip-hop culture was that it did not capture enough of 
the aesthetic process and therefore the self-aesthetic relation since his analysis relies 
mostly on an examination of hip-hop’s products.  I further suggested that the best the 
reconstructive sciences have to offer in terms of inquiry into artistic process and the self-
aesthetic relation is ethnography.  Yet, it is important to keep at the center of this study 
the idea that there is a deep bond between hip-hop and philosophy and therefore I 
articulate in this chapter a way of practicing philosophy through qualitative research.  
Along the way I examine ideas from Habermas, Carspecken, and Willis as they are the 
key informants for my methodology. 
 
Introduction 
Ethnography or qualitative research and philosophy ostensibly seem to be 
disciplinary fields with little in common.  Yet, the rise of critical ethnography, marked by 
Paul Willis’s Learning to Labor:  How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs 
(1977), strongly suggests a connection between ethnography and philosophy that could 
be explored toward fruitful ends.  This confluence is underarticulated in Willis and in the 
methodology literature, but what is implicit in Willis and in subsequent critical 
ethnography is a kind of uncovering of philosophical ideas embedded in a variety of 
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social science inquiries.  This chapter addresses a series of questions that might all be 
considered under the umbrella of the general idea of the intersection of philosophy and 
ethnography.  In so doing, I reference the ethnographic work on hip-hop culture that is 
fully articulated in subsequent chapters and use examples of analyses from that study to 
illustrate ideas related to this intersection.  Also, I lean heavily on Willis’s text and 
suggest that it provides a kind of template for thinking about philosophy and 
ethnography.  Finally, I employ the phrase “ethnographic philosophy” to describe my 
own work and other studies that seek to develop, uncover, and tease out theories that 
emerge in qualitative social science research.  Ethnographic philosophy seeks to maintain 
careful qualitative research methodology while conscientiously drawing on philosophical 
concepts to produce sophisticated analyses.  Put another way, ethnographic philosophy 
seeks to honor both disciplines that make up its whole, not reducing one to the other. 
Ethnographic philosophy takes a cue from Jurgen Habermas’s conception of the 
relationship between the reconstructive sciences (which include ethnography) and 
philosophy.  “According to this approach, philosophy surrenders its claim to be the sole 
representative in matters of rationality and enters into a nonexclusive division of labor 
with the reconstructive sciences.”1 
 
The Lifeworld/System Distinction and Critical Ethnography 
An examination of Habermas’s discussion of the lifeworld/system distinction is 
an appropriate place to begin the elucidation of ethnographic philosophy since that 
discussion makes a salient contribution to critical ethnographic methodology.  Habermas 
                                                
1 Jèurgen Habermas, Maeve Cooke, and NetLibrary Inc., On the Pragmatics of Communication 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998). 
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introduces the concept of the lifeworld in his magnum opus, Theory of Communicative 
Action (1984), as “intersubjectively shared” and he claims it is “bounded by the totality 
of interpretations presupposed by the members as background knowledge.”2  This 
lifeworld is a pre-interpreted world whose entirety cannot be questioned by those within 
it.  It is not a falsifiable world since it cannot ever be fully objectivated for the purposes 
of a discussion in which it might be falsified.  In fact, since the lifeworld is so basic to all 
meaningful acts within it, a member of the shared cultural community who questions the 
fundamental structures of the lifeworld would be thought insane or dishonest.  For 
example, if I look at a nickel and tell you I see a square and you cannot convince me 
otherwise (namely that the shape of a nickel is circle), or if I point toward threatening 
storm clouds and tell you that I am looking forward to “the visitors,” you would probably 
question my sanity.  The lifeworld is then, a “lived culture” that constitutes both the 
medium and the outcome of action.  These ideas also have relevance to the self since 
people will often believe themselves crazy if others find them unintelligible. 
A system refers to what Habermas considers to be the kind of human action that 
does not rely on communicative action for its coordination (as opposed to the lifeworld, 
of course).  In other words, systems work to coordinate action between actors who are 
separated in space and time.3  Societies are functionally differentiated into specialized 
roles of work/activity and thus, different institutions rely on other institutions to perform 
tasks of which they are incapable.  This coordination constitutes a system.  For example, 
doctors need factory workers to make their equipment, while factory workers need 
doctors when they are in ill health.  Society needs teachers to educate and socialize 
                                                
2 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action Volume 1, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), 13. 
3 These ideas about “the system” as distinguished from the lifeworld come from TCA, Volume 2, chapter 5. 
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children and teachers need factory workers and doctors, and so on.  Obviously, this 
system stands in contrast to the “lived culture” that is the lifeworld.  The system can also 
be exemplified by the economic coordination of capitalist societies (this example and the 
Marxist criticism will be central to the discussion of Habermas’s concept of “the 
uncoupling of the lifeworld and the system” below).  
This lifeworld/system distinction should inform critical ethnographic 
methodology in significant ways.  Certainly in critical ethnography we are seeking to 
explore the “lived culture” that is constitutive of the lifeworld and to provide analyses 
that uncover social inequalities in order to work toward positive social change and a 
refining of social theory.4  However, in order to do this, we must consider the impact of 
the system on the lifeworld (and obviously in order to do this we have to note the 
distinction).  Habermas claims that the lifeworld of contemporary complex society is 
primarily “deformed” by system factors.5  So, the distinction between lifeworld and 
system is important for critical ethnographers who seek to refine social theory and 
ameliorate social inequalities.  Of course, methodological questions are indicated by this 
discussion.  Can we ever “observe” a social system if we are always already existing 
within a lifeworld?  Developing an answer to this question is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, but Habermas begins to address it by saying that access to social systems 
necessarily makes use of hermeneutic processes and therefore systems analysis includes 
                                                
4 Phil Francis Carspecken, Critical Ethnography in Educational Research:  A Theoretical and Practical 
Guide, (Routledge:  New York, 1996) 
5 This idea will be explored further below in the discussion of system colonization of the lifeworld. 
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reconstructive methodology (yielding findings of different significance than analysis of 
the lifeworld).6 
 
The Uncoupling of System and Lifeworld 
The work of critical ethnographers can also benefit from an examination of the 
uncoupling of system and lifeworld.  Habermas claims that both system and lifeworld 
grow as they are differentiated from one another (as in the social evolution of tribal 
societies to modern ones).  As the rationality of the lifeworld grows, so does the 
complexity of the system.7  When this process reaches the stage of the modern society, 
the lifeworld that once was coupled with a scarcely differentiated social system gets 
reduced to a subsystem. At the same time, the system becomes more and more 
autonomous, with organizations connected through “delinguistified media” (that is to say, 
money, for example) that operate as steering mechanisms for “a social intercourse that 
has been largely disconnected from norms and values.” 8  Yet, systemic mechanisms are 
necessarily informed by the lifeworld.  Thus, in modern societies, systemic mechanisms 
must be institutionalized which results in bureaucratic (economic) spheres that are 
regulated solely by these delinguistified steering media (money and power).  Habermas 
adds that “Norm-conformative attitudes and identity-forming social memberships are 
neither necessary nor possible in these spheres; they are made peripheral instead.”9 
This uncoupling of system and lifeworld depends upon “value generalization” and 
“reification.”  Value generalization refers to the process by which traditions, religions, 
                                                
6 Carspecken also begins to explore this methodological question in “Five Third Person Positions” from 
Four Scenes for Posing the Question of Meaning, (Peter Lang:  New York, 1999). 
7 TCA Volume Two, 153. 
8 Ibid, 154. 
9 Ibid. 
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normal and legal norms become culturally rationalized and move from the specific to the 
general.  Here Habermas leans on Durkheim’s ideas about legal development to assert the 
notion of “universalization of law and morality … brings with it a disenchantment of 
sacred law” (emphasis in original).10  This value generalization is partially constitutive of 
the uncoupling of system and lifeworld, mainly as a precondition, as the increasingly 
complex system mechanisms can only be coordinated through more generalized norms.  
A good example of this is the traditional classroom that has specific rules that result in 
“mechanical solidarity,” as when student must raise her hand to ask permission to speak 
or use the restroom.  A more constructivist classroom produces “organic solidarity” that 
might employ more general rules that are interpreted in a given context, such as, “respect 
others” and “don’t be rude.”  A related phenomenon within the realm of value 
generalization is the construction of trust in social relationships through generalizing 
categories.  For example, the general category “doctor” comes to elicit trust in 
relationships and so on.  So, the growing complexity of systems depends on value 
generalization.  Yet, as mentioned above, the lifeworld still informs systemic 
mechanisms.  However, this happens through the reification of lifeworld phenomena 
where system differentiation causes “disturbances of its [the lifeworld’s] symbolic 
reproduction.”11  So, the uncoupling of system and lifeworld depends on both value 
generalization and reification.  This uncoupling eventually (and ironically, according to 
Habermas) reveals that “the rationalization of the lifeworld makes possible a heightening 
of systemic complexity, which becomes so hypertrophied that it unleashes system 
                                                
10 Ibid, 84. 
11 Ibid, 83. 
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imperatives that burst the capacity of the lifeworld they instrumentalize.”12  This provides 
an apt transition to a discussion of the “colonization of the lifeworld.” 
With regard to reification, what is fundamentally reified is a socially constructed 
“agreement” such as the agreement that money represents value, or the agreement that a 
formal position in an organization has a fixed relation of authority in relation to other 
formal positions.  These reifications form the basis of system media, and with system 
media in place we have the development of subsystems.  The subsystems are not exactly 
reifications; they are rather coordinated systems of action that depend upon reifications 
that have been substituted for communication. 
 
Colonizaiton of the Lifeworld 
Habermas introduces the idea of the “colonization of the lifeword” in Chapter 
Eight of TCA, Volume Two (1987).  This notion is based on Habermas’s evaluation of 
modern societies.  He claims that systemic mechanisms of integration have replaced the 
lifeworld as a unifying social force.  This displacement happened alongside the 
diminishing of collectively held convictions that integrated society and is also tethered to 
the truncation of reason.  In a modern society in which the system has colonized the 
lifeworld, “cognitive-instrumental” reason (a kind of theoretical reason conflated with 
technical reason) operates alone at the expense of aesthetic and moral-practical reason.  
This dominance of instrumental reason affects the everyday lives of people in modern 
societies since it creates subsystems that are nonnormative and are integrated only 
through the functional connection of action consequences (as opposed to communicative 
                                                
12 Ibid, 155. 
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integration aimed at discursively producing a kind of “general will”).  These subsystems 
are merely objectifications in which the only appropriate form of reason is the cognitive-
instrumental.  Therefore, it is impossible to discursively and collectively argue for 
alterations in structures of power and economic opportunity through an examination of 
their normative implications that reduces individuals to self-centered actors.  The result 
of this colonization is a general loss of meaning and freedom. 
One particular example of this phenomenon that has salient implications for my 
own research on hip-hop culture is the welfare state.  Habermas comments on this 
particular manifestation of lifeworld colonization.  “The effects of this – to date, final – 
wave of juridification do not appear as side effects; they result from the form of 
juridificaion itself.  It is now the very means of guaranteeing freedom that endangers the 
freedom of the beneficiaries.”13  The cognitive-instrumental form of reason exclusively 
dominates the subsystem of the welfare state resulting in a theft of autonomy from the 
lifeworld and its subjects.  Indeed when any government-controlled subsystem intervenes 
in societal problems, it does so through hegemonic hierarchy.  In the 1970s, early 
manifestations of hip-hop forms of expression in the South Bronx were a direct response 
to such lifeworld colonization when once close-knit working class black and Latino 
families were scattered into government project housing in order to make way for the 
construction of the Cross Bronx Expressway.14  Of course, the result of this government 
subsystem intervention was a loss of meaning and autonomy.  The early forms of hip-hop 
expression were attempts to seize both literal and discursive space in order to make 
                                                
13 TCA, Volume Two, 362. 
14 For a detailed account see Tricia Rose, Black Noise:  Rap Music and Black Culture in Contemporary 
America, (University Press of New England:  Hanover, New Hampshire, 1994). 
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meaning and construct a sense of autonomy.  Put another way, these early hip-hop 
expressions can be taken as efforts to decolonize the lifeworld. 
 
The Implicit System/Lifeworld Distinction in Paul Willis’s Learning to Labor 
Paul Willis’s seminal work, Learning to Labor (1977), is a fertile location for the 
exploration of the intersection of ethnography and philosophy.  One salient example is 
that Habermas’s system/lifeworld distinction lurks just beneath the surface in Willis’s 
ethnography; specifically the idea is implicitly at play in “Part II:  Analysis.” In this 
section of analysis Willis employs a number of bifurcated ideas (some more implicitly, 
others more explicitly) that can be conceived as approximating system/lifeworld 
distinctions.  One of these is the “system”/”structure” binary in which the “structure” 
resembles “lived culture” or lifeworld which is both the medium and outcome of action 
as opposed to the “system” that is the production of patterned action that coordinates 
society across time and space.  Related to this more implicit distinction is Willis’s 
explicit use of “penetrations” and “limitations.”  Here Willis refers to the way the lived 
culture of the working class “lads” can sometimes “penetrate” their conditions of 
existence.15  Though Willis claims these “penetrations” are always “skewed” and 
“deprived of their independence,” they are clearly associated with lived culture and 
therefore suggest a system/lifeworld distinction when taken together with the idea of 
“limitations.”  These “limitations” are the mechanisms that “confuse and impede the full 
development and expression of these impulses [that is, the impulses that constitute the 
                                                
15 Paul Willis, Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs, (Columbia 
University Press: New York, 1977), 119. 
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‘penetrations’].”16  This is one way we find the system/lifeworld distinction.  A 
penetration and a limitation could in principle be related only to lifeworld domination, 
that is to say, dominant ideologies only, not clearly linked to systems.  Penetrations into 
racism and sexism would have some of this character because although the two “isms” 
work to support system processes and arrangement, those processes do not absolutely 
need sexism and racism.  They do, however, need classism, which is what Willis’s 
inquiry is all about.  
Further evidence that Willis’s analysis implicitly makes use of a system/lifeworld 
distinction is the association of “creativity” with “penetration.”  This “creativity,” Willis 
claims, is often constitutive of a penetration and is not an individual creativity, but rather 
a function of group activity.  Additionally, it is not the result of “conscious intention.”  
Here we see in the idea that collective and unconscious creativity informs “penetrations” 
another indication of a system/lifeworld distinction operating, albeit implicitly, in 
Willis’s analysis of “the lads” and working class culture.  The system, for Willis, is social 
class and its relation to material production.  That results in work conditions (as in factory 
work) that in turn produce a cultural response and this is where the distinction is most 
clearly at work.   
As Willis’s work suggests a system/lifeworld distinction, so too does it percolate 
with the energy of a number of other philosophical ideas under its surface.  This will be 
discussed at more length below.  Here it is appropriate to report that Phil Carspecken 
calls Learning to Labor the first “critical ethnography,” which, among other things, 
means that it applies a kind of critical epistemology. 
                                                
16 Ibid. 
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Critical Epistemology and the Fact/Value Distinction 
There are a number of features that distinguish critical epistemology from more 
traditional epistemological theories when applied to empirical studies of social life.  To 
begin, it calls into question the paradigmatic status of sense certainty that is so ubiquitous 
in mainstream research epistemologies.  In so doing, it takes seriously Husserl’s 
phenomenological challenge to this sense certainty.  However, critical epistemologists do 
not stop where the phenomenologists did by replacing the sense certainty of seeing an 
object as the ground for its truth with the not dissimilar enough certainty of experiencing 
phenomena; they also consider the poststructural/postmodern critique/deconstruction of 
presence found, most notably, in the work of Jacques Derrida.  When presence is 
dismantled (and Derrida’s “trace” is all we are left with – and actually not even that since 
this is the concept that “destroys its own name”) the phenomenological grounds for truth 
are dealt a fatal blow.  So, critical epistemology eschews both sense certainty and 
phenomenological experience as grounds.  Further, it resists the modified perceptual 
imagery embraced by some constructivists and naïve postmodernists.  In their stead, 
critical epistemologists employ more communicative, holistic, predifferntiated imagery.  
This involves the recognition of what Phil Carspecken calls “cultural typifications” in 
which experiences are holistically recognized and not perceived.17 
 One cannot discuss critical epistemology without canvassing the fact/value 
distinction.  Phil Carspecken maintains a distinction between facts and values for critical 
epistemology.  Instead of a naïve fusion of facts and values (again, accepted by some 
postmodernists and constructivists), he offers “value orientations” that do not determine 
                                                
17 This summary owes much to Phil Francis Carspecken, Critical Ethnography in Educational Research:  
A Theoretical and Practical Guide, (Routledge:  New York, 1996).  Examples of this type of imagery are 
provided in the first chapter of this text. 
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the “facts” we uncover in the field.  This kind of critical epistemology resists the notion 
that the ideology of the researcher inevitably finds its way into an inextricable 
relationship with the researcher’s methods and findings.  Instead, it operates with a more 
complex notion of the relationship between facts and values.  Critical epistemologists do 
have value orientations that inform their guiding narratives for doing research.  These 
value orientations clearly shape the kinds of studies critical ethnographers take up, 
however they do not determine the empirical findings of their inquiries.  In the end, 
Carspecken sums up the relationship between facts and values as “interlinked but not 
fused” in critical epistemology.18  How is it that facts and values are interlinked but not 
fused?  All meaningful acts and thus all knowledge claims have all three validity claims 
necessarily so that it is impossible to assert only something objective, or only subjective, 
or only normative.  It is only possible to foreground and background claims.  So, in the 
speech act, and this is the model we should map over to knowledge claims, we have an 
interlinking of the claims, including value claims when we emphasize facts, facts when 
we emphasize values.  However, there is a necessarily understood analytic distinction 
between all three claims such that the response to a factual claim can always distinguish a 
factual component from a value component.  But, once again, the response will be in the 
form of a speech act and will have all the claims itself.  Nevertheless, one can always 
respond to the response to make the analytic distinction between the various claims.  This 
results in foregrounds to the acts progressively highlighting one claim in distinction from 
the others and it approaches purely objective, or subjective, or normative claims as limit 
cases.  This is how these claims are interlinked and not fused.  The distinction between 
                                                
18 Ibid, 6. 
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them is understood by everyone with communicative competence, and it is a distinction 
used to clarify meanings, refine scientific vocabularies, and so on. 
 
“Meaning Field”:  Heuristic Device or Substantive Concept? 
 Critical ethnographers make use of the concept of the “meaning field”; the idea 
that when human beings act meaningfully there is a bounded set of possible meanings 
that others in the setting could infer.19  While researchers use the concept to 
articulate/reconstruct possible ranges of interpretation, it is more than simply a heuristic 
tool; it is a substantive concept to be used in social theory.  This is because we do not 
merely construct meaning fields for the purpose of analysis, rather we can analyze a 
meaning field because it is a concept that structures interactions between meaningfully 
acting subjects.  Put another way, ethnographers do not “create” meaning fields as a tool; 
rather, subjects interacting with each other in meaningful ways are aware (often tacitly) 
of possible ranges of meanings for each act and therefore the meaning field is a 
substantive concept in social theory.  The following is an example of the use of a 
meaning field from my study of hip-hop culture.  The setting is two hip-hop “spoken 
word” artists performing at a high school for students in an alternative program.  
Following the meaning field is an “observer comment” represented by [O.C.]. 
 VARIOUS STUDENTS:  claps and other forms of percussive and vocal applause  
 
                                                
19 Although we can never know as researchers if we have reconstructed or articulated the same set of 
possible meanings as those present during the act have tacitly or explicitly received, it is important to 
remember that meaning fields are not boundless, that the meaning of an act does have a limit to its field of 
possible meanings.  For example, if a friend or acquaintance of mine sees me in the hallway and 
exuberantly smiles and says, “You the man!” I know that the meaning of his act is not to communicate to 
me that his pet died this morning (unless, of course, there are other contextual reasons to include this in the 
set of possible meanings).  We can think of an infinite number of examples of how meaningful acts can be 
limited to a set of possible meanings since certain meanings would not be possible to conclude given the 
particular act. 
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[1]:  You GO boy!  That was raw … (voice trails off/inaudible) 
 
[Meaning Field:  “The words really resonated with me” AND “I 
want to hear more” AND/OR “I recognize the truth in the lyrics” 
AND “You are ‘telling it like it is’” AND/OR “You are saying 
things that not everyone is willing to say” AND “I want you to 
keep doing that” AND/OR “I hope you keep this up”] 
 
 [O.C.]:  This female student is obviously connecting with Melek’s piece. 
    “You go boy” is a kind of general approval, saying basically 
    “keep on doing what you’re doing, ‘cause it’s good!”  The other 
    comment, “That was raw” is even more interesting.  Here it means 
    that the words of the piece cut to the heart of things … one key  
    phrase in hip-hop vernacular is “eeping’ it real” … in other words 
    telling it like it is, with “no holds barred …” The student here is  
    saying that Melek’s piece cut to the chase and laid bare 
    real issues. 
 
 
Philosophy and Ethnography in Learning to Labor 
 
 As mentioned above, Paul Willis’s classic, Learning to Labor (1977) intertwines 
ethnography and philosophy despite the ostensible differences of the two disciplines.  In 
fact, Willis weaves together standard ethnography, macro and micro-social analysis, and 
phenomenological theorizing of the self into what Phil Carspecken has called “the 
inaugural study for critical ethnography.”20 
 This classic study examines the resistance culture of working class boys in 
“Hammertown,” England, and how these “lads” navigate the shopfloor culture of their 
parents, their teachers, and the influence of the school (including how their lived culture 
contrasts itself from that of the school conformists or “ear’oles”).    
 Learning to Labor is evenly split into two parts that Willis labels “Ethnography” 
and “Analysis.”  However, this is a bit misleading since there are plenty of adumbrations 
of deep and subtle analysis in “Part One:  Ethnography.”  There are a number of specific 
                                                
20 Phil Francis Carspecken, Four Scenes for Posing the Question of Meaning and Other Essays in Critical 
Philosophy and Critical Methodology, Peter Lang: New York, 1999, 37. 
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philosophical ideas that can be located in the text.  As noted above, there is an implicit 
system/lifeworld distinction operating in Learning to Labor.  Perhaps the philosophical 
piece that moves closest to the explicit level in Willis’s study is the theorizing of the self 
that can be found throughout the ethnography and analysis sections.   
When I first read the introduction and the ethnographic portion of Willis’s book, I 
noticed some salient ideas from Plato’s Republic sneaking into my thoughts.  Most 
notably, I was thinking about the tripartite soul and the myth of the metals.  Juxtaposing 
Willis’s conception of the working class and Socrates’s appetitive class born with bronze 
or iron in their souls leads to any number of interesting questions about the influence of 
Western philosophical tradition on ideas of class, culture, and the self.  And so, with 
these Platonically inspired questions, I located a theory of the self operating just beneath 
the surface in Learning to Labor. 
Willis defines “labour power” as “the human capacity to work on nature with the 
use of tools to produce things for the satisfaction of needs and the reproduction of life.”21  
This has significance for his implicit theory of the self in the following quotation from 
the introduction. 
Class identity is not truly reproduced until it has properly passed through the 
individual and the group, until it has been recreated in the context of what 
appears to be a personal and collective volition.  The point at which people live, 
not borrow, their class destiny is when what is given is re-formed, strengthened 
and applied to new purposes.  Labour power is an important pivot of all this 
because it is the main mode of active connection with the world:  the way par 
excellence of articulating the innermost self with external reality.  It is in fact the 
dialectic of the self to the self through the concrete world.22 
 
 When Willis claims that this “labour power” is the “main mode of active 
connection with the world:  the way par excellence of articulation the innermost self with 
                                                
21 Paul Willis, Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs, (Columbia 
University Press: New York, 1977), 2. 
22 Ibid. 
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external reality” there is a suggestion that praxis is the sine qua non of the most pristine 
self for working class peoples; that the true self only “shows up” through the exacting of 
this “labour power.”  When conceived of this way, one begins to notice both a Marxist 
idea and an impulse that is clearly informed by pragmatist philosophy.  The theory 
gestured at here seems to have application beyond working class people.  Of course, in a 
class society, praxis becomes fractured so that thinking and “doing” are separated and 
assigned to different groups and we see this explicitly articulated by “the lads.” 
So, it seems clear that Willis’s conception of the self is informed by Marxism and 
pragmatism.  Yet, it leaves open the question of the ontology of the self pre-labour 
power, or, before the “innermost self” is articulated with external reality.  What can we 
make of this innermost self prior to active connection? 
 There are other interesting components in Willis’s tacit theory.  “Class identity is 
not truly reproduced until it has properly passed through the individual and the group, 
until it has been recreated in the context of what appears to be personal and collective 
volition (emphases mine).”23  My added points of emphasis locate Willis’s qualifiers that 
indicate questions about his theory.  First, Willis seems to be claiming that group identity 
is tightly bound up with the self.  He is suggesting that there are gradations of class 
identity reproduction; that it’s true reproduction must involve the volition of the 
individual and of the group.  Yet, it must properly pass through both the individual and 
the group and appear to be tethered to individual and collective will.  The use of such 
qualifiers (i.e., “appear”) could be an indication that Willis’s analysis reveals the idea that 
while cultural practices often appear to be fully volitional, yet they are indeed highly 
                                                
23 Ibid. 
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conditioned (this idea has a direct connection to Willis’s idea of “partial penetration”).  
At any rate, one gets the sense that, indeed, this manifestation is not a simple borrowing 
from their parents, but an actual living and re-forming of it.  This idea emphasizes again 
the primacy of praxis in Willis’s theory of the self. 
 The discussion of Willis’s tacit theory of the self indicates how he synthesizes 
ethnography and philosophy.  As noted above, there are other intersections with 
philosophy operating just underneath the surface in Learning to Labor; yet examining 
Willis’s theory of the self alone provides ample support for the contention that this classic 
work effectively blends philosophy with ethnography.  It should be emphasized that the 
study is primarily ethnographic and the philosophical analysis and especially the 
theorizing operates largely at the tacit level; still this theorizing uses Marxist ideas and is 
shot through with American pragmatist sensibilities.  Willis skillfully constructs a subtle 
philosophical analysis (exemplified by his implicit theory of the self) from a careful and 
sophisticated ethnographic study. 
 
More General Thoughts on the Intersection of Philosophy and Ethnography 
 Critical ethnographers, because of their value orientations, seek to go beyond 
describing social realities to enter the arena of uncovering multiple levels of oppression 
and structural inequalities.  They are also committed to refining social theory.24  To this 
end, it is worthwhile to reconsider ethnography as a discipline unto itself.  Qualitative 
research has demonstrated the ability to think creatively about itself with the rise of 
critical ethnography mentioned throughout this essay and other developments like 
                                                
24 Phil Francis Carspecken, Critical Ethnography in Educational Research:  A Theoretical and Practical 
Guide, (Routledge:  New York, 1996). 
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“autoethnography” and the conception of qualitative research as methodological 
bricolage.25  I submit that, though it may not pack the avant-garde punch of 
“autoethnography,” a more conscious and explicit synthesis of ethnography and 
philosophy could provide fecund ground for qualitative researchers of the critical variety.  
The contribution of Willis’s esteemed work to social theory is clear evidence of the 
efficacy of this more explicit and deliberate connection between philosophy and 
ethnography.  In this way critical ethnographers with an interest in philosophical analysis 
and philosophers interested in investing their theoretical work toward meliorative ends in 
social theory can intersect fruitfully with each others’ disciplines. 
 These kinds of cross-disciplinary efforts are, of course, not new.  In fact, 
ethnography in combination with other disciplines has been used by a number of scholars 
whose primary discipline is not qualitative research.  In the 1980s, French historian 
Jacques LeGoff developed the historical method he called “mentalite,” which has been 
described as “a blend of history, philosophy, ethnography, and social psychology.”26  
More specific to the current discussion and more recently, sociologist Loic Wacquant 
marries theoretical analysis with meticulous ethnographic study resulting from his 
participation in a Chicago boxing club.27  Consider the following passage in which 
Wacquant reflects on his emergent knowledge of pugilism as he was learning the “sweet 
science” through his training as an amateur boxer: 
Indeed, the deep imbrication among gesture, conscious experience, and 
physiological processes – to recall Gerth and Mills’s distinction between the 
three constituent elements of emotion – is such that a change in any one triggers 
an instantaneous modification of the other two.  Failure to tame the sensory 
experience of punches flying at you amputates your ability to act and by the 
                                                
25 Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, The Landscape of Qualitative Research:  Theories and 
Issues, (Sage:  Thousand Oaks, California, 2003). 
26 Elizabeth Ervin, “Interdisciplinarity or “An Elaborate Edifice Built on Sand”? Rethinking Rehtoric’s 
Place” Rhetoric Review, Vol. 12, No. 1. (Autumn, 1993), 92. 
27 Loic Wacquant, Body and Soul:  Notebooks of an Apprentice Boxer, (Oxford: New York, 2004). 
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same token alters your corporeal state.  Conversely, to be at the height of 
physical fitness allows you to be mentally ready and therefore to better master 
the feelings triggered by the blow.28 
 
 There is not enough space here for any kind of serious analysis of this passage, 
but it is clear enough, even at first glance, that Wacquant’s work engages philosophical 
ideas (specifically here the mind/body relationship). 
 Finally, and related to Willis and Wacquant, my own work is an attempt to “do 
philosophy” through critical ethnography.  This means I will explicitly employ 
philosophical underpinnings for my work in the field and use philosophical analysis of 
my ethnographic work toward the end of exposing social inequalities and oppression and 
to contribute to the refinement of social theory. 
 
Mead’s Theory of the Self and Qualitative Data Analysis 
 George Herbert Mead’s dialogical theory of the self has implications for social 
science.  Here I will discuss those implications after a brief sketch of the theory.  For that 
sketch, I will rely on Habermas’s discussion of Mead in Theory of Communicative 
Action, Volume Two (1987).  In Habermas’s discussion of phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
development, Mead’s work is most salient.  Habermas notes Mead’s use of the “I” and 
the “me.”   
Mead deals with identity development under the rubric of a relation between the 
“me” and the “I.”  This expression ‘me’ designates the perspective from which 
the child builds up a system of internal behavior controls by adopting the 
expectations of the generalized other toward himself.  By way of an 
internalization of social roles there gradually takes shape an integrated superego 
structure which enables the actor to orient himself to normative validity claims.  
At the same time as this superego – the “me” – there takes shape an “I,” a 
subjective world of experiences to which one has privileged access:  “The ‘I’ 
reacts to the self which arises through the taking of the attitudes of others.  
                                                
28 Ibid, 93. 
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Through taking those attitudes we have introduced the ‘me’ and we react to it as 
an ‘I.’”29 
 
 Hence we can say that the “me” is the part of self that is capable of being 
objectivated in ways the “I” is not. The “me” is tied to the second person position, 
whereas, the “I” is bound up in the first person position.  The “I” essentially has no 
qualities, once we begin to speak of it in any context, the second person position is 
ushered in and it instantly becomes the “me.”  In this way the “I” is, at its core, an 
“evanescence,” behaving like Jacques Derrida’s “trace” and resulting in Phil 
Carspecken’s use of the phrase, the “I feeling.” 
 This dialogical theory of the self can certainly inform qualitative data analysis.  
Any study that intends to uncover ideas about identity formation or ideas about 
development and expression of the self could use this theory as a lens through which to 
view empirical findings.  This is because Mead’s “I/me” distinction can be found 
operating at tacit levels in individuals as they live or otherwise consider their identity; 
when they articulate ways in which they express themselves and the way others receive 
them and the ways in which people can articulate fractures in the ways in which their 
“true” selves are recognized by others.  In my own study of hip-hop culture that is 
certainly concerned with identity formation and theories of the self, I have applied 
Mead’s theory in my analysis.  In fact, I have even used Mead’s “I/me” distinction as a 
high level code (I call my higher level codes that are rooted in philosophical ideas 
“speculative codes”) in my findings.  Consider the following narrative passage from my 
notes related to this high level code.  Here, the subject, “Melek,” a Jewish spoken word 
                                                
29 Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume Two, (Beacon Press: Boston, 1987), 
40-1. 
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artist, has made several statements in interviews that I take to be related to Mead’s theory 
of the self. 
Storytelling, for Melek, is inspiring, motivational, and challenging.  More 
important, it seems to be a means through which we: (a) recognize our “self” or 
become more pristinely cognizant of our “self.” (b) begin to take notice of and 
eventually know “the other.”  Plus, there seems to be something extremely 
important about storytelling for posterity and local community.  So, the story is 
the mechanism through which we build bridges both to an understanding of the 
self (perhaps approximating Mead’s “I” as closely as we can) and an 
understanding of (perhaps a recognition) the other. 
 
 
Kierkegaard’s “Repetition” and Cornel West’s “Prophetic Pragmatism” Meet 
Ethnography of Hip-hop Culture 
 In addition to having previously noted the intersection of critical qualitative 
research with Habermas’s system/lifeworld distinction and Mead’s theory of the self, I 
turn now to a discussion of two more ideas from philosophy and their specific 
intersection with my own ethnographic inquiry.  I discuss an idea from contemporary 
philosophy (West’s “prophetic pragmatism”) and one historical idea (Kierkegaard’s 
“repetition”).   I conclude with a preliminary discussion about validity in social science 
research and how “critical ethnographic philosophy” might go about validating its claims. 
 “Prophetic pragmatism,” Cornel West’s unique brand of neopragmatism is a 
whole philosophical system, an explication of which is beyond the scope of this essay.  
However, here I will deal specifically with an articulation of West’s sense of the tragic 
found in “prophetic pragmatism” applying that idea to my ethnography. 
The sense of the tragic in prophetic pragmatism is meticulously nuanced.  It 
begins with the assertion that “tragic” is a polyvalent term.  For prophetic pragmatism, 
the idea of tragedy is set apart from the Greek notion in which “the action of ruling 
families generates pity and terror in the audience” and is rather tethered to “a society that 
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shares collective experience of common metaphysical and social meanings.”30   Prophetic 
pragmatism’s sense of the tragic emanates from what West calls the modern context of 
tragedy “… in which ordinary individuals struggle against meaninglessness and 
nothingness” within “a fragmented society with collapsing metaphysical meanings.”31  
This adaptation of tragedy to the modern context provides the criterion by which 
prophetic pragmatism accepts or rejects the sense of the tragic found in the various 
thinkers in American pragmatism. 
 Though West begins his genealogy of pragmatism with a celebration of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, he is critical of Emersonian pragmatism’s optimistic theodicy.  West 
admits that Emerson did have a sense of the tragic, but 
[T]he way he formulated the relation of human powers and fate, human agency 
and circumstances, human will and constraints made it difficult for him … to 
maintain a delicate balance between excessive optimism and exorbitant 
pessimism regarding human capacities.32  
  
This balance is important for West since without it there is no way to confront what he 
calls “the complex relations between tragedy and revolution, tradition and progress.”33  
Prophetic pragmatism recognizes historical human atrocities and brutalities as well as 
“present-day barbarities.”  In fact, it is this recognition that requires of prophetic 
pragmatism a conception of the tragic.  It must not avoid these facts of the human 
condition.  Yet, the conception of the tragic for the prophetic pragmatist is rooted in the 
modern context of tragedy, and for West this means not only the context of a fragmented 
society with collapsing metaphysical meanings, but also, and “more pointedly, the notion 
                                                
30 Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy:  A Genealogy of Pragmatism (University of 
Wisconsin Press:  Madison, 1989), 227. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid, 226. 
33 Ibid, 226, 7. 
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of the ‘tragic’ is bound to the idea of human agency, be the agent a person of rank or a 
retainer, a prince or a pauper.”34    
 Here the sense of the tragic found in prophetic pragmatism becomes profoundly 
attractive.  It is both critical of Emersonian theodicy and yet gives primacy to the agency 
of all persons.  West claims that the Reinhold Niebuhr of the 1930’s best exemplifies this 
complex sense of the tragic.  Niebuhr’s 
struggle with liberal Protestantism … forced him to remain on the tightrope 
between Promethean romanticism and Augustinian pessimism.  In fact, Niebuhr 
never succumbs to either, nor does he ever cease to promote incessant human 
agency and will against limits and circumstances.35  
 
  Thus, prophetic pragmatism is unwilling to sidestep real and unavoidable human 
atrocities, some of which are admittedly not transformable; while at the same time 
maintaining “utopian impulses” through an unfettered belief in the agency of all persons.  
West anticipates that this may make his sense of the tragic seem a bit schizophrenic – a 
Sisyphean outlook in which human resistance to evil fails on the one hand, and the 
promotion of a quest for utopia on the other.  However, West claims that “prophetic 
pragmatism denies Sisyphean pessimism and utopian perfectionism.  Rather it promotes 
the possibility of human progress and the human impossibility of paradise.”36  This is a 
subtle but profound movement away from a navigation between excessive pessimism and 
a pie-in-the-sky utopianism to a kind of paradigmatic shift which includes replacing the 
polar ideas with a singular conception of the evil in the world; an appreciable portion of 
which might be ameliorated through human agency, precisely because it is a product of 
human agency.   
                                                
34 Ibid, 227. 
35 Ibid, 228. 
36 Ibid, 229. 
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Prophetic pragmatism is a form of tragic thought in that it confronts candidly 
individual and collective experiences of evil in individuals and institutions – 
with little expectation of ridding the world of all evil.37 
 
 Now, consider the following passage from an interview with “Melek,” the spoken 
word artist mentioned above.  The context here is thinking about the meaning of 
commercially successful hip-hop artists/moguls versus the idea that hip-hop is essentially 
a resistance culture (the place from which Melek operates). 
Melek:  P. Diddy hosts parties in the Hamptons as Jay-Z does.  Which 
was kinda like this white playground.  Which, in some ways is interesting 
and in some ways it becomes about class … I wonder how many people of 
color are there, how many white people are there and I don’t even know if 
it matters, but there are plenty of folks who will never be able to go to the 
Hamptons regardless of how many P.Diddys go.  ‘Cause the very nature of 
that economic system is to have the base be en masse and, you know, have 
those people working … I mean, I don’t know who P.Diddy’s Hampton 
neighbors are, but I bet when they see him and crew come for the weekend 
or whatever, I bet folks were nervous and I think there’s something really 
powerful in that and I think that that needs to happen too, but with the kind 
of music that they put out, it isn’t about celebrating the mundane and the 
everyday struggles of day-to-day people, it’s really, it’s ultimately a song 
of capitalism … the overall systemic critique of capitalism has to 
acknowledge that there’s only space for a certain number who will be at 
the top … and of course Jay-Z and P. Diddy in the scheme of things they 
make pittance compared to Bill Gates or other white men who will always 
                                                
37 Ibid, 228. 
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be at the top.  But if they can hang out together, you know, cool.  I think 
Jay-Z and Donald Trump hang out at the same parties.  But, I don’t care.  I 
mean, that doesn’t mean that I have health insurance.  And that doesn’t 
make Chicago Public Schools better because P.Diddy has a house in the 
Hamptons. 
 
 An analysis of this portion of the interview certainly could benefit from an 
application of the sense of the tragic from West’s philosophy.38  There is, implicitly, an 
assertion here that human atrocities and forms of oppression are not all transformable 
while, at the same time, Melek indicates that, on certain levels, even some forms of non-
transformable oppression can be ameliorated and challenged and sometimes that happens 
through hip-hop “ways of being” and hip-hop expressions of which Melek himself is 
generally critical!  We can make good sense of this with the help of the sense of the tragic 
in prophetic pragmatism.  Some forms of oppression found in capitalistic societies may 
resist complete transmogrification (“white men who will always be on top”).  Yet, there 
is an emphasis on agency in Melek’s assertion; human action within the oppressive 
system is not rendered meaningless (“I think there’s something really powerful in that 
and I think that that needs to happen too”).  Of course there is much more analysis to be 
done here, but we can see that the application of this philosophical idea to qualitative 
research is fruitful. 
 Another idea from philosophy I have begun to use in the analysis of my 
ethnographic study is Søren Kierkegaard’s “repetition.” Repetition is first contrasted with 
the Greek notion of recollection.  For Kierkegaard, movement must be a kind of forward 
                                                
38 It is also seems clear that this passage indicates a host of philosophical ideas that could be of benefit in 
its analysis. 
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movement and not the “retracing of steps” that is constitutive of recollection.  
Recollection undoes whereas repetition produces.  So the retreat of recollection (John 
Caputo calls it “antimovement”)39 is simply another way out of the flux.  Instead of 
staying with the flux, recollection suggests that we must retrace our steps out of it; that 
our goal is to recapture the eternity that always already has been.  Its focus is on what has 
been lost, not on the “task” ahead. However, Kierkegaard’s concept of time constitutes a 
direct contrast with that of the Greeks.  Kierkegaard’s “Christian time” considers eternity 
to have a futural meaning – “the life that is to come.”  For the Christian, time (or 
temporality) “means an urgent task, a work to be done” while metaphysics seeks its way 
out of time.  In Kierkegaard’s time, everything (or all eternity) hangs in the balance in 
each moment.  This is the concept of time that is employed by repetition. 
 With this simplified articulation of Kierkegaard’s repetition in mind, let us 
consider another passage from an interview with Melek.  Here he is discussing hip-hop 
expressions as spiritual/ecstatic processes.  
 
Melek Yonin:  There are spaces to find within freestyle where you forget 
where you are and you forget how long you’ve been rhyming … the words 
just come.  And, at its best, for me, it seems like you are really like a co-
creator within the universe … In a cipher when words are just being 
passed … it’s just creation.  I think, in recitation, that happens too 
sometimes … there are times when you kind of forget, you transcend that 
space.  To me, sometimes, I’m speaking in that space, but I’m also 
                                                
39 John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project, 
(Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1987). 
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speaking to and for my ancestors and for people who can’t speak anymore 
or who wouldn’t be able to be in front of that audience. 
 
 Here again we see an opportunity to apply a philosophical idea to analysis of 
qualitative inquiries.  Melek’s experience with “freestyle” (a hip-hop form of expression 
in which MCs or “performance poets” spontaneously rap and ad lib a “rhyme,” most 
often in a group, a “cipher,” in which the verbal baton is passed around a circle of 
poets/MCs), is clearly a spiritual one in which time and space takes on new meaning; 
when “you forget where you are” and “how long you’ve been rhyming.”  It is interesting 
that Melek specifically mentions recitation as another means toward this spiritual end.  
Recitation necessarily involves repetition and Melek is claiming that such repetition 
produces, not unlike Kierkegaard’s repetition.  This production includes a kind of identity 
in which Melek becomes the mouthpiece for his “ancestors and for people who can’t 
speak anymore.”  Of course there is much more analysis to be done, but it is clear that 
Kierkegaards’s “repetition” will become another lens through which to view Melek’s 
experience as a hip-hop artist.   
 After establishing the appropriateness of combining philosophical ideas with 
analysis of the results of qualitative inquiries, it is important to consider the concept of 
validity in social science research and how we might think about “validating” the use of 
philosophy in qualitative studies.  To begin, critical ethnographers already lean on a 
philosophical idea when they use the concept of validity in their work.  That is to say that 
we make validity claims in place of “truth” claims because our orientation toward “truth” 
is informed by the pragmatist notion of truth (or consensus theory of truth) that asserts all 
claims are fallible and we can only speak of truth with small “t”s and never with a capital 
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“T.”  This, of course, will be no different when we “do philosophy” with our qualitative 
research.  It is also important for researchers/philosophers to build bridges between their 
philosophizing and their subjects.  Theories that are teased out or established 
philosophical ideas that are applied must be articulated to subjects in the study in a 
mediated language for the purposes of member checks and other measures critical 
ethnographers use to validate their findings.  The use of mediated language will go a long 
way toward validating the use of philosophy in ethnography.  Finally, 
researchers/philosophers seeking to validate the use of philosophy in ethnography must 
be prepared to experience a heightened sense of Peter McLaren’s notion of being 
“wounded in the field.”  This is especially important in the process of validating our 
claims to use philosophy in our research.  Using philosophy in critical ethnography 
means, among other things, that we will likely uncover deep ways in which we as 
researchers are complicit in wielding of some types of power (I have addressed this 
elsewhere in unpublished reflections on the idea of “researcher as gatekeeper”).  We will 
also likely uncover challenges to the ways in which we construct our identity (especially 
likely when, as in my own work, the philosophizing we do involves identity formation!).  
Therefore, in order to validate our use of philosophy, we must be ready and open to being 
“wounded”; if we resist, our application of philosophy may evade validity.40 
 
 Methodology Conclusions 
                                                
40 It should be noted that additional, more practical suggestions for validating the use of philosophy in 
ethnography would certainly include Phil Carspecken’s suggestions for validating meaning reconstruction 
in the normative-evaluative domain found in Chapter Eight of Critical Ethnography in Educational 
Research:  A Theoretical and Practical Guide, (Routledge:  New York, 1996). 
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 In the introduction I used the phrase “ethnographic philosophy” to describe my 
own way of synthesizing qualitative research and philosophy.  I submit in conclusion 
what I hope has become clear in this chapter, that my aim is to promote and engage in 
critical ethnographic philosophy.  For those of us (researchers/philosophers/educators) 
who find ourselves “thrown” into a value orientation that moves us to take on projects 
that might provide some level of amelioration of social injustices and oppression, those 
who resist a cold positivism that reinscribes hegemony and a naïve postmodernism that 
leaves us handcuffed to mere ironic reflection and misanthropy, critical ethnographic 
philosophy could be a method that matches our orientation and provides creative ways to 
advance social theory.  Beyond that, if we are committed to careful critical ethnographic 
work and the conscientious application of philosophy, if we are willing to become 
vulnerable as researchers and allow ourselves to be threatened and/or wounded, critical 
ethnographic philosophy can be a way to work for justice and indeed love in a world that 
hungers for both. 
 
Ethnographic Design 
 The ethnography portion of this study was conducted over a three year period in 
Chicago.  For roughly the first half of the study I spent weekends and holidays in 
Chicago while during the last half I was a full-time resident.  The inquiry focuses on 
three local hip-hop artists, Melek Yonin, Idris Goodwin, and Dove Rock.41  The data 
were collected through a kind of participant observation, semistructured qualitative 
interviews with subjects, and published and non-published written work of the artists as 
                                                
41 By the time of data analysis, Dove Rock had moved to San Francisco.   
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well as musical recordings.   My status as participant observer stems from the friendships 
offered me by the subjects of the study as well as my own participation in hip-hop 
culture.  As I followed the artists in this study to schools, clubs, universities, panel 
discussions, open mics, and a variety of other performance spaces, I became somewhat of 
a recognized figure with my tape recorder or a video camera.  I sometimes traveled with 
the artists to schools just outside of the city or even further to university shows thereby 
constituting something of an entourage.  I certainly could not have attained this level of 
participation without the willingness and openness of the artists in this study who made 
me feel like a participant through the offering of friendship.  Also, my status as a fan of 
hip-hop contributed to my participant status.  I grew up listening to much of the hip-hop 
that the artists in this study have made reference to as being inspirational or formative in 
their development.  The subjects of the study also turned me on to a number of hip-hop 
artists that were well under the radar of major commercial success or mainstream radio 
airplay and I consistently sought out and listened to the work of the artists to whom my 
subjects introduced me.  For the last two years of the study I was a judge at a citywide 
teen hip-hop poetry slam organized by one of the subjects of this study.  Finally, 
throughout the study, I participated in the culture through the creation of my own art as I 
began to write and perform hip-hop spoken word pieces and write and produce hip-hop 
music.  It was not my aim to somehow join the subjects of this study in the community of 
underground hip-hop artists, yet, I wanted to experience the process of creating and 
performing in their genre.   
 The one-on-one interviews were each between an hour and an hour and a half 
long and were spaced out somewhat evenly over the three year period of the study.  All 
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interviews included audio recordings and some additionally included video recordings.  
There was also video taken of a number of performances and in one case I had the 
opportunity to watch the recording of the performance with the artist and discuss it.  In 
order to preserve the integrity of the ideas of the artists in this study, the recorded 
interviews will be quoted verbatim and at length when appropriate throughout the study, 
however, it should be noted that I gained much additional insight through informal 
conversation and casual time spent with the subjects and will therefore make ample 
reference to field notes in order to access the additional relevant ideas gleaned through 
informal social interaction with the subjects.  Additionally, published and recorded works 
of the artists are reproduced here in such a way as to maintain as much artistic integrity as 
possible.  With longer pieces that were not able to be quoted in their entirety, I have kept 
whole stanzas, verses, or choruses in tact. 
 
The Participants 
 Dove Rock, Melek Yonin, and Idris Goodwin are all part of the underground hip-
hop scene in Chicago.  Beyond this general connection, all three have worked closely 
with a local young authors’ organization that specializes in the fostering of talent in the 
area of hip-hop and hip-hop poetry.  I met Melek and Idris first at a hip-hop conference in 
Chicago and subsequently Melek introduced me to Dove whom I had already seen 
perform at some of the first underground hip-hop shows I attended. 
 Melek grew up in the suburbs and describes his experience as an “other side of 
the tracks” or a “forgotten” experience and he noted multiple times in interviews that 
suburban experience is not monolithic.  His own was marked by a single mother who 
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moved Melek and his brother around from one rental property to the next in an effort to 
avoid landlords.  Melek talks a lot in his work about trekking from the suburbs to the city 
and receiving a kind of voluntary education in hip-hop by frequenting places like Lit X, 
the now defunct Afrocentric bookstore to which he pays homage in a poem.  Melek’s 
formal education includes a substantial amount of college though he does not hold a 
degree.  During the course of this study Melek performed a number of times on Russell 
Simmons Def Poetry on HBO and published a book of his hip-hop poetry.   
 Dove Rock grew up in the city (Chicago) although she bounced around from one 
neighborhood to the next.  She describes her childhood and adolescence in rather bleak 
terms.  Though she was not an official gang member, she talks at length about her 
connection to gangs growing up and the experience of having friends shot and killed at a 
young age.  Her formal education ended before high school and she often made mention 
of her status as a high school dropout.  During the course of the study, Dove released an 
underground hip-hop recording titled, Sylvia Plath Easybake Oven.  The dark imagery 
runs through the album and reveals Dove’s preoccupation with mortality that is discussed 
in chapter four.  Dove also provided unique insight as the lone woman in this study and 
her work thematizes the experience of a female participating in the male-dominated 
culture that hip-hop is and this is examined in chapter three. 
 Idris Goodwin’s family moved when he was young from the city of Detroit to a 
suburb.  His experience with hip-hop goes all the way back to some of his first memories.  
He claims, “for me, rap was just kinda always around.” After growing up in suburban 
Detroit, Idris came to Chicago to go to art school and he currently holds a graduate 
degree making him the most formally educated of the participants.  When I first met Idris 
 89
he was doing quite a bit of collaborative performing with Melek Yonin.  Like Dove 
Rock, Idris released a recording during the time of this study.  In addition to recording 
rap music, Idris is a playwright (he is sometimes referred to as a “hip-hop playwright”) 
and I had the pleasure of attending one of his plays during the course of the study. 
 
Chicago’s Underground Hip-Hop Scene 
 Unlike the East Coast and West Coast hip-hop scenes replete with well-
established and distinct personalities as well as the storied rivalries between them and 
unlike the meteoric rise of Southern rap onto the commercial landscape, Midwestern rap 
has yet to establish a clear style of its own that separates it in the way other regional hip-
hop has in its commercial manifestations.  Idris Goodwin once told me that the only thing 
that might be a defining characteristic of Midwest hip-hop is that it is known for hard- 
working artists.  However, this was not necessarily unique to Chicago as he also said this 
is a feature of Detroit’s and Minneapolis’s underground scene. 
Without spending time in urban settings other than Chicago for this study, I did 
acquire some amount of knowledge that suggests underground hip-hop transfers well 
from one city to the next.  Almost all the artists I met in Chicago, including the three 
participants in the study, were able to travel and find places to perform in other cities and 
some of them did this quite frequently.  Idris once told me in an interview that it wouldn’t 
take him long to “find the hip-hop kids” in any city.  
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Chapter Three 
 
K(nowledge)R(eigns)S(upreme)-O(ver)N(early)E(veryone)1:  Prophetism and 
Organic Intellectualism in Hip-Hop Culture 
 
 
Practical movement and theoretical thought are united (or are trying to unite 
through a struggle that is both theoretical and practical).  It is not important that 
this movement had its origins in mediocre philosophical work, or at best, in 
works that were not philosophical masterpieces.  What matters is that a new way 
of conceiving the world and man is born and that this conception is no longer 
reserved to the great intellectuals … but tends rather to become a popular, mass 
phenomenon, with a concretely world-wide character, capable of modifying … 
popular thought. 
      
Antonio Gramsci 
 
 
i sought my generation/hip hop kids breakin down nouns and verbs to reality 
mystically/inclusivity/based on skills and never skin/ i re-present creation/from 
my light within/cuz how you gonna build apocalyptic space stations and tell me 
about sin/I’d rather dwell near ayin/from nothingness we do begin  
 
 Melek Yonin 
 from “pieces of shalom” 
 
  
 
I have argued above that hip-hop culture has multiple points of intersection with 
philosophy especially when philosophy is reconceived and unfettered from its quest for 
first principles, and that therefore hip-hop has a special connection with pragmatism.  I 
have also argued that an even more fruitful examination of hip-hop culture can be 
executed through the lens of prophetic pragmatism.  The remaining chapters will 
examine points of connection between philo-sophia and hip-hop culture as well as engage 
                                                
1 The moniker KRS-ONE refers to the artist with the birth name of Lawrence (Krist) Parker, commonly 
known in hip-hop circles as “The Teacha” due to the fact that his efforts as a hip-hop artist have been 
primarily educative through albums (with his group, Boogie Down Productions) such as Criminal Minded 
(1987), By All Means Necessary (1988), Ghetto Music:  The Blueprint of Hip-Hop (1989), and most telling, 
Edutainment (1990).  By the turn of the century, KRS-ONE has gained status of a revered elder in the hip-
hop community, earning respect and honors from efforts such as VH1’s “Hip-Hop Honors” in its inaugural 
year, 2004.  His 2003 book, Ruminations, is a kind of continuation of “edutainment” by other means and in 
it he fortifies and makes explicit the relationship between hip-hop and philosophy with his “Urban 
Inspirational Metaphysics.”  In 1996, KRS-ONE established The Temple of Hip-Hop that “operates within 
four departments which are called its ‘M.A.S.S.’ or ministry, archive, school and society” thus accentuating 
the blending of hip-hop and philosophy, education, and religion and spirituality. Notably, KRS-ONE is an 
inspirational hero to Melek Yonin, one of the subjects in this study. 
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in “doing” philosophy through the means of critical ethnography, as discussed in chapter 
two.   
In what follows I specifically argue that hip-hop and philosophy intersect in two 
distinct ways.  First, these artists often engage in philosophy (that is, when philosophy is 
considered broadly as it is here) through their cultural expression and their philosophizing 
is best examined under the rubric of prophetic pragmatism.  They are aligned with 
prophetic pragmatism’s reconceptualization of philosophy that Cornel West attributes to 
Emerson (as precursor), Peirce, James, and Dewey and conceives of American 
pragmatism as an evasion of epistemology-centered philosophy.  He notes,  
To evade modern philosophy means to strip the profession of philosophy of its 
pretense, disclose its affiliations with structures of power (both rhetorical and 
political) rooted in the past, and enact intellectual practices, i.e., produce texts of 
various sorts and styles, that invigorate and unsettle one’s culture and society.2 
 
Second, focused inquiry into the lives, work, and art of hip-hop artists yields especially 
elucidative theoretical insight with regard to ideas about the self, identity formation, and 
the self-aesthetic relation.   
This chapter lays out the first connection by examining the ways in which hip-hop 
artists are engaging in philosophy through their cultural production and criticism, their 
artistic corpora and worldview articulations that are shared in community both formally 
and informally.  This examination flows directly into the second intersection mentioned 
above.  A consideration of the ideas of the artists in this study through the notion of 
cultural production as philosophy produces useful philosophical ideas with regard to 
identity, the self, and aesthetics. 
                                                
2 Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy : A Genealogy of Pragmatism, The Wisconsin Project 
on American Writers (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). 
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Hip-hop artists embody the intersection of Dewey and Gramsci in prophetic 
pragmatism.  Their philosophy takes cultural form through their artistic products and the 
critical conversations about the art that hip-hop produces and therefore aligns itself with 
West’s idea of the Deweyan evasion of epistemology-centered philosophy.  They are also 
certainly organically linked with the community/communities they attempt to uplift.  
Though many hip-hop artists both of the commercially successful kind and those from 
the so-called underground have varying levels of formal education, their theoretical 
insight has much less in common with professional philosophy, strictly conceived, while 
it is clearly congruent with Gramscian notions of intellectualism.  So, organically 
connected to the groups with which they align, hip-hop artists produce theoretical 
thought, connected to practice, via cultural production and criticism. 
In addition to embodying this Dewey/Gramsci intersection, hip-hoppers evince 
the prophetism in prophetic pragmatism.  I want to be clear about the use of the term 
“prophetic” here.  It is a word that has a history of being associated with hip-hop and with 
some rap musicians in particular.  The late Tupac Shakur comes immediately to mind 
when one thinks of this association.  Although I would certainly argue for Tupac’s status 
as (commercial) hip-hop’s preeminent example of organic intellectualism, the kind of 
prophetism usually attributed to him is dissimilar to the definition of prophetism 
employed here.  In hip-hop lore, when “prophet” is juxtaposed with Tupac it is typically 
meant to describe his hyper-cognizance of his mortality to the point of producing 
multiple artistic predictions of his own early demise.3  That kind of predictive power is 
not emphasized in the idea of the prophetic used here.  Instead, the focus is on a kind of 
                                                
3 See Michael Eric Dyson, Holler If You Hear Me : Searching for Tupac Shakur (New York: Basic Civitas 
Books, 2001). 
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language of moral vision, a prophetic passion for confronting oppression and social 
injustice.  This kind of prophetism aligns itself with the marginalized and counter-cultural 
voices that are lost or misrepresented in the mainstream (see discussion of prophetism in 
chapter one).  It is animated by courageous and frank speech, vulnerability, and a hope 
that is earned through organic attachments with the communities on behalf of which they 
speak.  The idea of courageous and frank speech is first examined below with regard to 
hip-hop culture generally, then as it is found in the so-called underground participants of 
this study.  Next, Gramsci’s notion of the organic intellectual, as it is treated by Cornel 
West, will be examined, again, as a component of hip-hop broadly and then specifically 
applied to the work and ideas of the artists of this study.  
     
“Say It Plain”; or What’s the Difference Between Gwen Ifill and Kanye West? 
 
Kanye West set off a firestorm with his remarks on NBC’s televised Hurricane 
Katrina relief concert on September 2, 2005.  The comments came as part of a segue in 
which comedian Mike Myers and West were supposed to read from a script about the 
Katrina devastation.  But, in true hip-hop improvisational style, West went off script and 
used his part of the 90-second segment to air grievances about the racist media coverage 
of the aftermath in New Orleans and eventually gave his assertion the trenchant cadence, 
“George Bush doesn’t care about Black people!”4 
Within minutes the blogosphere was littered with anti-Kanye rage ranging from 
“Who the fuck is Kanye West?” to “Kanye West says Bush hates black people” to 
“Kayne West is a punk. There was no need to say what he said, even if he believes it. The 
                                                
4 Lisa de Moraes,  “kanye west’s torrent of criticism, live on nbc,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/03/AR2005090300165.html 
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fundraiser was not a political platform for Bush-bashers to spew their anti-Bush 
rhetoric.”5  Of course, there was also a salient amount of support for West by bloggers as 
well.  While it would be nearly impossible to say which side won the Internet battle over 
the incendiary remarks, it is clear that the overall mainstream American reaction was 
something like “even if someone really thinks George W. Bush doesn’t care about Black 
people, that just isn’t the sort of thing that should be said on television, especially in the 
context of American people doing the much more constructive work of raising money for 
relief efforts.”  What is also clear is that as a result of the ad-lib, scores of people who 
had never heard of Kanye West before were talking about him and what he said during 
the NBC benefit concert.  The argument could be made that the West comments helped to 
fix race firmly into the American conversation about the Katrina disaster.  In fact, in the 
aftermath of his remarks there was significant media coverage of polls suggesting that 
most Black folks in America believed that the federal government response to the disaster 
would have been quicker and better had the majority of Katrina’s victims been white 
while, conversely, most white people believed the response would have been no different 
if the victims would have been mostly white.   
In the weeks following the NBC event that aired live on the East Coast but was 
edited for its delayed broadcast on the West Coast (call it a “script malfunction”), a 
number of African-American journalists weighed in on Kanye West’s statement.  Among 
the most interesting responses was the print/television pair of Eugene Robinson and 
Gwen Ifill on September 18, 2005.  Speaking as a guest on NBC’s “Meet the Press,” Ifill 
                                                
5 It should be noted as well that a common theme by some bloggers was that West’s comments were 
obviously a marketing ploy for his sophomore album, Late Registration (2005), which had been released a 
few days before the event.  The intent of most who made this claim seemed to be to say something 
disparaging about West while at the same time challenging the veracity of the substance of his comments, 
something like, “it’s not really true, he’s just saying it to sell records.”  What is unclear to me is if these 
people considered the possibility that West’s comments might discourage sales in some markets. 
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responded to host Tim Russert’s question about the poll mentioned above regarding the 
question of the speed of the response. 
You know, I'm going to take a line from Gene Robinson's column this morning 
where he talked about Kanye West, the rapper, coming out and saying George 
Bush doesn't care about black people.  Well, even though what--to a lot of 
people--and Condoleezza Rice has said, "Oh, come on, that's ridiculous"--the 
question is the wrong question, whether he personally cares. This isn't about 
whether the president is a racist or whether anybody in his family is.  It's a 
question about whether this catastrophe exposed a divide that was already there 
in a way that allowed not only black folks but a lot of white folks, too, to say, 
"There is a real problem here." 
 
Heretofore, the Republicans and Ken Mehlman, the head of the Republican 
National Committee, and the White House, had been approaching this in a 
purely political sense.  "Let's see if we can peel off some black voters, black 
conservatives, go at them through the churches."  What this has exposed is that 
this is not a political solution.  This is not a political problem.  This is a social 
concern, which has been roiling for a while.  But that it took something this 
catastrophic for the president to address, in the way he did, in his speech 
Thursday night, and, even then, only addressing it as a regional concern.6 
 
“Gene Robinson’s column” on the op-ed page of the Washington Post to which 
Ifill referred had this to say about the West comments. 
I don't expect the president to know who Kanye West is, since hip-hop isn't his 
thing, and maybe he shouldn't care that this talented, impertinent young man told 
a national television audience that "George Bush doesn't care about black 
people." But shouldn't he give some thought to the polls indicating that three out 
of four African Americans agree? One reference to historical racism, as if he had 
just learned of it, won't change many minds. The vast majority of black people 
in this country believe their president doesn't care a hoot about them, and that 
doesn't provoke even a tinge of where-did-I-go-wrong?7 
 
 It is first important to note that Ifill’s suggestion that Kanye West’s “question is 
the wrong question” seems to be a rather thin reading of West’s participation in the 
debate.  Indeed, as mentioned above, it is not altogether clear whether the conversation 
about the Katrina disaster would include as bright a spotlight on race as it has without 
West’s improvisation on the NBC television special.  Also, Ifill might be inadvertently 
trivializing West’s comments by suggesting that he was onto the wrong question by 
                                                
6 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9327333/ 
7 Eugene Robinson, “beyond contrition,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/17/AR2005091700974.html?sub=new 
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proclaiming that Bush doesn’t “personally” care about Black people and that the larger 
and more appropriate area of inquiry is the larger “social concern” that Katrina exposed 
that Bush and the Republican party policies have failed to adequately address.  Yet, 
Kanye West did not use the adverb “personally” and it is certainly conceivable that the 
meaning of his words was indeed something like what Ifill suggested was the real 
question about Bush policies and the “social concern” Katrina exposed.   
 Robinson’s column to which Ifill ironically refers does not at all claim that West 
has raised the wrong question.  On the contrary, Robinson seems to say that if Bush 
doesn’t respect the messenger, he ought to at least pay heed to the message (“shouldn’t he 
[Bush] give some thought to the polls indicating that three out of four African Americans 
agree [with Kanye West]?”).  So, Ifill’s mention of Condoleeza Rice’s reaction that it is 
“ridiculous” to suggest that George Bush doesn’t “personally” care about Black people 
seems misplaced in one sense because such a characterization of West’s comments might 
not be true to his intent, but this reference (and Ifill seems to say she agrees with Rice) is 
also misplaced because she wants to align herself in some way with Robinson who 
clearly disagrees with Rice’s reaction and indeed, by the end of her comments, Ifill 
agrees with Robinson that Katrina exposed race as a substantive social issue that Bush 
and other conservatives have failed to treat seriously enough. 
 In the final analysis, perhaps Gwen Ifill and Eugene Robinson are not saying 
anything much different than Kanye West said.  The difference is in the delivery.  Kanye 
West is hip-hop.  Ifill and Robinson are not. 
Prophets and Parrhesiasts 
 My introduction to the underground hip-hop scene in Chicago was at an 
international conference on “hip-hop and social change” hosted by a museum on the 
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city’s south side in 2003.  Panels and workshops were facilitated and attended by hip-hop 
artists, scholars, journalists, and enthusiasts from around the globe.  The scope of the 
conference was impressive.  Topics of panel discussions ranged from hip-hop’s cultural 
status to its political present and future while artists and educators conducted workshops 
on everything hip-hop from dance to rap to spoken word.  There was even a workshop 
dedicated explicitly to hip-hop and education.  The common and banal perception of hip-
hop as strictly a genre of music was dismantled at every turn here from the topics of 
discussion to the participants and attendees to the very fact that the conference was taking 
place at a reputable Chicago museum.   The two-day affair culminated with commercially 
successful (though also known for their more thoughtful/insightful lyrical content) MCs 
Mos Def and Talib Kweli delivering a joint keynote address, which amounted to a kind of 
state of the hip-hop union, to a standing room only crowd in the museum’s ample theater.    
 As a fan of hip-hop and a scholar with an emergent academic interest in the 
culture, I was aware of the growing number of organizing efforts within hip-hop, 
especially those that included or were hospitable to scholarly inquiry, yet this conference 
was bigger and broader and better attended than any other previous effort I had known.  
To be clear, this conference was not one of the many gatherings that use the name of hip-
hop to organize youth for a cause with the recognition that urban, minority teenagers and 
students, by and large, speak the language of hip-hop and can be organized around it.  
Instead, this conference, while it did not take an exclusionary position toward hip-hop’s 
teenage audience, was about taking a kind of internal audit of hip-hop’s socio-cultural 
status, taking stock of its current and future socio-political efficacy, and generally 
promoting the internal dialogue within the culture that inevitably unmasks sharp 
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ideological divisions between schools of thought inside the culture.  It, therefore,e was 
attended and facilitated by those who participate in the culture at the level of this internal 
conversation and reflection.  In this case, that included some teenage hip-hop enthusiasts, 
but mostly the conference was a conversation between artists, journalists, and educators.  
Many of these participants (facilitators, panelists, attendees) were local. 
 Melek Yonin8, local MC/spoken word artist was on the first panel I attended.  He 
joined other local hip-hop artists in a general discussion of hip-hop’s cultural status.  It 
was immediately apparent that Melek was deeply reflective and decidedly articulate.  
After the session was over, I met Melek face-to-face for the first time after a few phone 
conversations, and he immediately accepted me as a kind of friend/colleague.  Not only 
was he summarily accepting of a role in the study, but he was poised to introduce me to 
any number of his local colleagues and a number of others at the conference with whom  
he had a connection. 
 Melek introduced me to Idris Goodwin after the panel discussion.  Idris had been 
working with Melek on the beginnings of a two-man hip-hop show that combined rap, 
spoken word, and comedic sketches.  Within minutes of meeting both of them, I was 
invited to go run errands, have lunch, and introduce my study to them.  They were both 
willing to participate and seemed genuinely interested in the study.  Their easy manner 
                                                
8 I will continue to refer to this particular artist as “Melek” throughout the body of this study.  Melek Yonin 
is the Hebrew name that operates, for him, as a kind of alias.  He is mostly known by what he refers to as 
his “government name,” Kevin Coval.  While it is certainly uncommon to make mention of an actual name 
of a participant in an ethnography, I do so here, after much discussion with the artist, in order to properly 
cite his published work.  Toward the end of the study, Melek published a book of his original poems under 
the name Kevin Coval and this work will be cited throughout the study.  While I want to give credit to the 
name under which the work is published, it is equally important to stress the importance of “Melek Yonin.”  
Much of his working out of his own identity is captured in the tension between the “government name,” 
Kevin, and the Hebrew name, Melek.  In one conversation about this tension, he characterized his internal 
debate about which name to use as “a struggle.”  This is due, in large part, to the fact that Melek claims that 
hip-hop was the exclusive channel through which he reconciled himself with Judaism.  This is discussed at 
length below.   
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and their willingness to include me in their day suggested they were offering friendship 
as well as participation. 
The conference, Melek’s readiness to work with me, and the other artists I met 
that day were the beginning of my experiential understanding of the culture’s communal 
sense.  From that time forward, I was introduced to dozens of people who Melek thought 
might benefit the study, including Dove Rock who eventually became a third focus along 
with Melek and Idris.  It was this introduction to a segment of Chicago’s underground 
scene that first began to foreground particular characteristics of the culture.  The 
conference was a manifestation of internal dialogue and critique, one of hip-hop’s most 
animating features.  In all the panel discussions, workshops, even the keynote address, 
there was an emphasis on conversation between panelists, between workshop facilitators 
and attendees, and between keynote speakers and audience members in a way that set it 
apart from other conferences or meetings in which the line between presenter or speaker 
and audience is more clearly marked. 
 
Parrhesia and Personal Risk 
Part and parcel of the kind of dialogue that happens in hip-hop culture and was 
evidenced by the conference is a related animating feature of hip-hop articulated in one of 
its oldest mantras, “keepin’ it real,” which is the linguistic kin of “say it plain” from 
Black homiletics.  Like most hip-hop apothegms, “keepin’ it real” is not strictly defined 
but is felt and experienced on an affective level.  When it is operating alongside dialogue 
this sentiment signifies a stripped down, raw and frank kind of speech free from the 
constraint of a conservative convention of propriety and tact.  “Keepin’ it real” does not 
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connote rudeness or insensitivity, but rather the kind of plain speech that might be 
captured by the ancient Greek idea of parrhesia.  According to Cornel West, parrhesia is 
“fearless speech … that unsettles, unnerves, and unhouses people from their uncritical 
sleepwalking.”9  For West, parrhesia is part of a Socratic commitment to courageous 
opposition (in the case of Socrates, to the sophists) found in his claim from Plato’s 
Apology (24a), “Plain speech is the cause of my unpopularity.”  
Kristen Kennedy, in her discussion of the use of parrhesia by the Cynics, claims 
that, “Despite its multiple uses and changing contexts, parrhesia generally means 
freedom of speech, the practice of frank and open discourse.”10  This reading of parrhesia 
meshes well with Cornel West’s conception of parrhesia as “plain, frank speech” aimed 
at unsettling and unnerving for the purposes of providing the “lifeblood of any 
democracy.”11  Kennedy’s discussion of parrhesia is especially instructive when 
considering the notion as a central, animating feature of hip-hop culture.  In addition to 
defining it as a kind of freedom of speech or frank speech, Kennedy assigns to the Cynic 
parrhesiast the description of “one who speaks openly and at great risk” and also one 
who “creates the space to speak out.”12  It is difficult to imagine a more appropriate 
notion to describe the dialogue within hip-hop as speaking frankly at great risk, and the 
creating of space for speaking out are fundamental ideas in the culture.  Hip-hop artists 
are taught through the cultural milieu (and often though explicit instruction) to tell their 
own stories with a kind of openness and frankness that lays bare the possibility of 
                                                
9 Cornel West, Democracy Matters: Winning the Fight Against Imperialism, (New York: Penguin, 2004). 
10 Kristen Kennedy, “Cynic Rhetoric:  The Ethics and Tactics of Resistance,” Rhetoric Review, Vol.18, 
No.1 (Autumn, 1999), 33. 
11 Cornel West, Democracy Matters: Winning the Fight Against Imperialism, (New York: Penguin, 2004), 
19, 209. 
12 Kristen Kennedy, “Cynic Rhetoric:  The Ethics and Tactics of Resistance,” Rhetoric Review, Vol.18, 
No.1 (Autumn, 1999), 27. 
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personal risk.  Indeed, performing in front of an audience with such plainness carries with 
it an inherent emotional risk.13  Dove Rock talks about the kind of vulnerability involved 
in telling personal narratives through art. 
Dove:  I find it a lot easier to write music with a political agenda [as 
opposed to personal narratives] … the personal stuff is 100% me … And I 
think also there’s a lot more risk involved.  You have to have a certain 
level of trust with your audience … if I’m talking about something that’s 
really personal, for somebody to criticize that, it can be really difficult. 
KK:  And that experience of having a personal experience or narrative 
feels different than a political message being criticized? 
Dove:  Oh yeah, definitely.  And I think that does have a little bit to do 
with the fact that in a political arena you have reinforcements.  Generally 
you have people standing behind your beliefs [but] with personal issues, 
it’s just you … it’s your own battle. 
The vulnerability inherent in laying bare one’s personal issues through art has a kind of 
double effect when the art is performed and Dove is tuned into this layered vulnerability 
of self-examination manifested in artistic creation and the risk of performing the result. 
Dove:  [I’m] trying to convince the audience that I’m experiencing these 
feelings at the time I’m performing, trying to put myself in the place that I 
was when I wrote that particular piece [but] with the political songs it’s a 
little bit easier to do that because, like I said, you feel the sense of having 
                                                
13 I have witnessed students as young as 13 tell deeply personal stories through their spoken word 
performances and the emotional investment and risk is often obvious.  During a spoken word competition I 
was judging, an African-American teenager told the story of the moment she found out that her brother had 
been shot by her ex-boyfriend.  The personal risk she took in performing the piece was palpable. 
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backup … but with the more personal stuff, I think, it’s another area of 
vulnerability, you know what I mean?  Not only are the things you’re 
saying exposing a very vulnerable side of yourself, but now you’re also 
displaying what that feels like, if that makes sense. 
KK:  Like you’re naked on two different levels? 
Dove:  You’re naked on two different levels, yeah. 
This multi-layered vulnerability, rooted in the idea of keepin’ it real/parrhesia is 
so foundational to hip-hop culture that it transcends its status as mantra to become in no 
small part constitutive of the very identity of the artists.  Melek Yonin often talks about 
the idea that hip-hop “demands” of its participants that they “represent,” which for Melek 
means telling their own personal stories and therefore opening themselves to the kind of 
vulnerability involved in articulating those stories with the additional layer of risk added 
through performing them.  Melek’s own identity is bound up with an idea he attributes to 
one of his personal inspirations, Chicago poet Gwendolyn Brooks, of “telling the story 
that’s in front of your nose.”  For Melek, this is sometimes the story of local Chicago 
realities including the social miseries that come from institutionalized racism, hyper-
privatization, and gentrification.  These are certainly part of the stories in front of his 
nose.  Sometimes he writes and tells the stories of everyday people, ostensibly ordinary 
lives that become extraordinary through what he often refers to as “the poetic 
imagination.”  But more than that, the story in front of his nose is a story about himself, 
and this story is replete with his working out, grappling with, and embracing his Jewish 
heritage.  It often involves the telling of deeply personal family events and conversations 
as in the piece, “family feud.” 
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my mother’s voice rises 
like defense shields when i ask if she wants 
my daughter to be murdered by bombs  
built of self-delusion 
 
my father screams  
fists thru my face when i mention 
this new war aids right wing rhetoric 
and maybe the government is involved 
in ways known secret books from now 
 
my grandfather gone three years, returns 
between john wayne AMC marathons 
george m. cohan in front of a dead tv 
tells me ike and mcarthur are patriots 
i should leave this country if i won’t 
lay truth down for it 
 
my Uncle Steven 
thirty years earlier took manuscripts to manhattan 
moved office mail and furniture, bike messengered 
in the dusk of empire, left wife and german Shepard 
sister, brother and Mother Ellie, draft dodged and drugged 
rather than continue scraping knuckles against his father’s  
nearsightedness 
 
my family says i remind them of him 
every time i open my mouth and dream14 
 
Here we see that the risk and vulnerability involved in the artistic revealing of 
intimate, personal (and in this case familial) dynamics and experiences are a part of 
keepin’ it real for Melek.  This is so because the hip-hop aesthetic calls for such personal 
vulnerability.  It is a prodigious part of what drew Melek to hip-hop in the first place.  
The idea is that in the best of hip-hop culture, there is no disconnect between the self and 
the art.  The hip-hop aesthetic is contrasted with what Melek calls “a white aesthetic” and 
“a white politic.”  I once asked him about the differences between performing in front of 
predominantly white audiences and predominantly nonwhite audiences. 
                                                
14 Kevin Coval, Slingshots:  A Hip-Hop Poetica (Channahon, IL: EM Press, 2005). 
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Melek:  I think I’ll offend a lot more people in predominantly white 
audiences. 
KK:  Because? 
Melek:  Because the politic is not like a white politic.  It’s not a white 
aesthetic, it’s not a white politic.  It challenges those things.  It pushes 
them and, like, punches them and makes people uncomfortable.  It says 
things that people who look like me probably shouldn’t say in their [the 
audience’s] mind.  Certainly I say things that Jews in dominant cultural 
consciousness should not be saying. 
KK:  Such as? 
Melek:  I believe in the state of Palestine.  I believe that Israel is 
participating in white colonialism, that Jews have been steadily 
participating in white colonialism, have paid the price of the ticket in order 
to assimilate and be safe here but we have lost so much along the way, you 
know, and it’s a tragedy.  It’s a tragedy because we don’t know who we 
are anymore and it’s a tragedy because we’re practicing the techniques of 
our master. 
KK:  You say that shit in the synagogue? 
Melek:  Yeah 
KK and Melek:  [laugh] 
Melek:  That’s probably why I don’t get invited to too many 
KK:  What’s a white aesthetic? 
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Melek:  It’s a kind of pseudo-objectivity that white sociologists and 
ethnographers and novelists have maintained where they don’t think that 
they exist within their words.  They try to limit themselves within their 
words but by doing so they inevitably, they’re present but like whiteness 
they are present by their absence.  Everything and nothing.  A white 
aesthetic tries desperately not to think about who the author is. 
 In addition to the insightful comments about whiteness, Melek’s ideas here show us that 
by contrast the hip-hop aesthetic is one in which the artists do “exist within their words” 
or their performances.  This means that, similar to critical qualitative researchers, hip-hop 
artists know that their work is always, to some degree or another, about them.15  It is the 
knowing that the self exists in the words/works of the artist that separates a hip-hop 
aesthetic from the so-called white aesthetic.  Hip-hop, instead of grasping for an elusive 
objectivity, acknowledges, embraces, and often celebrates the presence of the self within 
each of its expressions and for Melek the self is in part constituted by this notion that he 
exists within his words.  Therefore there is a dynamic relationship between the idea that 
the self is present in the art and Melek’s reconstructions of self that are dependent on the 
hip-hop aesthetic.  Put another way, the parrhesiast in Melek is a result of the working 
out of the self through a hip-hop aesthetic that acknowledges the presence of self in its 
articulations such that parrhesia operates simultaneously as medium and outcome of hip-
                                                
15 Phil Francis Carspecken, Critical Ethnography in Educational Research : A Theoretical and Practical 
Guide, Critical Social Thought (New York: Routledge, 1996), Phil Francis Carspecken, Four Scenes for 
Posing the Question of Meaning and Other Essays in Critical Philosophy and Critical Methodology (New 
York: Peter Lang, 1999), Norman K. Denzin, Performance Ethnography : Critical Pedagogy and the 
Politics of Culture (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003), Norman K. Denzin, Yvonna S. Lincoln, and 
NetLibrary Inc., The Landscape of Qualitative Research Theories and Issues (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: 
SAGE, 1998). 
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hop culture.  This also means that parrehesia describes both a cultural value in hip-hop 
and an aesthetic sensibility. 
 
Parrhesia and Political Risk    
There is another kind of risk for the parrhesiast in addition to the vulnerability 
involved in confronting, writing, telling, and performing revealing personal stories.  
Kennedy discusses the overtly political use of parrhesia by the Cynics to “speak openly 
to leaders and others with power to note their hypocrisies and abuses.”16  This kind of 
parrhesia also operates in hip-hop and carries with it a different kind of risk.  When 
spoken word artists or MCs use parrhesia as political or socio-cultural criticism, they run 
the risk of alienating or offending portions of their audience through their frankness and 
also of becoming targets of the hegemons they criticize.  Yet, hip-hoppers are taught 
through the culture to keep it real which is a simultaneous encouragement to dispose of 
the kind of filtering that mainstream American culture typically invokes when the subject 
matter is harsh and upsetting or disturbing and incensing (see the contrast between Gwen 
Ifill’s and Kanye West’s delivery) even though its targets may be powerful or influential 
individuals or institutions. 
 As an example of this kind of risk, Melek Yonin wrote and performed several 
poems in the controversial aftermath of Mel Gibson’s film, The Passion of The Christ.  
Melek’s response included caustic criticism of Gibson’s film mostly in the context of 
defending Melek’s own Jewish heritage.  One such poem, “The Bitch in You: for mel 
gibson,” elicited this response from Michael Eric Dyson:  “ … [that was] raw, straight no 
                                                
16 Kristen Kennedy, “Cynic Rhetoric:  The Ethics and Tactics of Resistance,” Rhetoric Review, Vol.18, 
No.1 (Autumn, 1999), 33. 
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chaser.  That’s the real lethal weapon right there.”17  In this piece, Melek uses moments 
of comic relief to play off of the more acrimonious passages, yet even the comic elements 
are part of a whole that is scathing and unrelenting.  The piece begins,  
if you really want to talk about it 
(and I think you don’t) 
 
let’s start with your conquistador Australian aboriginal killin 
afrikaans apartheid separatist evangelical klansmen crusade 
 
your alcoholic rapist phallocentric lethal weapon 
forced into temples of bubbes, abulitas, and granmammas 
in every continent you ever got lost on 
 
you pompous pilot 
roman bathhouse closing closet fascist third reich memorabilia 
collecting dick sucker like Hoover damn cointelpro Hollywood 
mkkkarthy blacklist Robeson jew-baiting pinko commy snitch 
 
In the wake of Gibson’s The Passion of The Christ, plenty of rabbis and other Jewish 
leaders could be found articulating their disappointment in the offensive anti-Semitic tone 
of the film on cable news network shows.  Even the most brazen of these opponents of 
the film did not come close to keeping it as real as Melek does in his piece.  He continues 
by switching from the personal critique to a sophisticated analysis of Gibson’s film 
followed by an outright assault on Gibson’s rejection of Vatican II Catholicism, 
 you steadily been revising history 
 only got libeled kings’ accounts of what happened 
 journals and gospels of war captains and capitalists 
 first hand records lost like ashes in smoke stacked ovens 
 indistinguishable body parts in mass graves 
 
 your church is full of shit and martyrs beatified after you killed them 
 this is not to mention Lumumba and Malcolm, Medgar and Emmett 
 the 6 million, gypsies and homosexuals, Galileo, all the strike leaders 
 the Harolds and Hamptons, Lozanos you can’t Lazarus, this is not to mention 
 crusades and inquisitions, missionary slave shackles with biblical justifications 
                                                
17 See front matter of Coval, Slingshots:  A Hip-Hop Poetica. 
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 american presidents enacting end time scenarios with the lives of poor kids 
 sent to stand in front of the missiles and die for the cross (i mean flag)18  
 
Though there is much in this piece that would be taken as crass and offensive by 
some, the very point for the parrhesiast and for the prophetic voice in hip-hop culture is 
to unsettle and unnerve those who oppress and marginalize as well as those who would 
sympathize with the oppressors and with those who marginalize through an unwillingness 
to point out hypocrisy in plain and frank language, or those who might choose instead to 
use a more filtered language of criticism that takes the bite (and in the eyes of hip-hop 
culture, the “realness” and perhaps effectiveness) out of caustic messages like the one in 
Melek’s “love song for mel,” as he calls it.  The piece is indicative of parrhesia as part of 
an aesthetic sensibility in hip-hop and beyond that, the performance of this caustic 
criticism is an indicator of the place parrhesia has in constructions of self in the culture.  
Melek’s identity is bound up in the demand of the hip-hop aesthetic to tell his story even 
when the story brims with a kind of rage that makes audiences uncomfortable.  So tied to 
his identity is Melek’s sense of prophetic voice/parrhesia that he did not hesitate to 
perform a series of pieces attacking white supremacy that included a few “love songs for 
mel” and specifically, “The Bitch in You: for mel gibson,” at a local, predominantly 
white Catholic university!  This courageous move was accompanied by an introduction 
by Melek in which he asserted his Jewish heritage and pointedly, yet somehow 
punctiliously, invited his largely Catholic audience to give his trenchant criticism a fair 
hearing.  An identity partially constituted by this sense of prophetism, articulated through 
the aesthetic sensibilities of the culture result in Melek taking such profuse risks as this. 
                                                
18 From an unpublished set of poems entitled, Whiteboy Down. 
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This political risk that Kennedy claims the Cynics enacted through leveling frank 
speech at the hypocrisy of leaders and those in power finds congruence with Cornel 
West’s “tracking hypocrisy” component of prophetic thought.  Melek’s parrhesia 
certainly takes the form of tracking hypocrisy of individuals and institutions of power 
and, like West’s notion, it functions with a self-critical component as well.  The 
criticisms of Mel Gibson’s Catholicism are joined in Melek’s corpus by pieces that 
reflectively target his own religious heritage, as in the daring piece, “no better.” 19 
we know better 
have known bitter 
each year marror 
matzah sandwiches of affliction 
parsley slave tears/late night exodus 
we fled all of europe/first blamed 
hid secrets in our shoes/diaspora 
culture where we populate/infiltrate 
assimilate/the world’s finest chameleons 
we could look light/white/like hosts 
walk into diners after sunsets and order bacon 
new names to pass/knew the new deal/the steal 
tucked between legs trembling before shiksa infidelities20 
 
The repetition of the collective first-person pronoun is both an explicit indication of the 
presence of the self within the art and an embodiment of the prophetic pragmatist notion 
of tracking hypocrisy, specifically the self-critical moment of locating oneself within a 
particular hypocrisy.  This piece rises to a poignant crescendo with a refrain at the end in 
which the playing with “know better/no better” becomes less of a device and more of an 
explicit, opprobrious internal audit of his own people. 
no better 
  than roman emperors 
   crusade leaders 
                                                
19 Coval, Slingshots:  A Hip-Hop Poetica. 
20 Ibid, 63. 
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    knesset klansmen 
 
no better  
  than sharonian war criminals 
   arafatian castro infidels 
    imperial ghetto kings 
 
no better  
  than rabid hand puppets 
   golden calf slum lords 
    genocidal amnesiacs 
 
no better  than christians 
no better than white men 
  than nuevo fascists 
  than a million mccarthyites 
no better than syrian armies  
  than suicide bombers 
  than arab holocaust deniers 
no better  than blind shepards 
no better than cain21 
 
Each of the artists in this study, in her or his own style, both embodies and 
produces work that incorporates the prophetic/parrhesiast notion of using frank speech to 
confront the abuses of those in power.  To different degrees, they each bring critique to 
bear on large, formal governments (particularly the U.S.).  They also engage the notion of 
the politics of the personal through their critical artistic expression.  Both Idris and Dove 
have written and performed songs to this effect.  Idris’s song, “Mr. Hipster,” though 
arguably less abrasive and emotionally charged than Melek Yonin’s “The Bitch in You: 
for mel gibson,” still effectively enacts the parrhesiast’s mode of unfiltered, direct 
critique without regard for the politcal risk involved.  Here, Idris takes on the hipster 
journalist art critic.  This is a distinct theme in his work and it comes up routinely in 
conversation.  While Melek’s targets are likely to be social and political hegemons, 
                                                
21 Ibid, 64. 
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Idris’s parrhesia is often aimed at what he perceives to be self-interested criticism and 
commentary on his (and others’) art.  The chorus of the piece directly addresses a 
generic, self-interested critic. 
Hey there Mr. hipster 
Why don't you come define these lines I draw 
Just take your brilliant ink 
and make me sink to the bottom 
Then bring me back up 
 
PBR crack another as you attack a brother 
Miss the point 
Mistake make another 
 
About 
 
Exactly what I do and make reference to22 
 
Here we see for the first time a stylistic distinction in Idris’s use of humor within the 
critique.  Specifically, this comedic criticism is aimed at those with whom Idris finds 
fault for writing contemporary art criticism that misunderstands its object in part because 
there is often an attempt by the critic to promote herself with lofty language and 
exposition at the expense of an accurate understanding and evaluation of the art.  “Mr. 
Hipster’s” last verse is another comedic confrontation of this kind of self-absorbed 
journalism and failure to understand hip-hop. 
We call this thing hip hop 
One, twos and the don't stops 
Don't got no big club house 
Some need to get kicked out 
It's a plain fact/ that power gotta get took back 
why I'm 'posed to listen to Brian Nemtusak 
jockin zev love x but he'd probably diss you 
you aint hear peach-fuzz till the kmd reissue 
Who got the biggest verbs? 
whose got the biggest words? 
                                                
22 Idris Goodwin, Idris Goodwin (chicago: naivete records, 2004). 
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it's a one legged race to see who's the biggest nerd23 
This direct confrontation with those in power certainly embodies a different mood 
than Melek’s more astringent tone, yet the frankness and direct confrontation is there and 
is again bound up in the identity of the artist.  “Mr. Hipster” reflects Idris’s artistic 
heritage and influences.  
Idris: [responding to a question about the direction of his art in the future] 
My sense of humor is a huge part of who I am and a huge part of what I 
think will be unique about me as a voice.  And some of my fucking 
biggest influences and heroes are comics. 
The parrhesia in Idris’s work naturally emerges through this comedic influence, and the 
prophetism in his voice and corpus is colored with the humor of the comics that 
influenced his aesthetic sensibilities.  But the common ground that is shared by all three 
artists is that their reconstructions of self are informed by the parrhesia/prophetism of 
hip-hop aesthetics, and, in turn, the self that is so informed influences the art that is 
produced so that both the identity of the artist and the art are organically tied to 
parrhesia/prophetism even while particular artistic sensibilities may differ from artist to 
artist. 
In one interview, Idris began to work out the idea that labeling and defining a 
particular artistic sensibility diminishes its power and mystery, as in trying to define “the 
blues” or hip-hop.  He suggested that those who want to compose and apply particular 
definitions to the sensibilities within hip-hop culture are like the self-interested journalists 
in that their analyses become more self-promotion than anything else and at the same 
                                                
23 Ibid. 
 113
time their definitions and labels, in effect, are too narrow to capture fully the essence of 
the culture, if there is such a thing.  Because of this Idris prefers more informal and 
sometimes visceral responses to the art such as, “that was dope!”  
KK:  But “dope” doesn’t really capture what it is – like when you label it 
something? 
Idris:  Yeah, it’s like “X” but like “dope” being “X,” the unknown, it 
shows more respect for that thing by not trying to say, [mocking highbrow 
critical tone] “Yeah, what it is, it’s a pastiche … what you’re doing is 
transforming the pain of your people.  It’s the rage, Black rage personified 
…” you know what I mean?  That’s fucking irritating.  When people come 
up to me and they’re like, “yo man, that shit was cold, man … you sick, 
you a beast,” that means a lot because it has such an effect you can’t even 
really put it into words.  To me that’s more flattering than like [mocking 
tone again] “Goodwin comes from a long tradition of battle-scarred 
griots,” it’s like, what the fuck are you talking about?  Just shut up because 
that’s not about me, that’s about you.  That’s about you trying to sound a 
certain way.  That’s about you trying to align yourself in a way with what 
it is – I mean, I’m not saying – I’m obviously going to an extreme in this 
regard.  Flattery is great.  But, to me, it almost takes away from the 
unknown part of “that shit was dope!” 
We see again Idris’s comedic style in the foreground of this comment, but it constitutes a 
comedic parrhesia nonetheless.  He wonders aloud about whether or not his direct 
confrontation with the highbrow analyses that he mocks prohibits him from being in the 
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right frame to mind for obtaining grants for the production of his art.  But, ultimately, the 
hip-hop aesthetic informs Idris’s identity with its prophetic sense and parrhesiast 
disposition such that Idris must keep it real when it comes to confronting those who 
would seek to label and define what Idris views as resisting definition beyond, “that was 
dope!” and other more immediate, felt responses. 
Idris’s distinct way of working out his parrhesia with humor is matched by Dove 
Rock’s particular prophetic voice that manifests itself in confrontation of gender 
oppression.  She has thought and reflected deeply about gender issues in general and 
gender and hip-hop in particular.  It stands to reason that in a culture dominated by men 
and containing pockets of patriarchy and misogyny, a female artist would necessarily 
grapple with gender issues and Dove has certainly done so in sophisticated ways.  So 
entrenched is the masculinity within hip-hop that even some of the more “conscious” 
artists in terms of politics or social ills have been known to express patriarchal and 
misogynist lyrics and messages. 
Dove:  [in a discussion about hip-hop and misogyny] I had The Roots 
“Things Fall Apart” album and maybe like a month after it came out I read 
this interview with them and um, they had called themselves like self-
proclaimed bitch pullers or something like that and after I read that I just 
gave it away – or I threw it out.  I got rid of it regardless and I’ve never 
bought another Roots album since. 
 So, Dove’s parrhesia that confronts those in power has as its target those misogynists 
and patriarchs within the culture.  Her song, “estrogen” has all the ingredients (perhaps 
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even in the title itself) of risk that a parrhesiast takes with regard to a prospective 
audience. 
 
Phallic keys tell fallacies to unlock chastities 
Bubblegum pop love songs as pubescent unsung 
rhapsodies 
The centaur flees to trample cherry trees in teenage 
tragedies 
while Venus slits her wrists with blades of inadequacy 
 
Words laced with hate disguised as flattery 
She's the energizer playboy bunny of the verbal 
battery 
She's a body first before mind 
cursed to pace to rythems set in King James time 
Bleeding for Eve she dies ribless 
There's mountains peaking in her dress 
Baptisms in her uterus 
Her sister slid into urethras and got lost 
Her mother Lilith, being nailed to an x-chromosome 
cross 
Pink Y-me ribbons serve as nuses for the cause 
Wasn't it Father Freedom who wrapped Lady Justice's 
eyes with gauze? 
 
Where do I belong 
Where do I belong? 
Between a sanitary pad and an erogenous zone 
Where do I belong 
when estrogen drowns in a teaspoon of testosterone 
estrogen drowns in a teaspoon of testosterone24 
 
Dove has performed this piece in many male-dominated settings.  Her peers and 
her audience are largely male.  No doubt Dove is aware during the writing and 
performing process that those who experience a song such as “estrogen” will be 
overwhelmingly male and it is likely that in every performance setting, given the 
misogynist and patriarchal segments of the hip-hop community, that some in her 
audience will be hostile to the ideas so directly confronted by the piece.  However, much 
                                                
24 Dove Rock, Sylvia Plath Easybake Oven (Chicago: iron vagina records, 2005). 
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like Melek and his trenchant criticisms of Mel Gibson’s Catholicism performed at a 
Catholic university and like Idris’s comedic criticisms of the very journalists and analysts 
that have the power to recommend his work to the public (or not), Dove’s identity is too 
much bound up in the hip-hop aesthetic that promotes the prophetic voice despite the risk 
to ease up on her raw descriptions of female experience regardless (or perhaps because) 
of the makeup of her audience.   
In interviews, Dove talks about the frustrations of being an artist in a genre so 
colonized by men.  This frustration does not necessarily seem to discourage her in 
general and it certainly does not discourage her from writing songs that meet the 
patriarchy in hip-hop head-on.  She is acutely aware of how gender operates in the 
culture. 
Dove:  sometimes when I meet new people and they’re not familiar with 
what I do and they ask, “Well, what do you do?” and I say, “Well, I’m an 
MC,” sometimes they’re like, “Oh really?  Rhyme.”  You know.  And it’s 
like, “What do you do?”  You know, plumbing?  You wanna go fix me a 
toilet? 
KK: (laughs) right 
Dove:  and that’s really annoying.  And equally annoying are the people 
who give me like this “honorary penis” or “she’s dope, she’s female and 
she rhymes and she’s dope.”  And it’s like, so what?  You know what I 
mean? 
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KK:  Right.  So you find people either expressing some sort of doubt that 
you have skills like “Okay, rhyme if you’re an MC.”  Or, if they recognize 
that you’ve got skills it’s like you’ve got man skills or something like that. 
Dove:  Sometimes, sometimes.  Some people, I mean there’s a couple of 
people who’ve been good about that but there have been a number of 
shows that I’ve been introduced as “the dopest female MC” … and I 
would rather be considered a very good MC … 
KK:  Because it implies that any female MC is inferior to any male MC. 
Dove:  Right, totally, it’s like giving us our own category … 
 The way the parrhesia/prophetism manifests itself in Dove’s work is through a 
kind of feminist education for her peers and audience that is likely to be somewhat 
ignorant of or perhaps hostile to the female experience.  Since the culture is so male-
driven the voices telling stories from a female perspective are usually found on the 
margins of any segment of the culture but Dove is aware of the necessity to speak with 
that voice. 
Dove:  My writing is based on my life experiences and my thoughts and, 
you know, being a woman I definitely have a lot of experiences that I feel 
the need to talk about like “estrogen” like, that song is basically just about 
what it’s like to be a woman and like misogyny and … I have mostly male 
friends and like, while I love my friends to death it never ceases to amaze 
me how absolutely oblivious they are to [the female experience]. 
KK:  Right. 
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Dove:  You know, to walk down the street and not be harassed, you 
know?  That’s a privilege. 
 
Creating Space 
Kristen Kennedy’s notion of the Cynic parrhesiast creating space to speak out 
finds much congruence with hip-hop culture.  Creating the space to speak openly has 
been a part of hip-hop since the days of the Creation Myth of Kool Herc in the Bronx 
when early hip-hop parties were precisely a seizing of public space and eventually a 
stealing of electricity.  To this day, carving out space for expression is an animating 
feature of the culture.25  The specific ways in which the creation of space manifests itself 
in hip-hop culture is well rehearsed most notably in Chang (2005), Forman (2002), 
Forman and Neal (2004), and Perry (2004).  For the purposes of this study, it is important 
to note that such space creation connected to the idea of speaking out in a frank manner 
constitutes a form of parrhesia as described by Kennedy.  Additionally, it will be 
important to get clear about how this kind of parrhesia is viewed and treated by the 
subjects of this study. 
Melek is very much tuned into the creation of space in hip-hop.  His sense of this 
feature of hip-hop culture is strongly connected to the idea that hip-hop is the artistic 
creation of the abandoned and the forgotten. 
Melek:  You know, one time I heard Cornel West say that hip-hop is the 
articulation of “the latch key kids.”  Plain and simple.  So, and he said, 
regardless of if it’s urban, suburban, white, Black, Latino, whatever, it’s 
                                                
25 Murray Forman, The 'Hood Comes First: Race, Space, and Place in Rap and Hip-Hop, Music/Culture 
(Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 2002). 
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the generation of latch key kids that created the music.  You know, it’s 
kids whose parents were working or not, but would come home and have 
the after school time to do whatever they imagined, you know.  And, my 
brother and I were latch key kids and we invented not hip-hop, but we 
invented crazy games by ourselves, you know, we’d play stickball behind 
the Ace Hardware and use their sod bags as bases and imagine ourselves 
as Darryl Strawberry and Doc Gooden … So, I think, in some ways, why 
does hip-hop get created?  It’s kinda the next expression of a soul music, 
it’s a post-industrial soul music.  So, you take the relics of, I mean you 
have like, forgotten cities, you have the South Bronx is the ultimate 
metaphor for forgotten, abandoned, you know, “white flight” urban 
America.  You know, but you have this articulation of that experience.  
The bass in someone’s car is the insistence on being seen, as is the graff-
tag, as is breaking on the street … I don’t know, it’s just all these things 
that are forgotten and I think my experience in the suburbs was a forgotten 
experience.  It’s something that is discarded as well by popular culture or 
dominant culture.  It’s not what you hear about in the suburbs and, of 
course, the urban experience, period, and then the South Bronx experience 
specifically is not heard about in the popular dominant cultural 
consciousness either.  And so, there’s something about that … I was left 
out as well – and in different ways, but for some of the same reasons that 
[DJ Kool] Herc, other people are also left out. 
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The personal “forgotten” experience to which Melek refers is of a working class 
Jewish family trying to keep its financial head above water in the middle of a white collar 
suburb of Chicago.  Melek’s suburban experience is not similar to typical suburban 
stories, and it is this experience that, at least in part, is responsible for his felt connection 
with hip-hop culture. 
Melek:  In the suburbs we had a kinda like a, you know, there’s multiple 
experiences in the suburbs and we had kinda like an “other side of the 
track” type experience, you know.  Me, my mom, and my brother, ‘cause 
my parents were divorced when I was seven years old, and then, you 
know, we moved in the suburb nine times just evading landlords, not 
being able to pay rent here or there.  And because my mom wanted to keep 
us in the school system so we could get a good education.  I saw friends 
who lived in, you know, these huge mansions, rocked new Jordans all the 
time, drove cars at 16 and so on and so forth.  And, I don’t know, there 
was an economic inequity that I saw early, that I experienced early that 
hip-hop in some ways was beginning to articulate.  And of course mine 
was class and they were also talking about race and class, you know.  For 
some reason, there was a correlation.  Even though it’s dominantly Black 
men in the South Bronx … talking about class and economic, racial 
inequity.  You know there was something about my experience that I 
think, I was also like, “Okay.  Word.”  You know and I feel those 
sentiments.  I haven’t lived that life by any means, but I feel those 
sentiments.  
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Discursive Activism 
Additionally, according to Kennedy, the Cynics use of parrhesia could also be 
“extended to an imperative of discursive activism.”26   Hip-hop is seething with this kind 
of parrhesia and it takes but a cursory glance at the emergent body of hip-hop 
scholarship (or a listen to some recordings of “conscious” MCs) to unveil the discursive 
activism in the culture.27  Much of this kind of activism in hip-hop follows yet another 
line in Kennedy’s assessment of the Cynic parrhesiast.  In summing up her evaluation of 
Cynic parrhesia, Kennedy claims that it “called attention to unjust rhetorical contexts by 
highlighting those who were not invited to speak and then speaking in these places.”28  
Specifically for spoken word/hip-hop artists, this kind of activism on behalf of the 
marginalized is a familiar component of the culture.  Melek Yonin’s corpus (as well as 
the work of other hip-hop artists in Chicago) reflects this.  In an early interview I 
conducted with Melek, he recalled his days in a suburban white high school when he 
began to engage in the plain, frank speech he learned about through hip-hop.29 
Melek:  I think I really didn’t like my English or history teacher, you 
know?  So this is like sophomore or junior year of high school and I, like 
they were giving us this kinda white bread, Eurocentric curriculum and at 
that point I think, I had, I read Malcolm’s autobiography my sophomore 
                                                
26 Kristen Kennedy, “Cynic Rhetoric:  The Ethics and Tactics of Resistance,” Rhetoric Review, Vol.18, 
No.1 (Autumn, 1999), 36. 
27 See especially Chang (2005) and Forman and Neal (2004). 
28 Kristen Kennedy, “Cynic Rhetoric:  The Ethics and Tactics of Resistance,” Rhetoric Review, Vol.18, 
No.1 (Autumn, 1999), 37. 
29 The story of Melek’s high school experience bears on his connection with hip-hop.  He describes it as an 
“other side of the tracks” experience (in a economic sense) because he went to a suburban high school in 
which the majority of students came from affluent families, while Melek was moving around from one 
apartment complex to the other as his single mother struggled to make rent, trying to keep her sons in 
“good schools.” 
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year and then Lerone Bennett, Jr.’s History Before the Mayflower [sic] I 
think in my junior year … Was exposed to Baldwin, I think, my junior 
year.  And then I think my senior year, Nikki Giovanni, Sonia Sanchez.  
And it opened up a canon.  So I knew that, I mean, the first day of my U.S. 
history class my junior year, all I saw was white men on the wall.  The 
first time I got the book I went quickly to see what was gonna be talked 
about in terms of other forms of, er, other stories within, you know, the 
kind of white American narrative.  And there was about two pages about 
slavery and then there was like a paragraph literally about what they 
called, “the black revolt” and they had a picture of Martin Luther King.  
And I couldn’t believe it and so right away I kinda began to try to battle 
my history t--, I mean I raised my hand and I’m like, “Why are there only 
white men on this wall and this is a U.S. history class?”  And I just started 
writing essays that were super angry and like I was trying to, like I had 
heard about the battles and I don’t think I was conscious about, “Word, 
I’m gonna battle my English teacher, I’m gonna battle my history 
teacher.” 
 
These confrontations with teachers over a Eurocentric curriculum certainly 
amounted to significant risks for Melek.  He further described his teachers’ reactions to 
his “battling” them. 
 
Melek:  Oh, they hated me.  I mean, I got kicked out of class all the time.  
I’d get bad grades.  I think that they were, I mean, ‘cause I was coming at 
them.  I wasn’t trying to make this argument around what they were 
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saying.  I was like, “You, Mr. Rofholter or whoever the fuck you are, are 
wack!  This is why …”  You know?  How can you teach us about such and 
such and not give us the full story?  Why are we only covering, you know, 
why are we, you know, whoever my English teacher was, you know, why 
do we only read Edgar Allen Poe?  And whatever other dead white dude 
you wanna … And so, I don’t think that they appreciated it. 
Whether through the risk of personal vulnerability, the risk of direct confrontation 
with hegemons, the creation of space to speak out, or discursive activism, parrhesia is 
constitutive of what I am calling the prophetic voice in hip-hop, even as the idea of the 
prophetic remains an elusive concept as noted in chapter one.  The parrhesia in hip-hop 
aesthetics gives voice to what West refers to as “prophetic thought” that operates within 
the culture (i.e., the example of Melek’s aesthetic sensibilities operating with West’s idea 
of “tracking hypocrisy”).  I emphasize here that the parrhesia/prophetic voice is a part of 
a hip-hop aesthetic for the subjects of this study.  This aesthetic is then both medium and 
outcome of reconstructions of self within the culture. 
Related to the parrhesia/prophetism in hip-hop is the organic intellectualism with 
which several scholars and journalists have, mostly in passing, associated hip-hop artists.  
In what follows, I develop that association both theoretically and ethnographically.  Here 
I point out that organic intellectualism in hip-hop is related to the hip-hop artist as 
parrhesiast in two ways.  First, both are of extreme importance when considering the 
self-aesthetic relation of hip-hop artists.  Second, they are related substantively in that the 
notion of voice is essential to both and so it follows that voice is an important location of 
inquiry within hip-hop culture. 
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Organic Intellectualism 
While it can be argued that contemporary versions of the organic intellectual are 
in some ways continuous with Gramsci’s original formulation, the idea is employed 
today in ways Gramsci did not and probably could not anticipate.  Contemporary 
scholarship in a wide range of disciplines including sociology, cultural studies, and even 
ethnomusicology has stretched organic intellectualism into the postindustrial era, often 
adding additional modifiers to set a particular “brand” of organic 
intellectualism/Gramscianism apart from others (including the original version).  Mark 
Anthony Neal identifies “Celebrity Gramscians” and “soul Gramscians”30 in reference to 
politically trenchant/identity conscious rap and neo-soul artists.  Jeffrey Louis Decker 
speaks of “organic cultural intellectuals” referring to Black Nationalist hip-hoppers.31  
These reformulations follow the trajectory of the meaning of organic intellectual that led 
scholars of the generation preceding Neal and Decker to hold up Malcolm X and Martin 
Luther King, Jr. as American embodiments of Gramsci’s idea.  In other words, the 
contemporary versions of organic intellectualism have been and currently are largely 
informed by African American scholarship, style, sensibilities, and the “Black 
aesthetic”(this term is used in this essay in a more general sense than The Black Aesthetic 
that is associated with The Black Arts Movement).32  Further, the primary location for 
                                                
30 Mark Anthony Neal, Songs in the Key of Black Life:  A Rhythm and Blues Nation, (New York:  
Routledge,  2003). 
31 Jeffrey Louis Decker, “the state of rap:  time and place in hip-hop nationalism,” Social Text, 34 (1993), 
53-84. 
32 I do not mean to suggest here that there is one pure cultural stream that produces this aesthetic.  
However, that does not prohibit the existence of a bounded set of aesthetic sensibilities that is primarily 
informed by and associated with people of African descent.  This “Black aesthetic” is historically linked 
with Black arts movement figures such as Amiri Baraka.  This movement grew out of the need for African 
American artists to produce a system of art criticism that did not depend on Western standards.  See Sandra 
Govan, “The poetry of black experience as counterpoint to the poetry of the black aesthetic,” Negro 
American Literature Forum, Vol. 8, No. 4. (Winter, 1974), 288-292.  Or for an introduction to the more 
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today’s version of the organic intellectual is found in hip-hop culture (what I refer to as 
the postindustrial street intellectual).  Therefore, contemporary ideas about and 
contemporary embodiments of organic intellectualism are primarily informed by African 
American cultural sensibilities.   
Here I reconsider organic intellectualism, in light of the claims above, by first 
examining the intersection of Gramsci’s ideas and Cornel West’s neopragmatism, 
followed by an exploration of hip-hop culture and its resident “intellectuals.” These 
investigations naturally bump up against theoretical questions about what constitutes 
“doing philosophy,” the transfer of knowledge, the legitimacy and/or limitations of 
popular cultural expression, all of which yield important conclusions for theorists who 
seek to understand better the present cultural moment and its relationship with educative 
processes. 
 
Remaking Gramsci in the Image of Prophetic Pragmatism 
The currently privileged vocabulary for a position of intellectual engagement is 
taken from Gramsci, and it’s his concept of the “organic intellectual.”  It’s the 
term that has gained the greatest currency in the rhetoric of “oppositional 
criticism” but the difficulty is that it has been taken as such an ahistorical master 
concept.  Which is ironic, because Gramsci was hailed by Marxist theorists in 
England as a corrective to the massively ahistorical tendencies of structural 
theorists.33 
 
Henry Louis Gates, Jr.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
recent version, see Trey Ellis, “the new black aesthetic,” Callaloo, No. 38. (Winter, 1989), 233-243.  
Again, this essay employs a more general definition of the “Black aesthetic,” albeit, one that is informed 
by the more specific rendering in these articles.  Even more recently and related to the context of hip-hop, 
Imani Perry discusses the idea of claiming that hip-hop is Black music in a way that avoids essentializing it 
in Prophets of the Hood : Politics and Poetics in Hip Hop (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). 
33 Charles H. Rowell, “An Interview with Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,” Callaloo, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Spring 1991), 
457. 
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 It is conceivable that Gates was thinking of his friend and former Harvard 
colleague, Cornel West, when he made these statements about the ahistorical use of 
Gramsci’s organic intellectual.  West is clearly well-versed in Gramsci’s Marxism.  He 
devotes a significant portion of Prophesy Deliverance! (1982) to Gramsci’s ideas as he 
seeks to conjoin elements of the Marxist tradition with prophetic black Christianity.34  
Yet, on Gates’s terms, West might seem guilty as charged.  In his genealogy of American 
pragmatism that culminates in the articulation of his own neopragmatism, West reshapes 
Gramsci’s ideas for his own purposes since Gramsci employed a  
fluid Leninist conception of political organization and mobilization (which 
downplays the democratic and libertarian values of prophetic pragmatists) [and 
an] unswerving allegiance to sophisticated Marxist social theory (which is an 
indispensable yet ultimately inadequate weapon for prophetic pragmatists).35 
 
West takes Gramscian notions of praxis, intellectualism, and culture, rids them of 
their elements that are incommensurable with prophetic pragmatism, and adopts them for 
his project.  However, he challenges Gates’s assertion by doing so with sophistication 
and accuracy.  In other words, West is well aware of the historical specificity and the 
context of Gramsci’s ideas, but his scholarship and thinking have penetrated the Marxist 
tradition and Gramsci in particular in such a way that he is able to navigate the historical 
specificity and appropriately draw out Gramscian ideas and insert them into the prophetic 
pragmatist program. 
 Gramsci’s work provides a kind of balance that fits the aims of prophetic 
pragmatism.  West highlights the foregrounding of culture, the unity of theory and 
                                                
34 Cornel West, Prophesy Deliverance!:  An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity, (Westminster: 
Philadelphia, 1982). 
35 Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy:  A Genealogy of Pragmatism, (University of 
Wisconsin:  Madison, 1989), 231. 
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practice, and the political trenchancy in Gramsci.  In fact, these ideas “inspire” prophetic 
pragmatism.  Thus, he claims, 
[Gramsci is] the major twentieth-century philosopher of praxis, power, and 
provocation without devaluing theory, adopting unidimensional conceptions of 
power, or reducing provocation to Clausewitzian calculations of warfare.  
Gramsci’s work is historically specific, theoretically engaging, and politically 
activistic in an exemplary manner.  His concrete and detailed investigations are 
grounded in and reflections upon local struggles, yet theoretically sensitive to 
structural dynamics and international phenomena.36  
 
West also makes clear that prophetic pragmatism leans on Gramsci’s ideas about 
philosophy and its relationship with “common sense,” oppositional criticism, and the 
critical spirit.  For this reason, West places emphasis on Gramsci’s conception of 
philosophical activity as “a cultural battle to transform the popular ‘mentality.’”37 
Additionally, West aligns himself with Gramsci’s ideas about the philosophical elite, 
claiming, “prophetic pragmatist sensibilities permit (or even encourage) this [Gramsci’s] 
rejection of the arrogant scientistic self-privileging or haughty secular self-images of 
many modern philosophers and intellectuals.”38 
West’s treatment and use of Gramsci’s ideas about philosophers and intellectuals 
are of primary concern here.  In his earlier work West makes explicit and provocative 
connections between the organic intellectual and African American theologians.  Again, 
in Prophesy Deliverance! West brings the Marxist tradition to bear on a critical analysis 
of black theology.  Here he says that Black theologians “may find Gramsci’s conception 
of organic intellectuals helpful.”39  He draws on the idea of the organic intellectual as a 
                                                
36 Ibid. 
37 Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New 
York:  International Publishers, 1971), 348. 
38 Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy:  A Genealogy of Pragmatism, (University of 
Wisconsin:  Madison, 1989), 232. 
39 Cornel West, Prophesy Deliverance!:  An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity, (Westminster: 
Philadelphia, 1982), 121. 
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means to aid Black theologians in their quest for the products of African American 
culture that might contribute to what Gramsci refers to as a counter-hegemonic culture.  
West’s most interesting assertion related to Black theologians and organic intellectualism 
is found in a footnote in which he claims, “Although he [Gramsci] completely 
misunderstands the nature of the radical potential of Afro-American culture and Afro-
American intellectuals, this does not harm his theoretical formulation of the notion of 
organic intellectuals.”40  In turn, despite what Henry Louis Gates’s comments suggest, 
West’s application of the notion does not harm it either.  Organic intellectuals on 
Gramsci and West’s terms are directly tied to and organically involved with a particular 
cultural group.  They “combine theory and action, and relate popular culture and religion 
to structural social change.”41 
 West’s treatment of Gramsci and of organic intellectualism in particular 
foregrounds that which gives the ideas most meaning for counter-hegemonic minded 
African Americans.  In Prophesy Deliverance! he particularly targets Black theologians, 
and in the subsequent essay, “The Dilemma of the Black Intellectual,” he adds another  
location for the application of Gramsci’s notion.42  This time, instead of using the idea of 
the organic intellectual to inspire (as in his adoption of it into prophetic pragmatism) or as 
a lens through which an intended audience might view its counter-hegemonic struggle (as 
in the convergence of Marxism and Black theology), West employs organic 
intellectualism to describe phenomena within black culture.   
I would suggest that there are two organic intellectual traditions in African-
American life: the black Christian tradition of preaching and the black musical 
                                                
40 Ibid, 171, 172. 
41 Ibid, 121. 
42 Cornel West, “The Dilemma of the Black Intellectual,” The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 
2 (Winter, 1993-1994), 59-67. 
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tradition of performance.  Both traditions, though undoubtedly linked to the life 
of the mind, are oral, improvisational, and histrionic.  Both traditions are rooted 
in black life . . .  (emphasis in original)43 
 
Here West uses Gramsci’s term (without referencing Gramsci) as a descriptor for 
traditions in African American culture.  His explanation of conceiving these traditions as 
rooted in organic intellectualism rely on his reformulations of Gramsci found in The 
American Evasion of Philosophy and Prophesy Deliverance!.  Taken together, these 
reformulations and descriptions suggest that organic intellectualism is today shaped by 
and embodied in African American life.  Further, the connection between organic 
intellectualism and the Black musical performance tradition clearly sets the table for a 
more specific discussion of hip-hop culture and its intellectuals. 
 
Postindustrial Street Intellectuals  
A number of different kinds of organic intellectuals can be found in the 
complexity of hip-hop culture.  Each kind can be related to Gramscian ideas, and each 
can be seen as connected to Cornel West’s treatment of Gramsci.  Ultimately all varieties 
of hip-hop intellectuals can be described by the phrase postindustrial street intellectuals.  
“Postindustrial” describes both the historic moment and the hegemonic forces at play, 
including those that elicited the initial hip-hop response in the South Bronx.  “Street” 
indicates both the literal location of the hip-hop intellectual and it suggests the general 
salience of place in hip-hop culture.  The “street,” or predominantly Black and Latino 
neighborhood/ghetto, public space, is the primary place of inspiration, imagination, and 
knowledge transfer within hip-hop; thus icons can be characterized as having more or 
less “street cred”(ibility).  “Street” is important to hip-hop also because the fluid nature of 
                                                
43 Ibid, 61. 
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its vernacular and style requires constant knowledge transfer.  Because the street is the 
primary location for the passing along of knowledge about issues the culture deems 
important, it becomes an appropriate part of the description of the hip-hop organic 
intellectual.  These ideas were exemplified by Public Enemy’s Chuck D. when he 
claimed in the late 1980s that “hip-hop is the CNN of the ghetto.”44  It is important to 
note that hip-hop continues to expand its cultural influence beyond urban spaces in 
America and this expansion has rendered obsolete the notion that hip-hop exists only in 
urban spaces.  As it becomes a major cultural force in white suburban and rural youth 
culture, as it continues to internationalize itself, the idea of “street” retains its 
applicability because the creative animations, additions and subtractions, cultural 
innovations including important changes in language and dress still largely emanate from 
“the street” even while more suburban/rural youth are engaged in the culture.  Even the 
idea of hip-hop sensibilities being shaped in non-urban spaces does not threaten the 
appropriateness of “street” as hip-hop culture was, from the beginning, and continues to 
be a product of the ideas and happenings in public spaces. 
 
Connecting Gramsci and Hip-Hop 
Jeffrey Louis Decker coins the title “organic cultural intellectual” to describe 
“conscious rappers” within the Nation of Islam.  Their organicism stems first from the 
fact that they “sustain their organic ties to the Black community from which they came 
and of which their music is a part.”45  Decker suggests this reality is in contrast to the vast 
                                                
44 A number of different sources have claimed this quote and its variations “rap is the black CNN” or “rap 
is the CNN of the ghetto.” 
45 Jeffrey Louis Decker, “the state of rap:  time and place in hip-hop nationalism,” Social Text, 34 (1993), 
58. 
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majority of American politicians or entertainers who typically remove themselves from 
their geographic origins (both figuratively and literally).  He goes on to say that these 
nation-conscious rappers are often involved in the kind of grassroots movements that are 
often constitutive of counter-hegemonic struggles.  It is fitting that he claims such artists 
are heeding Cornel West’s message. 
While hip-hop nationalists are not politicians, they are involved in the production 
of cultural politics – its creation, its curriculum, its circulation, and its interpretation – 
which are tied to the everyday struggles of working-class Blacks and the urban poor.  
Perhaps more than most popular Black musicians, hip-hop nationalists follow Cornel 
West’s assertion that “[s]ince black musicians play such an important role in Afro-
American life, they have a special mission and responsibility:  to present beautiful music 
[or serious noise] which both sustains and motivates black people and provides visions of 
what black people should aspire to.”46 
Decker says that rappers most resemble Gramsci’s notion of the organic 
intellectual when they, “appropriate popular knowledge from within the black community 
and exploit its most progressive elements in the process of envisioning a new society.”47  
Decker’s emphasis on the cultural within Gramsci’s notion of organic intellectuals 
follows West’s treatment.  Decker also makes note of Gramsci’s notion of “common 
sense” or what Decker calls “popular knowledge.”  Here Decker claims that the challenge 
of the organic cultural intellectual is to raise the interaction with popular knowledge to 
the critical level.  Gramsci’s discussion of “common sense” illustrates Decker’s point. 
                                                
46 Ibid.  Decker’s quoting of West is from “The Paradox of Afro-American Rebellion,” in The Sixties 
Without Apology, ed. Sohnya Sayers et. al., (University of Minnesota Press:  Minneapolis, 1984). 
47 Jeffrey Louis Decker, “the state of rap:  time and place in hip-hop nationalism,” Social Text, 34 (1993), 
59. 
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First of all, therefore, it must be a criticism of “common sense,” basing itself 
initially, however, on common sense in order to demonstrate that “everyone” is 
a philosopher and that it is not a question of introducing from scratch a scientific 
form of thought into everyone’s individual life, but of renovating and making 
“critical” an already existing activity (emphasis mine).48 
 
The connection with Gramsci is convincing; however, taking a critical approach 
to and renovating popular knowledge is not the exclusive domain of Nationalist hip-
hoppers.  In fact, it would be difficult to argue that there are more organic cultural 
intellectuals within nation-conscious hip-hop than outside of it.  Russell Simmons’s 
critically acclaimed HBO series “Def Poetry” features the performances of up-and-
coming as well as established hip-hop “spoken word artists” or “performance poets” who 
treat Gramsci’s “common sense” or “popular knowledge” critically through a variety of 
political, social, and economic lenses in ways that contribute to a counter-hegemonic 
culture.  Their renovation of popular knowledge is executed at both the stylistic and 
substantive levels.  Put another way, the spoken word artists on “Def Poetry” are doing 
what Gramsci says organic intellectuals do with “common sense” both in form and in 
content.   
 One of the most commercially successful hip-hop artists of 2004 was Kanye 
West, whose multi-platinum The College Dropout concept album clearly earns him status 
as a postindustrial street intellectual.  As Gramsci suggested, West’s is “mediocre 
philosophical work” at best.  It deals with “common sense” critically; for instance, the 
track “All Falls Down” examines the phenomenon of a young African-American woman 
who attends college unreflectively.  “She has no idea what she’s doing in college,” but 
she continues in a major to which she has no commitment since, “she can’t drop out, her 
                                                
48 Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New 
York:  International Publishers, 1971), 330, 331. 
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parents’ll look at her funny.”  This woman is caught in the trap of the American culture 
of consumption, wrestling with identity issues and purpose, and “she be dealin’ with 
some issues that you can’t believe – single black female addicted to retail.” This song 
demonstrates a critical examination of what constitutes popular knowledge among Kanye 
West’s cultural peers, that is to say, the phenomenon of young Black adults resolving 
their identity struggles with a commitment to materialism – “We all self-conscious, I’m 
just the first to admit it.” 49 
 Both Kanye West and the spoken word artists on Russell Simmons’s “Def Poetry” 
serve as examples of postindustrial street intellectuals connected to Gramscian notions of 
“common sense,” counter-hegemony, and the organic intellectual.  The ties between hip-
hop culture and Gramsci’s ideas are evident from a reading of Paul Piccone’s 1974 essay 
on Gramsci’s Marxism.  He asserts that “[t]he organic intellectual must ‘feel’ with the 
people and reconstitute Marxist tactics in terms of the concrete context within which 
these people operate – institutions, dialects, traditions, and so on.”50  Hip-hop’s 
postindustrial street intellectuals certainly emphasize the operation of counter-hegemonic 
cultural forces at the “ground level,” and “feel[ing] with the people” is what hip-hop, at 
its best, has been about since its inception. 
 
Feeling Chicago:  Local Postindustrial Street Intellectuals  
 The lives, work, and aesthetic sensibilities of Melek Yonin, Dove Rock, and Idris 
Goodwin intersect with organic intellectualism in multiple ways.  Dove Rock has an 
organic connection to a number of Chicago communities as she was born and raised in 
                                                
49 Kanye West, “all falls down,” on The College Dropout, Roc-a-Fella Records, 2004. 
50 Paul Piccone, “Gramsci’s Hegelian Marxism,” Political Theory, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Feb., 1974), 38. 
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the city.51  Melek, though he grew up in suburban Chicago, counts as some of his fondest 
childhood memories the times he spent in the city.  Subsequently, he has spent the bulk of 
his adult life residing in the city.  Idris is a transplant from Detroit, but since coming to 
Chicago for school, he has spent his entire adult life living in the city as well.  Though 
their performance schedules sometimes take them to venues and college campuses 
outside of the Chicago area (this is increasingly true as these artists garner more and more 
national exposure), the majority of their performances are still there.   
The organic connection between communities in Chicago and the artists in this 
study is also a highly reflective and nuanced one.  Sometimes this takes the form of 
celebrating Chicago’s influence on the particular artist as in Melek Yonin’s piece, “elegy 
for Lit X,” in which “Lit X” refers to a now defunct bookstore in a downtown Chicago 
neighborhood that was seminally formative in Melek’s elective education and aesthetic 
sense.  
i never said shit/nervous to read 
my little raps before a kingdom of griots 
 
but i loved the way you smelled 
 
sandalwood sweat cowry shells locked in dreads and wool hats 
packed flesh Rastafarian hymns wafting frankincense blunt smoke 
bookstore hemp oil weed wisdom saturday night live spot 
  
i met children prostrating with poems in the altar of your womb 
legitimate lyricists/street corner scholars/seditious dissonance 
on the drums of hip-hop disobedience/a basement 
before underground became a commercial calling card 
 
Mama Africa in Wicker Park 
you kept it real 
  it was/all good 
 
                                                
51 As noted above, Dove moved to San Francisco at the very end of this study. 
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Lit X like Malcolm in prison 
i changed in your lap lullabies 
 
KRS told me to read How to Eat to Live by Elijah Muhammad 
only your shelves carried the brown paperback/seven years later 
i do not consume the devil’s diet but feed on fruits and vegetables 
 
Mama i am starving since you were kidnapped 
i have not eaten properly since they shot you 
with property tax/i cannot sleep at night 
without hearing you scream 
 
they are fucking with us, Mama 
they built master’s metaphor/atop your grave site 
expect us to work there/cuz it’s the only place we can 
get health insurance/they spit and trample on your open tomb 
 
we will not bury you, Mama/you are not dead 
only on a vacation we needed/to organize ourselves better 
learn more/wrangle wild heads/into the dream of the struggle 
 
we are building Mama 
all of us/waiting/on you 
to resurrect52 
 
Lit X was a space where community happened and organic ties were established 
and it is one of several examples of spaces where such organicism was enacted in the hip-
hop community that I came to know.  Sections of neighborhoods, clubs, a local young 
authors’ initiative,53 were all important locations for the part of Chicago’s hip-hop scene 
that I became familiar with.  Yet, the connections transcend these spaces such that the 
local hip-hop community itself is what the artists in this study have organic ties to, ties 
that go beyond the spaces in which particular people moved.  Melek, Idris Goodwin, and 
Dove Rock all operate with this organic connection and exercise a kind of postindustrial 
                                                
52 Coval, Slingshots:  A Hip-Hop Poetica. 
53 All of the subjects of this study were connected at varying levels to this artistic/educational initiative.  In 
fact, all three were part of the organization’s “Teaching Artist Roster” for 2005-2006.  The organization 
provides educational workshops for young poets and writers as well as various performance opportunities.  
It also puts on a highly successful annual youth poetry slam that attracts individual poets and slam teams 
from a variety of local high schools. 
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street intellectualism that gets its inspiration from Gramscian notion of “feeling with the 
people.” 
Dove Rock often foregrounds her status as high school dropout.  Melek Yonin 
never finished the undergraduate degree he started.  Of the three artists that are the focus 
of this study, Idris Goodwin has the most formal education.  Yet, it is his street 
intellectualism that has come to constitute a salient portion of his identity and contributes 
significantly to the ways in which his internal reconstructions of self are related to a hip-
hop aesthetic.  His general criticism of the establishment discussed above is perhaps the 
greatest evidence of his organic intellectualism and indeed is the means by which Idris 
seeks to “modify popular thought.”54  In this way, Idris’s kind of street intellectualism 
that is bound up in his connection to a hip-hop aesthetic can best be seen in his internal 
critiques.  That is to say, hip-hop operates to a degree with its own kind of establishment 
that Idris often rallies against in his work.  This came out in an interview in which Idris 
noted his resistance to the “headz”55 in hip-hop journalism, specifically here, to one who 
has made claims that hip-hop has become self-diluting recently. 
Idris:  I make it a practice not to listen to the headz, just in general.  I have 
never and I’m certainly not gonna start now.  There’s a certain amount of 
gatekeeping that goes on and that’s just not gonna happen [him paying 
heed to these “gatekeepers”]. 
KK: …So, in a sense he’s [referring to one of the journalist “headz”] got 
respect and longevity and he’s fucking brilliant so he can say, he can write 
                                                
54 Antonio Gramsci, Quintin Hoare, and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of 
Antonio Gramsci (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 417. 
55 In hip-hop vernacular, this generally means “people” but it can specifically mean people with clout or 
something like that. 
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a piece or a column and he can basically decide when it is that hip-hop has 
diluted itself and he can tell a lot of people who are gonna listen.  
Idris:  Exactly, and that’s why I think there needs to be … I mean most of 
the people in that room [a recent panel discussion on hip-hop] were [just] 
talking, and I’m certainly not trying to diss nobody at all, but I’m like, 
dog, just this Saturday I did a show with all these groups that draw from 
this aesthetic that are completely different from one another.  It’s 
happening.  It’s never gonna stop, people are never gonna stop 
participating in hip-hop.  It’s never gonna stop, we’re just gonna come up 
with new stuff for other people to bite and later put in commercials.  
We’re the ones doing it.  We are hip-hop.  And hip-hop now is not 
supposed to look like it used to look.  That would be stupid.  That’s just 
dumb.  It’s not gonna be what it was because it’s different times now, too. 
This criticism of gatekeeping within the culture is evident in the work of all the artists in 
this study, though it is most prevalent in Idris’s. 
 Melek Yonin perhaps operates with the most pronounced street intellectualism of 
the artists in this study, and this starts with the idea that hip-hop necessarily led him to a 
kind of counter-school education that became the source of his discursive activism in his 
Eurocentric high school classes as discussed above.  It was hip-hop that “opened up a 
canon” for him that he was not being introduced to in his formal schooling.  It was hip-
hop that not only promoted his accessing the kind of literature ignored by his high school 
curriculum, indeed a self-directed education, but also an education of the self. 
 138
Melek:  Yeah, I mean hip-hop made me want to read.  I mean it demanded 
that I read.  In order to know what was being said, in order to get the full 
story, I had to read.  And you know, knowledge reigns supreme over 
nearly everyone, KRS’s acronym, you know.  “The teacher” he was 
talking about self-education, you know, knowledge of the self.  Yeah, it 
[hip-hop] demanded those things. 
Of course, this was the same demand that led Melek to Lit X, which led to a canon of 
literature that included James Baldwin and Nikki Giovanni and Sonia Sanchez.  It also 
resulted in a sense of self prodigiously influenced by a hip-hop aesthetic, not the least of 
which was KRS ONE’s encouragement.  Armed with this hip-hop induced counter-
school literary knowledge and a deeply reflective sense of self, Melek has become a kind 
of organic rector of his particular circle of budding MCs, DJs, and spoken word artists.  
Almost all of the artists I met during the course of this study were or had been at one time 
under either the formal or informal tutelage of Melek.   
 Melek also understands the Gramscian idea of “feeling with the people.”  Melek 
and Idris have performed their two-man show at a number of high schools and colleges, 
and I was along to observe during one of the early performances (in fact, the show was 
still in the developing stages) at a local high school.  The performance was for an 
alternative school program within the school for students who had been “unsuccessful” in 
the traditional school program.  It was clear to me during the observation that the students 
(exclusively nonwhite) were engaged at a level that their teachers in the program had 
rarely, if ever, reached with them.  This resulted in a discussion between Melek, Idris, 
and me following the school visit about engagement and education. 
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Melek:  We didn’t go in there to teach, but to engage … That’s why hip-
hop is so smart.  What does it say, “[do] you feel me?”  “Are you 
engaged?”  Right?  Basically that’s the question … “Are you with me?” 
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Chapter Four 
 
You Better Lose Yourself!:  Reformulated Praxis Theory, Spirituality, and Hip-Hop 
Aesthetics 
 
 
Indeed, Lord, to your eyes the very depths of a man’s conscience are exposed, 
and there is nothing in me that I could keep secret from you, even if I did not 
want to confess it.  I should not be hiding myself from you, but you from 
myself.  But now when my groaning bears evidence that I am displeased with 
myself, you shine out on me and are pleasing and loved and longed for, so that I 
am ashamed of myself and renounce myself and choose you and, except in you, 
can please neither you or myself. 
 
     Saint Augustine 
 
 
one time i heard Afrika Bambatta say 
when you hear the breakbeat / you let your g-dSelf get loose … 
 
i couldn’t afford a BMW or new clothes at the mall / and didn’t want it / comin up 
in the 80’s all i wanted to do was rock African medallions, some juju beads and hang out 
with X-Clan / but i felt like nobody would understand where i was coming from / so i just buried 
myself in the music / kept on hearing the refrain / it ain’t where ya from 
its where ya at / re-present re-re-present / it ain’t where ya from its where ya at 
 
 hip-hop asks one eternal question / what do you  represent 
 
 it was when i was in a Hasidic synagogue in montreal  
 during Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, the night of Kol Nidre 
 the most important time on the Jewish calendar 
 where we have one final evening to be inscribed in the book of life 
and pray with all of our might that i saw my people 
       head nodding 
swaying back and forth  bowingsupplicating 
bodies  twisting frentic, tallit whirling like tendrils, bodies 
bearded and sweating popping  submissive to the rhythm 
         of prayer 
for the first time i davened  
with the energy and ecstasy of a b-boy in battle 
 
     Melek Yonin 
 
 
… from the universal to the specific 
my flow manifests spirit … 
 
     Idris Goodwin and Melek Yonin 
 
 
 Cultural production in hip-hop has become such a multifarious notion from its 
original live performance, counter-culture orientation in the South Bronx to its early 
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commercialization with Sugar Hill Gang’s “Rapper’s Delight”; to its hyper-
commodification that produced the ubiquitous use of hip-hop in selling everything from 
sneakers to hamburgers and also created “hip-hop moguls” like Russell Simmons, Diddy, 
and (the most recent artist/producer/entrepreneur to reach such status) Jay-Z; to the birth 
of a generation of so-called underground hip-hop artists who are more likely to seek to 
recapture the early counter-hegemonic impulses than their more commercially successful 
peers.  The fact that hip-hop has gone from a local phenomenon to an international one 
adds to the layers of complexity in the culture.  Yet, there are common aesthetic threads 
that can be traced through the vast amount of cultural production that hip-hop has 
unleashed around the globe.  Obviously no single aesthetic sensibility is likely to be 
found in every iteration of hip-hop culture.  However, there are certain ideas that can help 
organize inquiry into the self-aesthetic relation in hip-hop because they seem to be 
recurring themes with artists and in the culture generally.  I have located above organic 
intellectualism and the prophetic voice as two such themes tied directly to the connection 
between reconstructions of the self and hip-hop aesthetics.  Here, I examine another 
related notion that is gaining some amount of attention in hip-hop studies, yet remains 
underarticulated and untheorized and has not yet been tied to the self-aesthetic relation as 
it can be observed “on the ground” with the hip-hop artists themselves.   
 There is an emergent body of work on the connection between hip-hop and 
religion and spirituality.  Mostly this work focuses on drawing lines of commonality 
between hip-hop and religious institutions and practices, even when it frames the 
connection as “hip-hop and spirituality.”1  The tracing of hip-hop aesthetics to Black 
                                                
1 See especially Anthony B. Pinn, Noise and Spirit: The Religious and Spiritual Sensibilities of Rap Music 
(New York: New York University Press, 2003).  This collection of essays is divided into thirds and two-
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homiletics is certainly not new, nor is the explicit relationship between a number of hip-
hop artists and the Five Percent Nation of Islam.2  What does seem to be missing from 
these articulations is a description of general spiritual experiences and spiritual 
sensibilities, not necessarily tied in some direct way to institutional religious practice or 
dogma, that stem from a participation in hip-hop aesthetics and the theorizing that can be 
done about spirituality and identity claims broadly, based on an analysis of such 
experiences.3   
 Dove Rock, Idris Goodwin, and Melek Yonin have all articulated, though in 
differing ways, notions about spirituality and hip-hop.  Idris and Melek in particular have 
described experiences they have had participating in hip-hop aesthetics that they 
explicitly name as “spiritual.”  These artists’ identities are clearly shaped by these 
experiences and ideas that are sometimes tacitly and other times overtly tied to a sense of 
spirituality or spiritual experiences.  Below I will describe in detail these sensibilities and 
experiences, how they are tied to “living out” a hip-hop aesthetic, and how each artist’s 
ideas and work is affected by them.  In order to use inquiry into these experiences to 
better articulate and theorize about spirituality and hip-hop, a significant amount of 
                                                                                                                                            
thirds of the book is dedicated to the “religious” connection.  One section of the book is titled “Rap and 
Issues of ‘Spirit’ and ‘Spirituality’” but only one of the essays in this section directly addresses this 
connection.  Mark Lewis Taylor’s “Bringing Noise, Conjuring Spirit: Rap as Spiritual Practice” comes 
closest to treating spirituality independently of religious traditions or practices but still falls short of 
articulating a connection between hip-hop and spirituality where spirituality is not at all conflated with 
religion or religious practice. 
2 See especially Jeffrey Louis Decker, “the state of rap:  time and place in hip-hop nationalism,” Social 
Text, 34 (1993). 
3 While I will discuss below the idea that Melek claims hip-hop was his route “back to Judaism,” I do not 
consider this claim to be a religious one per se.  Melek’s journey is one that is tied to notions of the self and 
identity (combined with general spiritual impulses) that happens to result in a renewed sense of his 
religious heritage.  Yet, the spirituality of the journey is not, for Melek, necessarily tied to a religious 
institution or institutional practices as we shall see.  Certainly what I am calling spiritual sensibilities and 
experiences can be manifest in moments that are in the context of particular religions, as in the prayer of 
Saint Augustine and in Melek Yonin’s poem, “breakbeats let my g-dSelf loose,” but the spirituality of those 
experiences seems to transcend the particular religious contexts in which they are found.  
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context must be explored including both definitional and theoretical groundwork.  I will 
use Phil Carspecken’s essay “Power, Truth, and Method” as the central theoretical piece 
for exploring praxis, spirituality, and the self-aesthetic relation in hip-hop.4 
 
Spirituality and Black Musical Expression 
 First, it is important to get as clear as we can about what is meant by “spirit” and 
“spirituality.”  These concepts are at least as elusive as the idea of the prophetic 
(discussed in chapter one), and therefore it is not the goal of this short section to exhaust 
the definitional possibilities of these ideas.  I will take up the notion of spirituality in a 
more complete way below after ideas such as reformulated praxis theory and the desire 
for recognition are elucidated.  Here, my aim is to provide a brief, working idea of spirit, 
and this is why I am situating it solely within context of Black musical expression.  It is 
also worthy of note that attempts to define “spirit” and “spirituality” outright are likely to 
run the risk of conflating the ideas with institutional religion, something that should be 
avoided here primarily because the subjects of this study do not necessarily experience 
spirituality in ways or have the kind of spiritual sensibilities that are exclusively or 
directly tied to particular institutional religions per se.  Yet, it is also important to avoid a 
kind of sweeping approach to defining the terms here that could render them 
meaningless.  Given that this study is associated with what most would consider African-
American forms of expression, it seems that a potentially fruitful location for an initial 
attempt at making sense of the idea of “spirit” and “spirituality” is in the context of Black 
musical expression.  
                                                
4 Phil Francis Carspecken, Four Scenes for Posing the Question of Meaning and Other Essays in Critical 
Philosophy and Critical Methodology (New York: Peter Lang, 1999).30-117. 
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A look at Black forms of musical expression in America reveals their 
transcendence of music and entertainment, indeed, ultimately their spiritual character.  
The African-American expressive response to nihilistic threat has produced various 
hybrid musical forms through the insertion of African performance practices into 
European structures that are inherently spiritual because they are the primary means of 
cultural education, they provide the wherewithal to hold nihilism at bay, and they are 
often influenced by Black homiletics and the culture of the Black church (even when the 
music is not explicitly religious).  Cornel West reminds us that the threat of nihilism has 
been part and parcel of the Black experience in America from its inception following the 
pernicious theft of Africans from the motherland. 
Nihilism is not new in black America.  The first African encounter with the New 
World was an encounter with a distinctive form of The Absurd.  The initial 
black struggle against degradation and devaluation in the enslaved 
circumstances of the New World was, in part, a struggle against nihilism …The 
genius of our black foremothers and forefathers was to create powerful buffers 
to ward off the nihilistic threat, to equip black folk with the cultural armor to 
beat back the demons of hopelessness, meaninglessness, and lovelessness.5 
 
West later describes in more detail the various manifestations of this “cultural 
armor.”  What is most salient here is that from the beginnings of the African experience 
in the New World, musical expressions served as this kind of armor that fended off the 
threat of hopelessness.  It seems, then, that artful forms of expression whose intention is 
to thwart nihilism are inherently spiritual.  That is to say, they are necessarily concerned 
with the spirit or perhaps the soul as an individual ontological structure. 
The cultural armor of which West speaks has taken many expressive forms, and 
hip-hop lies squarely within this trajectory.  This is not to say that hip-hop aesthetics 
necessarily include an explicit attempt to keep nihilism at bay (though plenty of hip-hop 
                                                
5 Cornel West, Race Matters (New York: Vintage, 1993). 
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does resemble this kind of “cultural armor”) but rather that it attends to the spirit.  It does 
so by demanding to be heard when its voice is suppressed and marginalized.  It asks not, 
“do you understand?” or “are you listening?” but rather, “do you feel me?” and it 
demands both intellectual engagement and bodily participation from its audience.  It 
challenges, paradigmatically, oppressive and powerful social institutions and gives voice 
to the oppressed.  Hip-hop, in its best manifestations, is a kind of egalitarian expressive 
activity that confronts and challenges dominant cultural and societal notions through, for 
instance, the cipher.  
Again, to be sure, this does not exhaust the notion of spirituality.  Hopefully, 
though, this context makes it clear enough for now what is meant by the kind of attending 
to the spirit that I am claiming hip-hop does.  The kind of spiritual experiences and 
sensibilities of the subjects of this study are directly tied to this expressive activity that 
attends to the spirit and this idea makes the most sense when we consider it in the context 
of reformulated praxis theory. 
 
Identity, Praxis, and Power 
 Carspecken argues that Paul Willis’s ethnography of working class boys in 
England, Learning to Labor, is the paradigmatic study that constitutes a breaking of new 
ground that paved the way for those that followed to draft the phrase “critical 
ethnography.”6  Its importance for hip-hop and the self-aesthetic relation lies primarily in 
its tacit reshaping of praxis theory and therefore it will be important to explore praxis 
theory as it was conceived by various groups around the time of Willis’s study and how 
                                                
6 Carspecken, Four Scenes for Posing the Question of Meaning and Other Essays in Critical Philosophy 
and Critical Methodology. 37. 
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we can interpret the impact of Learning to Labor with respect to praxis.   The context for 
this reformulation begins with the concept of power and the agency-versus-structure 
debates of the 1970s among three major Marxist camps:  Marxist-culturalists (mostly 
connected to E.P. Thompson), Marxist-structuralists (largely associated with Althusser), 
and the traditionalists.  It is not necessary for the purposes of this study to rehearse the 
details of the conflict between these camps, and it has been done in a sophisticated 
manner elsewhere.7  Here, I am concerned with the way in which power was treated in 
these debates and the resultant implications for praxis theory, so I will provide a brief 
sketch of the arguments made by each camp with this focus. 
 The debate between these three Marxist camps was ontological in that it was 
concerned not with epistemological issues related to power, structure, and agency, but 
rather, it sought to determine how to conceive of general structures of social reality and to 
become clear about ideas such as “social structure,” “social action,” “power,” “class,” 
and ultimately, “social existence.”  So, the question of power with regard to structure and 
agency was an ontological argument for the three groups of Marxists mentioned above. 
 The traditionalists relied on the “base-superstructure” model that worked as a 
form of functionalism that explicitly located power solely within social structures.  For 
the traditionalists, aspects of society, including culture and politics, were explained 
according to their function with respect to the economic “base.”  Although power was not 
addressed in a sophisticated way, it was definitely located within the social system.  Yet, 
the traditionalist treatment of power contradicted itself.  When calling for social change, 
                                                
7 R. Johnson, “Three problematics:  Elements of a theory of working class culture,” in John Clarke et al., 
Working-Class Culture : Studies in History and Theory, Hutchinson University Library (London: 
Hutchinson, in association with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, 
1979). 
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it appealed to agency at the same time that agency was ruled out as explanatory in its 
functionalist societal critiques.  Traditionalists claimed that social change had to be 
ushered in by human agents, therefore locating power within agency, but they then 
asserted that change could only happen on a revolutionary scale at the right stage of 
capitalism, an idea which clearly placed power back into the social system.8 
 The structuralist camp, with Althusser at the center, was more coherent and 
refined in its/his arguments than the traditionalists.  Althusser consistently ruled out 
agency and subjectivity as explanatory categories with regard to social change, and in this 
way, he was in step with the structuralist movment, generally speaking.9  He quite clearly 
argued that power was solely a structural component.  Carspecken notes that Althusser’s 
work does not garner the respect it once did largely because of successful arguments 
within Marxist discourse that wanted to employ human agency as an explanatory factor 
in social theory, though his work remains significant in its attack on the traditionalists 
and the “base-superstructure” idea.10   
 Finally, the Marxist-culturalist group, associated with E.P. Thompson, argued 
against both the traditionalists (with their “base-superstructure” model) and the Marxist-
structuralists for their failure to acknowledge human agency as an explanatory factor in 
social change and for the way in which they had failed to recognize the importance of 
culture.  For Thompson, power is mostly a feature of human agency and is located only 
within the social system to the extent that the system obtrudes upon agency through 
political and economic constraints.  So, Carspecken claims that for Marxist-culturalists, 
                                                
8 Carspecken, Four Scenes for Posing the Question of Meaning and Other Essays in Critical Philosophy 
and Critical Methodology. 
9 See Alex Callinicos, Althusser's Marxism (London: Pluto Press, 1976) for an opposing view. 
10 Carspecken, Four Scenes for Posing the Question of Meaning and Other Essays in Critical Philosophy 
and Critical Methodology. 
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power is located in every human act; yet, each act takes place within certain constraining 
conditions.11  This idea provides the context for a discussion of praxis theory and its 
reformulation. 
 In order to understand how Willis picked up praxis theory and reformulated it in 
ways that have significance for hip-hop and the self-aesthetic relation, it is important to 
summarize Marx’s use of praxis.  The Marxist-culturalists insisted that Marx consistently 
made use of praxis theory throughout his corpus although Althusser and the structuralists 
claimed that while the early Marx used a theory of human agency, the later Marx moved 
away from subjectivity and instead adumbrated structuralism in Das Capital.12   
 In the earlier writings of Marx such as Theses on Feuerbach, which the 
culturalists referred to for their arguments about human agency, praxis was discussed 
within the Hegelian context that held sway at that particular historical moment.  Thus, 
Marx made use of Hegelian categories such as “self-production,” “alienation,” and 
“objectification” in his discussions of praxis.  Hegel’s idea was that Geist produces itself 
through expression of its nature in objective forms even while no objective form can 
actually fully express it and so each expression contains a contradiction that leads to new 
expression; this process is known as a dialectic.  Marx, on the other hand, located these 
same ideas within the human subject as opposed to Geist, that is to say he thought human 
beings, not Geist, expressed themselves in objective forms in order to produce 
themselves.  Being human is being an expressive entity whose existence is more like a 
process of self-formation through objectivation than like the existence of physical things.  
This was an indispensable move for praxis theory but, in his attempt to completely shed 
                                                
11 Ibid, 36 and 37. 
12 Ibid, 37. 
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Hegel’s idealism, Marx limited the concept to human action oriented toward the physical 
world.  According to Carspecken, this was a damaging move that “truncated the core 
insight.”13  Willis would later repair the damage, at least implicitly, with his tacit 
reformulations.   
 Marx’s general idea was that human beings are motivated to express themselves 
or to actualize themselves through work oriented toward the physical world.  This is why 
the artisan is the paradigmatic case for him.  In this way, humans create themselves or 
create a self through the products they produce skillfully and artistically.  This kind of 
activity engenders pride and satisfaction.  However, this actualizing depends upon certain 
conditions.  The tools and other materials, the modes of production, must be under the 
control of the human agent creating the product otherwise she will experience 
“alienation” because she is essentially cut off from the products she creates.  The working 
class of a capitalist society becomes “alienated” in this way since it is not their own ideas 
they are using to create products, but rather those of designers or other employers that use 
them only for their labor.  Additionally, workers do not own the products they produce, 
nor do they own the tools with which the products are made, and this contributes to their 
“alienation.” 
 Carspecken refers to the kind of motivation human beings have to actualize in this 
way as an attempt to fulfill “expressive needs,” by which he means “the need to become a 
self, maintain a self, and grow as a self through expressive activity.”14  That praxis theory 
is ultimately about the desire to meet these expressive needs leads Carspecken to group 
Hegel, Marx, and Herder (whose ideas were labeled “expressivism” by Charles Taylor 
                                                
13 Ibid, 38. 
14 Ibid. 
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because Herder thought that the existence of human beings was basically an expressive 
movement from potential to manifestation)15 together as having sophisticated, though 
implicit, theories of human motivation. 
 The key conclusion for hip-hop aesthetics is that Hegel, Marx, and Herder all 
implicitly captured the notion that human beings are fundamentally concerned with 
identity.  Praxis is a theory of human existence that connects humanness with desire and 
motivation.  Carspecken reminds us, though, that praxis cannot be solely about work 
oriented toward the physical world.  Herder and Hegel were more aligned with the notion 
that praxis needs can be met through expressive activity that does not produce a material 
result.  Hegel noted the desire for recognition from which human expression flows.  
Carspecken comments that this means praxis is “more about human-to-human relations 
than it is about human-to-physical world relations.”16   
 Human beings, motivated by the desire for recognition seek to meet their 
“expressive needs” of forming and maintaining a self though production.  This is Marx’s 
praxis theory but he lost key insights from Herder and Hegel along the way when he 
focused exclusively on action oriented toward the physical world.  The desire for 
recognition that Hegel emphasized is fed by human-to-human relations.  This is the kind 
of reformulation of praxis theory that Willis’s Learning to Labor does, albeit implicitly.  
This also describes the way “expressive needs” are met through the engagement of hip-
hop aesthetics. 
                                                
15 Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, Modern European Philosophy (Cambridge [Eng.] ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
16 Carspecken, Four Scenes for Posing the Question of Meaning and Other Essays in Critical Philosophy 
and Critical Methodology., 40. 
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 Willis’s “lads” willingly participated in permanently locking themselves into their 
fathers’ working class, shopfloor culture and rebelled against their teachers’ urgings 
about the importance of school.  They did so because they were first and foremost 
cultural producers; their socially constructed identities were of higher importance than 
goal-oriented action and plans for the future.  The primacy of identity and the reality that 
human beings are motivated by the desire for recognition are part and parcel of Willis’s 
reformulated praxis theory.  Original Marxist ideas about “alienation” remain in Willis’s 
tacit re-workings but he also recaptures insights from Hegel and Herder by replacing 
Marx’s paradigmatic artisan and her actions solely oriented toward the physical world 
with a more thoroughgoing understanding of human self-expression that includes the 
notion that it is not the material products that are self-expression in and of themselves but 
rather, they become self-expressive in the sense that other people might recognize the 
person through her creation.  Since the “lads” were “alienated” by the culture of the 
school that denied their “expressive needs,” they responded by creating cultural forms in 
opposition to such “alienation,” and this was of greater importance for them than 
anything, including making future plans based or goal-oriented action that might increase 
their vocational choices or even provide them with opportunities to change their 
socioeconomic status.  With this reformulation of praxis theory, “expressive needs,” for 
Willis are resituated within human-to-human actions, not action oriented toward the 
physical world. 
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Power, Foucault, and Derrida 
 Carspecken goes on to discuss the notion of power as it is treated by Foucault and 
Derrida.17  Though this discussion takes a bit of a turn from the focus on Willis’s tacit 
reformulation of praxis theory, it is an important step toward the relationship between 
power, the desire for recognition, and spirituality that will eventually be discussed in light 
of hip-hop aesthetics and the experiences of the artists in this study. 
 Carspecken takes Foucault’s ideas to be a reduction of truth to power, executed in 
a contradictory way.  For this analysis, he examines the theme of the “death of the 
subject” in its Foucauldian treatment.  Modernist thought had reached an end owing to its 
insistence on employing human subjectivity as an explanatory category from which so 
much theorizing was built.  Foucault thought that the postmodern era uncovered this dead 
end by showing how the theorizing eventually resulted in “doubles” (e.g., the 
empirical/transcendental “double” in Hegel and Marx) owing to the fact that the modern 
period was animated by the contradictory notion that subjectivity is a precondition for all 
knowledge, yet, it is also possible to obtain knowledge about subjectivity.  Put another 
way, the human subject must exist prior to knowledge even as it is one of a litany of 
objects of knowledge.  Thus, for Foucault, the “double” is the result of modern thinkers 
attempting to navigate this tension by suppressing one notion of subjectivity at the 
                                                
17 A recent quotation from a feminist philosopher is instructive here in terms of the contemporary debate 
regarding the use of categories such as “postmodernism” and “poststructuralism” and which thinkers 
belong in which category.  “For the past few decades postmodernism has been at the center of debates 
about philosophy, history, culture, and politics, including feminist theory and politics. Its theoretical 
rationale can be found in poststructuralist modes of social and cultural analysis and its concerns are echoed 
in postmodern cultural practices. The range of theories broadly described as ‘‘postmodern’’ includes 
writers as diverse as Lyotard (1924–), Baudrillard (1929–), Derrida (1930–), Lacan (1901–81), and 
Foucault (1926–84). Among women theorists JuliaKristeva (1941–) and Luce Irigaray (1932–)have been 
particularly important,’’ C. Weedon, “Postmodernism” in  Alison M. Jaggar and Iris Marion Young, A 
Companion to Feminist Philosophy, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy ; 13 (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 
1998). 
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expense of the other just as Hegel emphasized the transcendental and suppressed the 
empirical while Marx did the opposite.18  The ultimate result was the development and 
eventual failure of theories built on subjectivity as an explanatory notion.  Foucault, then, 
replaced the primacy of human subjectivity from the modern era with his notion of 
power.  He did this through his “archeology” and, later, “genealogy” of knowledge that 
uncovered unconscious cultural conditions for notions of truth.19  Power produces 
“discourse-practices” that set the conditions for what is accepted as truth, that is to say, 
they are prior to truths.  “Discourse-practices” construct notions of truth and then they 
mask this act of construction.   However, since human subjectivity is no longer an 
acceptable explanatory category, “discourse-practices” do not rise and fall according to 
human assessments about the claims about reality and truth that they make—in other 
words through ideology critique—since that would presuppose subjectivity.  So Foucault 
had the idea of “anonymous power” that served as the primary explanatory term in his 
elucidation of “discourse-practices.”20 
 Carspecken’s primary critique of Foucault’s postmodernism concerns the 
reduction of truth to power.  Foucault’s ideas themselves seem to fall into some of the 
same traps he is convinced have brought modernity to its end.  While Foucault claims 
that the use of human subjectivity as the primordial explanatory category leads to 
“doubles,” Carspecken argues that power is just as susceptible to this threat.  As power 
                                                
18 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, [1st American ed. (New 
York,: Pantheon Books, 1971). 
19 Ibid; Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish : The Birth of the Prison, 1st American ed. (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1977), Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 1st American ed. (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1978). 
20 Carspecken, Four Scenes for Posing the Question of Meaning and Other Essays in Critical Philosophy 
and Critical Methodology. 
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becomes the primary explanatory notion for Foucault, it operates empirically as the 
object of his study, but it also tacitly functions transcendentally.21 
 Another criticism Carspecken levels at Foucault’s reduction of truth to power is 
that it undermines itself with its claim that “discourse-practices” that are not simply 
congruent with real phenomena set conditions for what is to be taken as truth at a 
particular historical moment.  Therefore, Foucault’s ideas themselves are a product of 
“discourse-practices” whose conditions for truth are internally constructed through 
anonymous power.  It seems there is no compelling reason, then, to accept his idea.22 
 There is a relationship between truth and power, Carspecken claims, but their 
distinction must be made clear in the wake of Foucault.  The distinction operates in all 
efforts to be understood (this idea holds significance for hip-hop aesthetics), and Foucault 
was certainly writing to be understood by an audience, and his writing was aimed, on 
some level, at convincing the audience of the legitimacy of his ideas.23  In other words, 
following Habermas, Foucault himself appeals for power-free understanding of his own 
texts and cannot help but do so.  This makes sense only if we separate power and truth, 
power and knowledge.  
 Before the relationship between power and truth can be further elucidated, it is 
important to discuss Derrida’s idea of “the metaphysics of presence.”  Derrida’s first 
“deconstruction” was an eminent critique of Husserl’s phenomenology.24  In this text, 
                                                
21 Ibid, 47. 
22 Ibid, 49.  Carspecken has subsequently developed his critique of Foucault and takes it in a different 
direction in Phil Francis Carspecken, "Ocularcentrism, Phonocentrism and the Counter-Enlightenment 
Problematic: Clarifying Contested Terrain in Our Schools of Education," Teachers College Record 105, no. 
6 (2003), 995-1001. 
23 Ibid, 47. 
24 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs (Evanston,: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973). 
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Derrida showed how Husserl’s project of of building knowledge upon certain foundations 
relies on the idea of presence.  This was Husserl’s phenomenology, that the experience of 
a phenomenon, not the existence of objects, was the source of certain knowledge. 
Husserl’s ‘principle of all principles’ was that the one thing that cannot be doubted is the 
experience of phenomena.  Derrida showed that in order for this experience of a 
phenomenon to be considered certain knowledge and the ground for all certain 
knowledge, one must claim that there is a moment in which the object is “purely present” 
before the subject experiencing it.  This “pure presence” is what Derrida deconstructed, 
using Husserl’s own arguments.   
 The point is that the moment at which I am aware of my experience of a 
phenomenon is necessarily a separate and distinct moment from my experience of having 
this phenomenon before me.  The former is always a reference to the latter and the latter 
is therefore always already gone by the time I am aware—it is a “trace.”     Derrida 
claimed that the moment I am aware of my knowledge of an object before me, I have 
referenced a moment that is “always already” gone by, and what is left is actually a 
“trace” or a kind of memory impression that references the previous moment of presence. 
But this is the case if we follow Husserl’s logic, and this deconstructs his logic—his 
division of time into moments and his belief in presence.  Even the moment in which I 
am aware of a previous moment already gone turns out to be a “trace.” Experience of a 
phenomenon and knowledge of that experience cannot be simultaneous.25 
                                                
25 Carspecken, Four Scenes for Posing the Question of Meaning and Other Essays in Critical Philosophy 
and Critical Methodology., 50, 51.  Of course, this is a very short and simplified summary of dense ideas.  
For the purposes of this text, only a cursory understanding is necessary as only the basic ideas will be used 
as contextual pieces for a discussion of spirituality and hip-hop aesthetics. 
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 Carspecken claims that Derrida’s ideas have important implications for the 
relationship between desire, power, and truth.  If we use “desire” broadly, that is to say, if 
it is conceived of as having to do with a variety of senses of motivation, it is a basic 
structure within human experience and meaning.  This means that experience is always 
animated by a desire for what is not yet, and this can include fear or 
anticipation/motivation of any kind to move to the next moment.  For Derrida, this idea is 
due to the impossibility of presence or is at least intimately connected with it, and the fact 
that the “trace” defers to a moment of presence that cannot be reached.  This is why one 
can find Derrida writing in various texts about the “longing for presence” that is, of 
course, never reached because of the impossibility of presence.  Yet, Carspecken claims 
that there are moments in Derrida’s writing when he articulates a view of existence in 
which humans desire to make certain basic uncertainties, and this process leads to 
expressions of power.  
Humans continually assert ‘truths’ that they cannot prove or know, due to the 
unreachability of presence.  Humans assert because they are motivated to do so.  
Humans fundamentally want certainty, long for it, and express power trying to 
feel it.  Yet it is unattainable.26 
 
 While these ideas about desire, truth, and power are part of another deconstructive 
move for Derrida, for Carspecken they are insights that can contribute to positive 
formulations, as opposed to deconstruction.  Derridian insights about desire, truth, and 
power are reminiscent of Nietzsche, Sartre, and Kierkegaard, that is to say, of 
existentialist thought.  
 
                                                
26 Ibid, 56.  See also Carspecken’s use of Nietzsche and his “figurative drive” in "Ocularcentrism, 
Phonocentrism and the Counter-Enlightenment Problematic: Clarifying Contested Terrain in Our Schools 
of Education," 984. 
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Carspecken’s Reconfigurations 
 
For Carspecken, the Derridian insights about power, truth, experience, and desire 
can be resituated in a different context than deconstruction.  Because experience cannot 
be knowledge without some kind of assertion of power (due to the impossibility or the 
“metaphysics of presence”) truth assertions are truth claims.  This is important for 
Carspeken’s treatment of the insights from Derrida.  He eventually relocates these ideas 
in the context of reformulated praxis theory. 
Carspecken uses Habermas to rethink the insights of Derrida regarding presence 
and the critique of Husserl.  In a detailed section of “Power, Truth, and Method,” he 
“reconfigures” the scene of presence with its solitary subject.  Here I will give only a 
very brief summary of that reconfiguration, leaving out Carspecken’s illustrations of the 
ideas, in an effort to get directly to the points of connection with hip-hop aesthetics.  
Many schools of philosophy have been constructed on the foundation of the “originary 
scene” of the lone, passive observer contemplating an object.  Yet, there is more 
happening than the perception of a solitary observer, even though Western thought has 
been mostly built on the foregrounding of perception in this scene.  In addition to 
perception, there is the constant movement of thought and desire.  Carspecken 
reconfigures the scene to include another human subject to illustrate the way in which 
communicative expectations are equally primordial to the scene as perception. 
There are four layers of expectations that lead to intersubjectivity:  expectations of 
consequences alone, expectations of how others will act with regard to the object of 
experience, tacit expectations of intersubjectivity and communicative action, and finally, 
explicit intersubjectivity and communicative action.  Once intersubjectivity is reached, 
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experience becomes knowledge-imparting.  So, for Carspecken, communicative 
anticipations or expectations are more primary than “presence.”  He summarizes,  
If I am to be able to transform an experience of into a knowledge of, I must 
simultaneously take the position of others in relation to my object of experience, 
and my “knowledge” is bound by expectations of how communicative actions 
that refer to the object would be understood by others.27 
 
Ultimately, this reconfiguration means that the primordial scene of the solitary 
observer shifts to a scene that includes two consciousnesses.  This is, then, a shift from a 
monological theory of truth to a dialogical one.  Habermas enters the picture here with his 
theory of communicative action.  He agrees that the primary scene should be two subjects 
communicating rather than the single observer.  Habermas’s theory asserts that when 
human beings act in meaningful ways, they are making “validity claims” or what we 
might call truth claims28 in three distinct categories.  Objective claims are those made 
about the objective world to which humans have access.  Subjective claims are related to 
the principle of privileged access.  Unlike the objective world, there is not multiple access 
to a person’s subjectivity.  Normative-evaluative claims (Carspecken has combined two 
categories here that Habermas keeps separate) are related to ideas of good and bad, right 
and wrong.  Neither multiple or privileged access applies here.  Only other value claims 
could be appealed to in trying to ground a normative-evaluative claim.   
Many meaningful human acts imply all three types of claims with some more 
foregrounded and others more backgrounded.  In addition, and perhaps of most 
significance for this study, all meaningful acts reference an “identity claim.”  The validity 
horizon of an identity claim can be configured in any number of ways in terms of the 
                                                
27 Ibid, 67. 
28 See “Power, Truth, and Method” p. 72 for an explanation of why Habermas uses “validity” instead of 
“truth.” 
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three categories and the backgrounding-foregrounding continuum The identity claim 
itself can be more or less foregrounded. 
 
Habermas/Carspecken and the Internal/External Relationships Between Truth, 
Power, and Action  
 As mentioned above, both Habermas and Carspecken claim that there is a 
relationship between power and truth and thus they are critical of Foucault’s reduction of 
truth to power.  The relationship between the two for Habermas and Carspecken is best 
understood as external and internal.  Habermas’s idea about the external relationship 
between truth and power is best understood in relation to his “ideal speech situation.”  
This is the situation that is presupposed by his theory of communicative action, and it 
entails social settings in which participants have equal social standing and have as their 
only motivation reaching understanding.  More specifically, power is equalized or 
neutralized.29  This “ideal speech situation” is treated as a “limit case” or the situation 
that is presupposed or referenced although it is most likely never empirically reached.  
The point is that power acts externally as a distorting force in communicative action.  
This is one way to describe the relationship between truth and power and to avoid 
Foucault’s reduction of the two. 
 The power/truth relationship also can be examined internally in communicative 
action.  Remember, it is not the negation of power that is presupposed by the “ideal 
speech situation” but rather, the neutralization of power.  Habermas and Carspecken treat 
power as a positive concept.  Habermas makes this move with an emphasis on action 
                                                
29 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984). 
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oriented toward consequences while Carspecken wants to apply this kind of internal 
connection between truth and power more to action oriented toward understanding, as we 
shall see. 
 Habermas overtly locates power internally with regard to actions oriented toward 
consequences.  These kinds of actions are characterized by goals and the acts are deemed 
“powerful” when the goals are met or the act is “successful.”  What about acts that are 
not successful or do not reach their goals?  In this case, Carspecken uses ideas about 
agency from Anthony Giddens to assert that power still has an internal connection.  
Giddens claims that action and power are logically connected since action always has 
some kind of impact on the world.  Carspecken concludes, “Power is a capacity of the 
actor presupposed by her action.  The concept of ‘actor,’ or ‘agent,’ presupposes this 
capacity.  All acts presuppose power, therefore, and empirically it is only a question of 
how much power is expressed (emphasis in original).”30  The idea that agency 
presupposes power is consistent with Habermas’s theory of communicative action. 
 Habermas’s treatment of the internal relationship between power and action 
focuses mostly on the context of action oriented toward consequences.  However, 
Carspecken puts emphasis on power and action within action oriented toward 
understanding.  In the same way that action oriented toward consequences contains goals 
that will be “powerful” and “successful” if met, action oriented toward understanding 
also has goals, and we think about them as being successful to the degree that we feel 
understood or, as Carspecken says, the goals of action oriented toward understanding 
                                                
30 Carspecken, Four Scenes for Posing the Question of Meaning and Other Essays in Critical Philosophy 
and Critical Methodology. 
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refer to “nonobjective states.”31  So, it makes sense to say that these “communicative 
goals” suggest an internal relationship between power and action because we feel 
“empowered” when the goals are reached or when we feel understood or recognized 
through our communicative acts. 
   
Communicative Goals and the Desire for Recognition 
 In action oriented toward consequences, the level of success of the goal is 
observable in the objective world, while goals related to action oriented toward 
understanding are observable only in nonobjective, subjective states.  Carspecken adds 
that communicative goals often are not clarified in terms of the exact understanding that 
is desired until after the communicative act is completed.32  This has significance both for 
identity claims and, notably, for communicative goals that are bound up in expressive 
needs and pursued through performance as is common for the artists in this study.  As 
Carspecken says, it is not uncommon to hear someone say, “I didn’t know what I really 
needed to say until after I said it!”33  This is so because agents often have implicit and 
holistic understandings of that which they wish to communicate that come prior to the 
explicit content that comes in the form of words, gestures, or performances.  There is a 
kind of uncertainty that the actor feels in this prior moment of holistic understanding 
about the significance or validity of the content.  This uncertainty becomes the impetus 
for expressing what the actor has understood implicitly and holistically.  It is important to 
note that agents can feel that the expression falls short of the prior holistic understanding.  
                                                
31 Ibid, 83. 
32 Ibid, 88. 
33 Ibid. 
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This often leads to a person saying something like, “No, I guess that’s not really what I 
meant,” or “That’s not quite it.”  On the other hand, the expressions can sometimes 
exceed what was grasped holistically and prior to the articulation and in these cases the 
actor often mentions surprising herself.  Again, this is of special significance when it 
comes to artistic expression and in particular, the artists in this study have talked about 
performances in ways that match the ideas above.   
 This is also a moment at which recognition enters the scene.  The success of a 
communicative act is often the result of the agent recognizing her own act.  Indeed, she 
will also notice a sense of shortcoming if the act is unsuccessful.  After the act is 
completed, the actor will find a match between holistic, implicit understandings and the 
expression or not.  Carspecken points out that this idea is connected to the concept of 
expectation.  “Among the many expectations constituting any meaningful act are always 
a cluster that anticipate what the act will bring out for the actor (emphasis in original).34 
 Recognition is also a desire to be recognized as an autonomous agent by others.  
This desire manifests itself in the identity claims that are a part of every meaningful 
human act at various levels of foregrounding or backgrounding.  It is clear that this desire 
for recognition from others indicates a need for human beings to construct a social self.  
This desire leads to identity claims, and these claims are often attached to the fulfillment 
of “expressive needs.”  Yet there is the contradiction that the social self never captures 
what is desired.  
 
 
                                                
34 Ibid, 92. 
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Refocusing Spirituality 
 With these ideas about reformulated praxis theory, power, action, identity, and 
desire, the groundwork has been laid to discuss spirituality in a broader way than was 
done earlier.  For this purpose I will discuss and apply ideas from a recent talk by 
Carspecken35 and in so doing I will highlight the Kierkegaardian ideas and supplement 
them with insights from John Caputo’s “radical hermeneutics.” 
 Carspecken’s talk begins with a response to scientism through exploring the limits 
of knowledge in the physical sciences.  These limits have implications for the human 
sciences and an intersubjectively constituted reflection.  The notion of reflection in the 
human sciences is tied to limits to knowledge in the human sciences and these limits 
imply that there is something “beyond the narrative horizon,” namely spirituality.   
 What are the limits to knowledge in the human sciences?  The first limit refers to 
the notion that meaningful human action originates in ways that cannot be explained.  As 
noted above, expressive acts clarify meaning both for the actor herself and others.  
However, Wilhelm Dilthey noted that other possible meanings are cancelled in the 
process.  George Herbert Mead’s theory of the “generalized other” asserts that the 
clarification of the meaning of an act to its actor occurs because human beings take the 
position of others and then respond to themselves as the others would.  This means that 
the origin of meaningful acts is unknown since the act is already interpreted once it is 
known. 
                                                
35 Phil Francis Carspecken, "What Lies Beyond the Narrative Horizon?:  The Spiritual Dimension in 
Critical Qualitative Research " (paper presented at the 7th Advances in Qualitative Methods 
International Conference, Surfers Paradise, Queensland, Australia, 2006). 
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 The next limit to knowledge in the human sciences is related to an insight from 
Kierkegaard’s The Sickness Unto Death,36 that is, the impossibility of not being one’s 
self.  This idea is related to the notion that every meaningful act contains an identity 
claim at some level of foregrounding or backgrounding as noted above.  These identity 
claims always imply self-narratives, and these narratives create a horizon within which 
meaning, thought, and action always occur.  There is no escaping the narrative horizon.  
Or, we cannot escape ourselves.  This is the first form of despair Kierkegaard explained 
when he said that man despairs “because he cannot consume himself, cannot get rid of 
himself, cannot become nothing.”37  
 The third limitation is also connected to Kierkegaardian despair.  It is the 
impossibility of being one’s self or one’s self-narrative. One can neither be any self-
narrative one constructs nor even be the difference between one’s “I” and one’s self-
narrative.  Again, this is a limit created by the narrative horizon.  “Although anything that 
can be said will be ultimately within a narrative structure, the self of the one who says 
anything at all is claimed beyond that structure.”38  Also, a quotation from Habermas is 
instructive here: 
…the subject would be misunderstood if he were taken at his word and 
immediately identified with his manifest actions.  As the art of rendering 
indirect communications understandable, hermeneutics corresponds exactly to 
the distance that the subject must maintain and yet at the same time express 
between itself, as the identity of its structure in life history, and its 
objectivations.  The penalty of not doing so is being reified by those to whom 
the subject addresses itself.39 
 
                                                
36 Søren Kierkegaard and Walter Lowrie, The Sickness Unto Death (Princeton,: Princeton University Press, 
1941). 
37 Ibid, 151. 
38 Carspecken, "What Lies Beyond the Narrative Horizon?:  The Spiritual Dimension in Critical 
Qualitative Research ". 
39 Jèurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston,: Beacon Press, 1971).166. 
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 The fourth limitation is the impossibility of knowing the Other completely and the 
impossibility of being known by the Other completely.  Like ourselves, the Other is not 
always what it says and does; therefore, our claims to know the Other completely amount 
to imposition or oppression.  Likewise, when the Other thinks it knows us completely we 
are at risk of oppression.  There is also a slightly different way to think about not 
knowing the Other.  Although Carspecken does not mention John Caputo, his project of 
“radical hermeneutics” is congruent with this particular limit to knowledge in the human 
sciences.  Caputo “radicalizes” the hermeneutic project by “harassing” it with 
deconstruction.40  In his first volume on the this notion, Caputo badgered hermeneutics 
with Kierkegaard’s idea of “repetition” but in the subsequent, More Radical 
Hermeneutics (2000), he runs deconstruction together with hermeneutics by asserting the 
notion of the  “absolute secret” or “The Secret.”  Caputo then claims that there, in fact, is 
no absolute secret and that is The Secret.  This idea is related to the primary animating 
notion of More Radical Hermeneutics that we do not know who we are and, “That, if 
anything, is who we are … ” (emphasis in original).41  This implies the idea that we do 
not know the Other and Caputo addresses this in the context of “preparing for the coming 
of the other” about which he posits these questions: 
How is one to prepare for the coming of the other?  Is not the other, as other, the 
one for whom one is precisely not prepared?  Does not preparation relieve the 
other of his or her alterity so that, if we are prepared, then what comes is not the 
other but the same, just what we were expecting?  Would not extending true 
hospitality toward the other involve a certain unconditionality in which one is 
prepared for anything, which means that one is not prepared?  Is the only 
adequate preparation for the coming of the other to confess that we cannot be 
prepared for what is coming?42 
 
                                                
40 John D. Caputo, More Radical Hermeneutics : On Not Knowing Who We Are, Studies in Continental 
Thought (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2000). 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid, 41. 
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 The fifth and final limit to knowledge in the human sciences is what Caputo 
claims is part of The Secret.  That is, the impossibility of knowing one’s self.    No other 
human being can completely know us, and we can never completely know ourselves 
because of the impossibility of gaining a pure reflection.  Self-reflection is always 
mediated by others, both specific and generalized.   
 So what is beyond this narrative horizon?  Carspecken claims that the limits to 
knowledge in the human sciences implicate spirituality.  He uses both Western and 
Eastern spiritual traditions to elucidate the point.  Christian theologian Michael 
Theunissen uses Kierkegaard, Hegel, and Marx to postulate a spirituality based on 
intersubjectivity, emphasizing the idea of the different and unknown other (in this way, 
Theunissen’s ideas are related to Caputo’s “radical hermeneutics”).  Intersubjectivity 
creates the possibility for authenticity since a communicative encounter with the other 
necessarily creates an experience of lack of control, that is, of not having control over 
how the other might respond.  However, encountering authenticity is certainly not 
guaranteed since fear can often motivate its denial.  Also, as noted above, power often 
distorts relationships. 
 The types of dialogic relationships include those characterized by passion in 
which one feels a kind of totalizing adoration for another, by negation in which one 
person feels threatened by another so much that the threat must be eliminated through 
negation of the other, by entanglement such that the self is completely dissolved into the 
identity of the other, or finally by mutual recognition, care, and affection.  Thinking about 
relationships thus characterized leads to the consideration of intersubjectivity in the 
spiritual domain.  The deepest desires in human existence are addressed only through 
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compassion and mutual recognition.  Often this realization happens through learning 
(painfully) how human beings can interpersonally dominate others out of fear or desire.  
This path finds congruence with Theunissen’s formulations. 
 Authenticity, for Theunissen, is the recognition of the other’s difference and 
freedom from yourself and your difference and freedom from the other.  Of course, this 
dialectic has been taken up by a number of thinkers before Theunissen, but he situates it 
within intersubjectivity.  The dialectic takes two forms.  One is “communicative 
freedom” or being-with-oneself-in-the-other.    
 The second form of the dialectic is love or being-with-oneself-in-the-other.  The 
freedom of the other lies in its difference from one’s self.  Recognizing this freedom is 
the acknowledgement that the Other can always act in ways we cannot predict, and, like 
us, the Other is always beyond any particular narrative whether told by us or by the Other 
herself. 
 In Theunissen’s monotheism the recognition of the freedom of the other and the 
implications for the self that this acknowledgement carries within the context of 
intersubjectivity presupposes an ultimately free other, or God.  So, the kingdom of God is 
an intersubjective idea that “exists between the human beings who are called to it, as a 
present future.”43  Human beings have a spiritual longing that is related to the 
contradictions of the self and this longing, according to Theunissen, must be pursued by 
humans though efforts to love and to be authentic.  Theunissen, quoted in Habermas says, 
…the reality as which the between discloses itself to dialogical thinking in a 
theological perspective is the only side of the kingdom of God that philosophy 
can catch a glimpse of at all: the side not of ‘grace’ but of the ‘will’.  The will to 
dialogical self-becoming belongs to the striving after the kingdom of God, 
                                                
43 Carspecken, "What Lies Beyond the Narrative Horizon?:  The Spiritual Dimension in Critical 
Qualitative Research ". 
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whose future coming is promised in the present love of human beings for one 
another.44   
 
 Carspecken connects this quotation to the limits of knowledge in the human 
sciences.  Philosophy can answer only so much.  In monotheistic spiritual traditions grace 
is necessary and outside of that which philosophy can “catch a glimpse.”  Carspecken 
adds, using the same prayer of Saint Augustine quoted at the opening of this chapter, that 
one has to be open to grace and grace is what is required in moving beyond the narrative 
horizon, since the spiritual longing is essentially a longing for knowledge that cannot be 
attained through the human sciences.  As Carspecken states, the knowledge is beyond the 
narrative horizon because, “all communicative acts at this level contradict themselves by 
trapping the actor in claiming to be both author and critic of her self-narratives: a finite 
subject contrasted with others, and also something beyond any finiteness.”45  So, this 
knowledge that is beyond the narrative horizon cannot be represented.  That is why the 
prayer of Saint Augustine eventually comes to the point of speechlessness which leads to 
an openness to grace through a kind of “letting go” or faith in an absolute other. 
 Carspecken notes that Eastern traditions also run up against the contradictions of 
intersubjectivity.  This is important because the spiritual experiences described by 
subjects in this study are not necessarily tied to Western religious thought and, in the case 
of Melek Yonin, even while his religious heritage is Judaism he specifically notes Eastern 
thought as informing some of his own spiritual experiences related to hip-hop aesthetics.  
Carspecken mentions Chan and Zen Buddhism as deconstructing representation in 
communication and thought as a way to reach an orientation of detached love with 
                                                
44 Jèurgen Habermas and Eduardo Mendieta, Religion and Rationality : Essays on Reason, God, and 
Modernity, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002). 
45 Carspecken, "What Lies Beyond the Narrative Horizon?:  The Spiritual Dimension in Critical 
Qualitative Research ".” 
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respect to the world, and this non-representational knowledge is akin to the prayer of 
Saint Augustine although the path to it is markedly different.  It is pursuit of knowledge 
beyond the narrative horizon.   
 So, pursuing knowledge beyond the narrative horizon can come in the form of 
deconstruction of the self-world relation as in Eastern spiritual traditions or in the form of 
a relation to the very notion of the Other as in Western, monotheistic traditions.  The 
point is that, according to the teachings of these traditions, both result in love and 
freedom.  With this refocusing of spirituality, it is now possible to consider the 
experiences of the subjects of this study to see how praxis theory, identity, desire for 
recognition, and spirituality inform their interaction with hip-hop aesthetics.  
      
Reformulated Praxis Theory, Identity, and Spirituality in Hip-Hop 
 Like Willis’s “lads” the hip-hop artists in this study seek to fulfill expressive 
needs through oppositional cultural production.  While Willis implicitly reformulates 
praxis theory in Learning to Labor, here I explicitly use Carspecken’s ideas about what 
lies underneath Willis’s ethnography as a lens through which to view the self-aesthetic 
relation in the hip-hop artists of this study.  Below I will locate the various ways in which 
hip-hop artists seek to fulfill expressive needs, make identity claims, measure levels of 
success of communicative acts (that take the form of writing hip-hop poetry/spoken word 
pieces or songs and performing), recognize themselves in their own communicative acts, 
and desire recognition from other human agents.  I will also show that identity and desire 
for recognition are pursued in hip-hop through high levels of foregrounding and that this 
is related to spiritual experiences for the participants.   
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 All of the artists in this study are full-time artists.  They engage in a number of 
artistic and artistically related activities (including working with young amateur artists 
and teaching high school or college workshops in hip-hop poetry and aesthetics) but at 
bottom they make their living from creating and performing their art.  This means that 
expressive needs are at the forefront of what they do vocationally.  And because hip-hop 
for these artists is so much an expression of the personal, identity claims are made in 
nearly every line of a poem or rap and with almost all the gestures and movements in a 
performance.  This is one reason why hip-hop can be so clearly recognized through the 
lens of reformulated praxis theory.  Hip-hop itself is a kind of response to “alienation.”  
As noted by Melek Yonin and countless other artists, hip-hop is the voice of the forgotten 
experience, the marginalized voice.  While certainly not all hip-hop artists have come to 
participate in the culture through a patent experience of “alienation,” it is still the case 
that the hip-hop aesthetic is animated by an insistence on being heard that is related to the 
concept of “alienation.”  Dove Rock’s foregrounding of her status of high school dropout, 
her self-reported difficult childhood and teen years that have created for her a “level of 
fucked-upness,” Melek Yonin’s “other side of the tracks” suburban experience, his 
struggles with Judaism, and Idris Goodwin’s reaction to self-referencing critics and 
pompous art school students with their fustian talk are all suggestions that they found in 
hip-hop a way of opposing some manifestation of mainstream or dominant culture.  Hip-
hop, then, is a constant pursuit of expressive needs, a way for these artists to construct 
and maintain a social self and to pursue knowledge of self.  In what follows I will attempt 
to capture these pursuits of expressive needs and the resulting spiritual experiences, and 
in so doing, I will rely on rather lengthy passages from interviews of the subjects of this 
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study.  It is my intent to maintain the integrity of the ideas of the artists, and therefore it is 
necessary to quote them at length because many of the experiences relevant to this 
chapter that they articulated to me during interviews included rather long descriptions.  
 
Spirituality and the Story in Front of Your Nose 
 Melek’s art has been significantly motivated by Gwendolyn Brooks and her 
suggestion that poets should “write the story in front of their nose.”  And hip-hop for 
Melek is largely about telling stories.  He repeatedly told me the story of how his family 
points out similarities between himself and his Uncle Steven, a storywriter.46  Melek’s 
hip-hop is a telling of stories of family in which he confronts difficulties in deeply 
reflective ways.  He tells intimate stories of his grappling with Judaism.  He tells stories 
of local realities that often are narratives of those “forgotten” experiences.  But more than 
anything, Melek’s stories are about himself.  This is mostly what he takes Brooks’s 
phrase to mean.  Melek is committed in deep ways to an animating idea in hip-hop 
culture that says, “represent!”47  His art does this work by telling the stories that are right 
in front of him, and even when these stories are ostensibly about the realities of others, 
they are still about him, his experience, his world.48     
Melek:  I guess, hip hop, like Gwendolyn Brooks, like Nikki Giovanni, 
they encourage you to, I mean it’s kind of this old adage, just talk about 
                                                
46 This is also mentioned in Melek’s piece, “family feud” that is discussed in chapter 3. 
47 I do not use this exclamation point here or in the title nonchalantly.  As one of hip-hop’s most 
recognized mantras it is always emphasized, often shouted when communicated verbally.  It is a kind of 
rallying cry that, to my thinking, must be accompanied by an exclamation point in its written form.  
48 As an illustration of how deeply committed to the idea of “represent!” and telling the story “in front of 
your nose” Melek is, I had shared with him a few times my own personal struggles with a religious heritage 
(in the context of his wrestling with his Judaism) and he once told me that he thought that was what I 
should eventually write about.  In fact, he thought that was “the story” I should tell. 
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what you know.  Gwendolyn Brooks says, “write the story that’s in front 
of your nose,” hip hop says, “represent!” and it’s this process of self-
reflection and kind of like understanding your space in the world.  And 
then also being able to like, look into other spaces or other things and see 
beyond those images.  So, for instance we see maybe like, abandoned 
factories along the lakefront on the south side [of Chicago] and so they 
stand, you know, perhaps just as old buildings that are rusted, but if we 
use a poetic imagination they speak to economic trends and 
postindustrialization and NAFTA and the loss of jobs, which speaks to 
gentrification, you know … but if we use our poetic imagination it opens 
up a world.  The process of writing, especially spontaneous writing, which 
I try to do a bit of, and freestyle especially is an ecstatic process, you 
know, it is like prayer because, you can lose yourself, you know.  You 
cease to exist in some ways, like your breath mirrors the flow of your 
words on a page or like, just into the open air.  So, especially freestyle is, 
or can be, a spiritual, religious practice.  I mean, certainly the motion of 
freestyling or even listening to beats is like davening for me.  Even when I 
recite, the recitation of my own poems, in some ways when I’m focused is 
like prayer. 
There is much to unpack in this insightful statement of Melek’s.  The pursuit of 
expressive needs is obviously at the forefront of Melek’s work, yet, it is also 
foregrounded in his way of being in the world with his insistence on viewing the world 
through the “poetic imagination” and “understanding [his] space in the world.”  This is 
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also evidence of how much emphasis identity claims receive in Melek’s work and way of 
being since “represent!” and the notion of self-reflection are being championed in ways 
that indicate he is making tacit claims such as, “I am the kind of person who takes the 
adage, ‘represent!’ seriously,” and “I am a reflective person who employs ‘poetic 
imagination’ when I observe everyday, local realities.”   
 In addition to the importance of expressive needs and the foregrounding of 
identity claims, Melek also articulates a sophisticated connection between hip-hop 
aesthetics and spirituality in this interview passage.  Spiritual experiences are tied to a 
number of features of hip-hop aesthetics for Melek.  Spontaneous writing and 
“freestyling” are both practices found within hip-hop aesthetics, and Melek draws 
connections between these practices and spirituality.  Both activities are tied to 
spontaneity, spontaneous writing, obviously so.  “Freestyling” is an artistic practice in 
hip-hop in which an MC ad-libs a rhyme (or a rap) and comes up with poetic lines on the 
spot, unrehearsed.  This is a practice that can take many forms but is often enacted in 
groups called “ciphers” (which are discussed in relation to spiritual experiences below) 
where hip-hop artists form literal or metaphoric circles and “freestyle” in such a way that 
one member of the circle will pick up the rhyme or rap and continue it from wherever the 
previous person has left off.  The connection between the cipher in hip-hop aesthetics and 
the desire for recognition is clear.  The motivation to perform in a cipher comes from the 
desire to be recognized as an autonomous agent and the desire to maintain a social 
identity, but it also is motivation for self-knowledge.  “Freestyling,” especially in a cipher 
can meet expressive needs and offers immediate and multi-layered feedback (both 
physical and communicative).  Goals oriented toward understanding take center stage in 
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the cipher and success is easily monitored through the kind of recognition that the group 
gives back to each individual participant.  Not only that, but the cipher is also a place 
where the uncertainty of the self is addressed.  The nature of the cipher and the art of 
“freestyling” necessarily mean that each actor/participant will have holistic and tacit 
understandings of her or his expressions prior to expressing them and only after 
expressing them are they able to recognize themselves (or not) in their words.  All of the 
artists in this study have talked about participation in ciphers and “freestyling”; however, 
Melek Yonin and Idris Goodwin talked most explicitly in interviews about this aesthetic 
practice in hip-hop. 
     The passage above also uncovers the spiritual significance of particular practices 
in hip-hop for Melek such as “freestyling” as it “opens up a world” where you can “lose 
yourself.”  It unveils the spirituality in hip-hop aesthetics that comes through repetition 
and recitation.  Melek deems some of his aesthetic practices to be ecstatic processes.  
First, what does Melek mean by “losing yourself”?  It seems to be somewhat related to 
the kind of “letting go” that St. Augustine exemplifies in his prayer quoted above.  The 
idea can also be explored through a discussion of Habermas’s treatment of George 
Herbert Mead’s notion of the “I” and the “me” as discussed in chapters one and two. In 
Habermas’s discussion of phylogenetic and ontogenetic development, Mead’s work is 
most salient.  It is within this context that Habermas notes Mead’s use of the “I” and the 
“me” that are discussed here in chapters one and two. 
After the discussion of the differentiation of the “I” from the “me,” Habermas 
uses traces of Mead’s thought combined with that of Emile Durkheim in a section 
concerned with the sacred and the normative.  In this section, Habermas quotes Mead 
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again regarding the fusing of the “I” and the “me.”  “It is where the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ can 
in some sense fuse that there arises the peculiar sense of exaltation which belongs to the 
religious and patriotic attitudes in which the reaction which one calls out in others is the 
response which one is making himself.”49  Habermas does not pursue this concept as an 
area of inquiry unto itself, but there seems to be something important about it that can be 
explored for the purposes here.  First, note that the extraordinary event of fusion of the 
“I” and the “me” is a rather regressive moment in Mead’s description of it.  The 
regression could be on two possible levels; a move back toward non-rationalization or a 
regression of the development of the self or perhaps on both levels at once.  In any case, 
the kind of fusion of the “I” and the “me” in Mead is an extraordinary yet unfruitful 
moment.   
 However, I suggest another, more fecund path to the fusion of the “I” and the 
“me,” one that will suggest implications for spirituality.  Mead’s suggestion about the 
fusion necessarily requires the religious experience (or some other kind of experience that 
captures Mead’s conception of the path to fusion) to involve a kind of inauthentic 
emotional manipulation.  Such situations might include persuasive, charismatic orators, 
sensationalized messages, or other manipulations.  This path to fusion is regressive 
because it opens the self to manipulative activity that can only inauthentically address 
expressive needs and the desire for recognition.  But, perhaps there is another, more 
genuine route to the fusion of the “I” and the “me.”  Consider a path that continually 
differentiates the “I” and the “me” more and more.  In this heightened state of 
differentiation, the “I” and the “me” eventually become fused from the opposite 
                                                
49 Ibid, 45-6. 
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direction.50  This process involves a kind of “letting go” of the self that can lead to the 
most genuine form of recognition.  Again, consider the prayer of St. Augustine.  This is a 
path toward fusion of the “I” and the “me” that goes in almost the opposite direction of 
the fusion conceived of by Mead. 
 So, the kind of “letting go” that is related to a non-regressive fusion of the “I” and 
the “me” can be thought of as connected to Theunissen’s ideas about spirituality and 
opening one’s self to grace.  “Letting go” also seems to be related to non-representational 
knowledge or knowledge of self that is beyond the narrative horizon. 
 But Melek’s spiritual experiences through engaging in hip-hop aesthetics are also 
self-described as ecstatic.  This kind of experience that he reaches through recitation 
seems to be more tied to Eastern traditions.  In fact, Melek, in a passage below, attributes 
part of his spiritual sensibility to Buddhism.  Here there is congruence between Melek’s 
connection to the kind of monotheistic spirituality of Theunissen and his connection to 
Buddhism in that both seek non-representational knowledge of self. 
 
The Spirituality of the Cipher 
 As mentioned above, the location of communal “freestyling” is the cipher.  Both 
Melek Yonin and Idris Goodwin have had spiritual experiences in ciphers.  Once again, 
the idea of “letting go” or losing one’s self is part of the experience.  Idris describes a 
related notion of “stepping out” of his body.    
Idris:  I have had the most profound experiences [participating in hip-hop 
aesthetics].  Just last weekend I was out partying and we had been 
                                                
50 That is to say, opposite from the direction of the fusion in Mead’s conception of it. 
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drinking and everybody was having a good time and at one point I just 
looked at my friend and I was just like, man let’s go on the back porch and 
just freestyle, man, let’s just do something, you know what I mean, I just 
felt so good.  It started out just me and my guy and another gentleman was 
playing guitar and I was spittin’ and my friend was beat-boxing and we’re 
ciphering and after awhile everybody, people would come back and just 
start picking up stuff and playing it and this one – the host of the party 
came back and I think she’s from Ecuador and she came back and started 
spittin this, like, it sounded like a sort of Ecuadorian nursery rhyme or 
something, like a song, one of those songs, like a church song.  If my 
family was in the room right now and I busted out, [sings] “Have ya got 
good religion?”  my brother would poke his head out of his room and be 
like, “Certainly, Lord!”  you know what I mean?  And she just was bustin’ 
that shit out but we were doing this thing together.  She was like, telling 
me when to go and like – to me that experience is so profound because it’s 
-- there’s community building going on but there’s a level of people 
opening themselves up to be vulnerable, you know what I mean, in that 
situation, it’s productive, we weren’t battling, we were all respectful of 
each other’s time and whatever and it was like one of the best ciphers I’ve 
ever been in because everyone was doing something different so it was 
very unique and it was from an extremely real place.  It wasn’t because we 
were drunk and at a party.  I swear, for the Lord, I sorta just like, stepped 
out of my body. 
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It seems that stepping out of one’s body combined with vulnerability and authenticity 
make this experience another instance of opening to grace, the Other, and non-
representational self-knowledge.  Although Idris does not use the term “love” here, there 
is a strong sense of what Theunissen would call being-with-oneself-in-the-other.  Melek 
describes a related experience in a cipher. 
Melek:  The cipher exists in multiple spaces and multiple times and then 
in multiple forms.  It is kind of the model but then, how does it exist?  So, 
one time I was at Brown University giving a talk and one of the women 
who brought me in for a long time was saying, “you gotta meet these guys.  
They’re Jewish hip-hop kids, you’ll love ‘em.”  … So the woman who 
brought me in brought me to their house and they were upstairs in this 
guy’s room, four of them, all white Jewish hip-hop kids.  I open the door 
and they’re in a circle and they’re freestyling.  And they don’t say hello, 
but I sit down.  And for two hours we just go around and around and 
around and trade words and lines and just flow.  And afterwards I felt like 
I knew them.  
Melek also discusses “freestyling” and the cipher generally with different metaphors. 
 Melek:  There are, I think, spaces to find within freestyle that you forget 
where you are and you forget how long you’ve been rhyming and in some 
ways you’re not even sure where you’re going or what you’re talking 
about but the words just come, you know?  And it seems like at its best, 
for me, it seems like you are really like a co-creator with the universe.  
The birds and the train, it’s all a track and you’re making music along with 
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the track, you know?  And in a cipher when words are being passed and 
people are being playful, it becomes this like – it’s like taffy and 
everyone’s pulling at it and you can’t get it off you, you know what I 
mean, and it’s just this big space and you forget who is where and it’s just 
creation, you know?  I think in recitation that happens too sometimes … 
you just kind of forget, you transcend that space, you know.  To me 
sometimes, I’m speaking in that space [performance space, on stage] but 
I’m also speaking to and for my ancestors and for people who can’t speak 
anymore or who wouldn’t be able to be in front of that audience … I don’t 
know if it’s a “wave” or whatever, something that you ride and that, it 
feels like, you’re not concerned with space and time.  You’re just creating. 
There is much to unpack here but I wish to let Melek’s deep insights here stand without 
getting in the way of them too much.  Certainly there is the notion of the uncertainty of 
the self when “you’re not sure where you’re going or what you’re talking about” and 
there is also a tacit claim here about losing one’s self in the act of creation because the 
primacy of creation begins to trump any individual identity claim when “you can’t get it 
off you” and “it’s just this big space.”  Western and Eastern ideas come together here 
again.  There is the suggestion of having faith in an absolute other in order to become a 
“co-creator” with the universe and also Melek experiences the “wave” through recitation 
that leaves him unconcerned with space and time, and this is clearly related to Buddhism. 
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Awakening and Other Spiritual Fragments 
 There are more spiritual notions that the artists in this study have talked about in 
relation to their participation in hip-hop aesthetics.  First, Melek talks about an 
“awakening,” which is essentially an acknowledgement of the other.   
 Melek:  Henry David Thoreau said that within a five mile radius of where 
you are there’s an infinite number of miracles and, you know, we only 
have to discover them.  I think a lot of times we’re numbed in our culture 
via mass media and the education system and just, our interactions are 
kind of dulled.  And so I think if we think about the story that’s in front of 
our nose and if we represent that story it means that we are awakened and 
if we are awakened then our senses – you know, it’s a sensory awakening.  
We see more.  We hear more.  We smell what’s around us and we begin to 
kind of feel the place that we walk in everyday.  As we awake and as we 
record and as we represent we begin to see it, I think, with new eyes.  And 
so it’s no longer just the bus stop or the bodega that we pass on our way 
there.  We see the man inside whose little girl works in the back and 
brings him, you know, elotes from the cart that’s outside and we see that 
that man then has a story as well, you know what I mean?  We just begin 
to kind of see.  We begin to kind of use the poetic imagination to connect 
it to history.  You know, the guy in the bodega, he’s Guatemalan, maybe 
he came here in the late 80s because he was fleeing from political 
persecution.  I don’t know.  It’s just about being awake.  In some ways 
that is a meditative process because it’s easy to get on the bus and kind of 
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bury yourself in your own thoughts, which is good too, but to kind of be 
awakened while you’re out in the world I think is a spiritual practice that 
maybe I first learned from Buddhists but certainly I think is present in 
many religions, Judaism.  Because you’re trying to connect these kind of 
sacred spaces and these profane spaces.  And so I think if we become 
awake, you know, like what Henry David Thoreau I think is essentially 
saying is “this whole space is sacred but we don’t normally see it or treat it 
as such” and so, I think if the MC goes out into the world and records, you 
know, tells the story of who’s on the bus and where they come from, do 
you know what I mean?  To me, that’s an awakening process which is a 
spiritual practice. 
This self-identified “spiritual practice” is a recognition of the other in that it is an 
awakening that allows Melek to see the other.  This also implicates intersubjective 
tensions since both Melek and those who are a part of his awakening will always be 
beyond any narrative either they or Melek might construct.  Once again, Western 
traditions are connected up with Eastern traditions as well since Melek explicitly 
articulates that his concept of “awakening” comes in part from Buddhism. 
 Idris relates another general notion that is important to the connection between 
hip-hop aesthetics and spirituality.  It goes back to the uncertainty of the self and the way 
in which actors often clarify their own communicative goals only after the act.     
Idris:  … you know it’s like when I’m on stage, when I’m in community, 
when I’m doing what I’m able to do when I’m in ciphers, when I’m on 
stages, when I’m in classes, when I’m in it and it’s right now and it’s 
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happening, it feels right and it feels natural and I step outside of myself 
and I do and say things that even surprise me.  So, I feel like that’s what 
I’m supposed to be doing, that’s what I’m good at and there’s no reason 
why I shouldn’t be able to do that.  And I’ve sort of resigned this idea that, 
you know, I believe in some of those corny after-school special messages, 
like I think that if you are willing to take the time and patience to do it and 
really try to be invested in something you could possibly be – that’s what 
it is, that’s the success, so I’m already successful, you know what I mean.  
I may not be financially successful, but again, I’m not starving.   
KK:  And you wouldn’t trade that experience on the back porch at the 
party for – 
Idris:  Fuck no.  Cause I needed that.  Cause I’m better now after that.  
That shit was amazing.  I wish you would’ve been taping that.  That shit 
was crazy, dog.  It was amazing. 
The emphasis Idris gives to the importance of this experience is another example of how 
important identity claims are in hip-hop aesthetics.  In this passage, Idris’s identity takes 
center stage with his assertions about success and “that’s what I’m supposed to be 
doing,” but these foregrounded identity claims are juxtaposed with uncertainties of the 
self, another reminder that no narrative can completely capture the self. 
 Finally, Dove Rock, though she does not overtly describe her experiences with 
hip-hop aesthetics as spiritual in the ways that Melek Yonin and Idris Goodwin do, 
clearly operates within the same aesthetic sense that constantly foregrounds identity 
claims and yet is also caught up in uncertainties of the self.  As mentioned above, she 
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continually asserts her status as a high school dropout and she often claims that her 
formative years have given her a level of “fucked-upness.”51  She released an 
underground recording during the study titled Sylvia Plath Easy Bake Oven.  The whole 
album is as dark as its title, and I was interested in how mortality came to be such a focus 
for Dove in her work. 
KK:  … the thing that comes through on Sylvia Plath for me is the 
wrestling with mortality – there’s so much death imagery and substance 
even in the very title.  So, talk about how that plays into your work. 
Dove:  Well, I mean, everything is perpetually dying – everything that’s 
alive at this very moment, you know, dying.  You know, you’re the first 
person to really bring up that theme interestingly enough, and I don’t even 
know if I was aware of it when I was putting the album together, but 
you’re right, there’s a lot of imagery and even the title, just … yeah …  
I have been thinking about mortality a lot lately, even more so than when I 
was making Sylvia Plath.  In order to address why it was a recurring 
theme, probably growing up where I did and certain family circumstances 
– I lost a lot of people – and friends at a very young age and when you’re a 
kid and when you’re 14 or 15 years old and you grow up with somebody 
and their lives end at 15, it really makes you, well it made me, very, I 
guess hyper-sensitive to mortality, you know what I mean, because one 
day they’re there and the next day they’re gone, you know?  And when 
you’re that young it’s kind of hard to wrap your brain around it.  So, I 
                                                
51 After I gave Dove a copy transcript of the interview in which she made these comments, she posted a 
passage from the interview on her myspace.com page and titled it “A Certain Level of Fucked-upness.” 
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guess, I was fortunate to have those experiences because I feel like it kind 
of made me appreciate in some sense, you know, the time that I have but 
at the same time with all this shit going on there was certain levels of 
being borderline suicidal and this constant conflict of like, I’m so lucky 
that I wasn’t the one who was shot in the head in the middle of the street 
but at the same time I’m so fucking miserable in my own life and almost 
feeling like I’m betraying those people who lost their lives by being 
unhappy in my own, you know?  So that’s something I still kind of 
struggle with not as much as I have in the past maybe five years or so, but, 
in the next album, I think I do address my own mortality a little bit more 
and I’ve also been thinking about different aspects of mortality other 
peoples’ – well, mine included – but just like, the Internet, I’ve been 
trippin’ out because a friend of mine – you know there’s this whole 
“myspace” epidemic or whatever, you know, a friend of mine’s friend, 
who was also very young – she passed away, but she was on myspace – 
she has a page that’s still there and I’m just buggin’ out on that because 
I’m, like, so in a way, like the Internet can be like this neoafterlife and 
that’s just fucking crazy to me.  People are leaving RIP comments and shit 
like that on her page and I’m just like so, dude, does she live on forever in 
the Internet, you know what I mean, like, when does that page – I mean it 
updates itself – as her birthday come around it’s gonna change her age and 
everything. 
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This Is Hip-Hop?:  Conclusions 
 In a short introduction to Idris Goodwin’s self-titled album that he 
released during the course of this study, Melek Yonin recorded a piece called 
“Prologue” that says: 
this is hip-hop 
it is alive and well 
it is not dead 
it is thriving in your neighborhood lunchroom in the hands of culture-bandit blackbooks/syllables jumbled 
in our mouths makin’ people wonder if we talk English 
 
this is hip-hop 
it is alive and well 
it lives elsewhere than your radio/MTV/BET station 
It has saved a generation of kids who write and bomb and break and make beats and read books on their 
own time outside of institutional gazes ‘cause they heard De La or Rakim or Big Daddy Kane or Pac or 
saw Style Wars or some gymnasium b-boy practice block party and wanted do that 
tell stories like that 
truth like that 
rep who you are/what you feel/where you come from like that 
 
hip-hop is our place to exist 
the whole of ourselves in the radically egalitarian paradigmatic challenge to dominant cultural Darwinism 
-- 
the cipher  
where we unwrap the multiple layers of identity and document the real life happenings of our block 
of our mind 
of our community and country from our perspective 
 
this is hip-hop 
it is alive and well 
it is not dead 
it is thriving in your neighborhood lunchroom 
and some are gonna call this “underground”52 
Unfortunately media images and dominant cultural discourse on hip-hop leaves the 
casual observer with the idea that hip-hop does not live elsewhere.  The reality that hip-
hop has been co-opted by capitalism and commercialism does not change the fact that 
hip-hop is still being used to challenge capitalism and commercialism (and a host of other 
targets).  And the dominant media portrayal of hip-hop as hypersexualized bodies and 
conspicuous consumption combined with violent and irresponsible diversion does not 
                                                
52 Idris Goodwin, Idris Goodwin (chicago: naivete records, 2004). 
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change the fact that hip-hop is also the force behind a generation that “reads books 
outside of institutional gazes.”   
 Though the idea is not yet part of the popular discourse about it, hip-hop culture is 
a fruitful location for gaining philosophical insight about praxis theory, identity claims, 
intersubjectivity, and spirituality.  I do not claim that hip-hop culture has a monopoly on 
these kinds of insights, but I am saying that perhaps there is no cultural location that has 
been so popularly maligned and misunderstood such that the kinds of insights explored in 
this chapter would seem completely foreign to those with only a cursory understanding of 
hip-hop and hip-hop culture.   
 For the artists in this study, hip-hop aesthetics demand that they “represent!” and 
in doing so, it forces them to grapple with intersubjective tensions and the uncertainty of 
the self.  Therefore, the demand to “represent!” helps make hip-hop aesthetics a 
profitable site for exploring ideas that are of interest to philosophy and other 
reconstructive sciences.  Beyond that, it provides a location for discussing the limitations 
for knowledge in the human sciences and points us toward what lies beyond the narrative 
horizon.  Whether through a monotheistic idea of love and the kingdom of God or 
through Buddhist notions of detached love or some combination of both, exploring 
spirituality in hip-hop ultimately provides deep insight about knowledge and human 
development. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Prophetic Pragmatist Aesthetics and the Self-Aesthetic Relation in Hip-Hop Culture 
 
 
All of this is my ebonix 
 
I'm fishin secrets out this gin and tonic 
 
I sip it for a taste of sour 
 
I got these bitter bites for every hour 
 
And yes, I live inside a hazy future 
 
And I write a song without a song 
 
I got these lyrics sprawled across the wall 
 
and they're upside down/ and so bizarre 
 
and it's me that's normal on the right track and formal 
suits & ties is balls and chains and my tattered stuff is all the rage 
age is regression and suppression is sinful/ unload this pencil like baggages 
and the raving Raymond Babbages is geniuses we savages/ cutting creativity 
because we ugly and, yes, that's what we like/ 
butcher cleavers/ bustin brilliance like balloons/ cartoons laughin at us/ while we 
try to crack our cocoons … 
 
all of this is my Ebonix 
 
i wrote love letters in my comics 
 
Soliloquies/ and silly sonnets 
 
Here comes the flood of quips and comments … 
 
    Idris Goodwin 
 
 
Even as hip-hop culture begins to find more acceptance in the academy as an 
appropriate location for scholarly inquiry, one can still encounter plenty of anecdotal 
evidence to suggest that the marginalization of this pursuit remains.  And while it is 
merely possible to find this kind of marginalization of hip-hop on university campuses, it 
is all too easy to find it under attack in dominant cultural discourse.  It is not at all 
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uncommon to find conservative (and moderate) television personalities lamenting the 
damage done to “our” youth and “our” culture by “rap music.”  Internet message boards 
dedicated to any number of topics from politics to culture to sports can sometimes 
stumble onto discussion topics that yield a similar wag of the finger at hip-hop.  To be 
sure, the blogosphere and the Internet in general are populated by plenty of hip-hop fans, 
scholars, artists, and general apologists.1  Yet, mainstream rhetoric about hip-hop culture 
or, as it is generally reduced to, “rap music” continues to stir up a kind of moral panic 
that obfuscates the discourse on the subject such that parents, educators, community 
leaders, and others often operate with less than complete and less than accurate 
understandings of hip-hop.  This creates problems since hip-hop as a cultural force has 
influenced youth culture on a massive scale.  Hip-hop’s impact has come to know no 
race, gender, or socioeconomic boundaries.  It continues to have increasing levels of 
influence internationally.  The combination of so many young people connecting to and 
being influenced by hip-hop culture with the ubiquity of truncated dominant cultural 
discourses that demonize it results in cultural and generational disconnections that have 
become fertile ground for marginalization and oppression.  It is not uncommon for 
teachers in even the most reputable schools to label students with pejorative 
classifications such as “thugs” or “gang-bangers” based on sartorial styles and tastes in 
music that are associated with hip-hop culture.2  The irony is that the further 
marginalization of these students based on ill-informed and incomplete notions of hip-
                                                
1 Jeff Chang’s cantstopwontstop.com (a title that is shared with his American Book Award winning history 
of the hip-hop generation) is exemplary. 
2 Stacey J. Lee, Up against Whiteness: Race, School, and Immigrant Youth (New York: Teachers College 
Press, 2005). 
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hop and rap serves to fuel their demand to be heard and solidifies their position in schools 
as cultural producers first, much like Willis’s “lads.”   
Marginalization and disconnection characterizes not only the relationship between 
hip-hop and specific institutions like schools but also, as noted above, between hip-hop 
culture and mainstream culture broadly.  Tipper Gore and Oprah Winfrey have waged 
highly public battles against hip-hop’s supposed injurious effects on youth.  These kinds 
of efforts are covered extensively by mainstream media while a claim like Melek Yonin’s 
that hip-hop “has saved a generation of kids who write and bomb and break and make 
beats and read books on their own time outside of institutional gazes” has largely been 
left out of the dominant culture’s reporting on hip-hop and its influence on youth culture.  
Of course, the marginalization and disconnection are driven by the fact that hyper-
commodified hip-hop and the kind of hip-hop that reinscribes hegemony rather than 
combating it is the variety that dominates major media outlets and as a result, the 
dominant cultural imagination.  The issue is complex because most of the so-called 
underground hip-hop artists I encountered in the course of this study do not necessarily 
lament the commercial success of the hip-hop artists whose records get mainstream radio 
airplay and whose videos show up on MTV and BET.  Mainstream success for hip-
hoppers is often celebrated by so-called underground artists, but not without certain 
caveats and not without complicating the matter to a degree.  For instance, in Melek 
Yonin’s discussion of Diddy’s financial success, he claims that Diddy’s neighbors in the 
Hamptons are likely “nervous,” and Melek thinks that “there’s something really powerful 
in that” but at the same time, Diddy’s (and other performers whose work has been hyper-
commodified) music is “ultimately a song of capitalism” leading Melek to conclude that 
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in the end, while there is some amount of positive social impact when a young African-
American man attains the kind of financial power necessary to gain access to residency in 
the swanky Hamptons, “I don’t care.  I mean, that doesn’t mean that I have health 
insurance.  And that doesn’t make Chicago Public Schools better because P.Diddy has a 
house in the Hamptons.”  And, of course, mainstream media is all too eager to tell the 
story of Diddy’s apparent life of conspicuous consumption while hip-hop artist Melek 
Yonin’s life of concern for the issues in Chicago Public Schools is likely not to gain 
traction as news at the national level.   
The marginalization and disconnection that impact the dominant culture’s view 
and (mis)understanding of hip-hop does damage to individual young people, youth 
culture in general, and hip-hop artists themselves as mainstream media continues to feed 
the moral panic that often surrounds hip-hop through incomplete understanding and 
misinformation.  In a review of Russell Potter’s Spectacular Vernaculars: Hip-Hop and 
the Politics of Postmodernism (1995), Brent Wood says, “Potter deftly shows how 
rappers' rhetorical strategies are often misunderstood by their audience, and how ‘moral 
panic’ can be used as a tool of powerful interests to keep insurrectionary culture at bay.”3  
The result of morally panicked discourse is a mainstream cultural sensibility that often 
maintains baseless negative associations such as hip-hop clothing styles being connected 
to gangsterism and general social indecency as evidenced by the litany of anecdotal 
records of teachers referring to students as “thugs” or “gangbangers,” evaluations based 
solely on dress.4  Moral panic is what causes ultra-conservative television personalities 
like Bill O’Reilly to constantly refer to hip-hop and rap as such alarmingly viperous 
                                                
3 Brent Wood, "Resistance in Rhyme," Postmodern Culture 7, no. 1 (1996). 
4 I once heard a white high school teacher say in a negatively sarcastic tone, “Yeah, I’d love it if my 
daughter dressed like that,” in response to a Missy Elliott television advertisement for the Gap! 
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cultural forces.  Of course, O’Reilly and other likeminded commentators are not 
inaccurate when they locate misogyny and violence in hip-hop and find it problematic.  
The problem is that these kinds of shortsighted and truncated analyses fail to appreciate 
the complexity of hip-hop and therefore marginalize something of which they do not 
have a robust understanding.  So, the kinds of analyses that create moral panic are 
something like writing a bad review of a film after only viewing the opening credits.  The 
mainstream (conservative) talking heads who have the most alarming messages about 
hip-hop seem to have, at best, an extremely cursory knowledge of the culture and their 
conclusions are rife with misunderstanding. 
There are a number of deleterious consequences associated with the 
marginalization of hip-hop.  One of those consequences is that hip-hop has yet to be 
given its full due as an art form and therefore has yet to be seriously treated as a location 
of aesthetic inquiry.5  Idris Goodwin voiced his displeasure about this reality in an 
interview.   
Idris:  The business, I mean you can’t have it both ways and the business 
of rap, of selling music, of selling any product, the people who run that 
industry are gonna have a say in the products.  But that product is not 
indicative of the motherfuckers who influence whatever product it is.  So, 
if this guy comes out of his community, he’s just a mere product of his 
community and he makes certain decisions based upon him wanting to be 
                                                
5 As noted with regard to other issues surrounding hip-hop’s marginalization in the mainstream, there are 
pockets of support for treating hip-hop aesthetics seriously.  For example, Jeff Chang’s forthcoming Jeff 
Chang, Total Chaos:  The Art and Aesthetics of Hip-Hop (New York: Basic Civitas Books, 2007).  Also, as 
mentioned in chapter one, Richard Shusterman has taken hip-hop aesthetics seriously in Richard 
Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics : Living Beauty, Rethinking Art, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2000). 
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a good businessman.  Now he can go the Whole Foods route and be like 
good wholesome things for your body, but not everybody can afford that 
and that doesn’t appeal to everybody, or you can go the McDonald’s route, 
which is, I wanna reach a lot of people, you know what I’m saying, and so 
I gotta dilute it a little bit and you can judge it or not judge it, but I’m in 
business.  But, at the same time if you love hip-hop and you love the real 
shit – go out and see some real motherfuckers, go see these dudes, come 
see us!  Ten dudes on a Thursday night spitting our hearts out for 15 
minutes – we only have 15 minutes to go, you know what I mean.  If you 
really love it, come support, come out and see it.  It’s the art.  People are 
forgetting the art … if we’re just talking about hip-hop and what’s 
beautiful about hip-hop, let’s talk about the art of hip-hop, let’s talk about 
what beatmaking is and where it comes from and who’s on the cutting 
edge of that craft, you know what I’m saying? 
  
 The short shrift that the art of hip-hop receives results in much missed opportunity 
to explore important aesthetic ideas and the confluence of identity and aesthetics that I 
have been referring to as the self-aesthetic relation.  I explore those ideas here beginning 
with Richard Shusterman’s important work in pragmatist aesthetics.  Not only does 
Shusterman recapture and reassert Deweyan aesthetic notions in contrast to analytic 
philosophy of art, he also specifically deals with the marginalization of popular art and in 
so doing treats seriously popular culture in general and hip-hop in particular.  Shusterman 
creates four aesthetic categories with which to examine hip-hop.  Here I adopt his 
categories but view them through the lens of the prophetic.  This results in adding to his 
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categories as well.  “Prophetic pragmatist aesthetics,” like “pragmatist aesthetics,” leans 
heavily on Dewey’s Art as Experience and it adds to this foundation Cornel West’s 
notion of the prophetic that is constitutive of his “prophetic pragmatism.”  Therefore, 
“prophetic pragmatist aesthetics” brings together Shusterman and West in a way that 
maintains central concepts of both while expanding Shusterman’s treatment of hip-hop 
aesthetics to include consideration of the prophetic and its influence on the art of hip-hop 
as well as the self-aesthetic relation. 
 As mentioned above, the artist in this study who made the most frequent and 
explicit calls for focusing on hip-hop aesthetics in a serious way was Idris Goodwin.  He 
provided me with insight from a so-called underground artist’s perspective about the lack 
of focus on hip-hop as an aesthetic location.  In interviews, he repeatedly circled back to 
ideas about hip-hop as an art form and the lack of discourse around this notion.  While I 
make the claim here that hip-hop has not, with perhaps one exception6 been treated as a 
location of aesthetic inquiry, in part, because the marginalization and demonization of 
hip-hop culture by mainstream media has truncated the dominant discourse on it to such 
an extent that it is difficult for the notion that hip-hop aesthetics is a serious location of 
inquiry to gain traction outside of those who participate on some level in hip-hop culture, 
Idris asserts the idea that the art of hip-hop should become more of a focus in the internal 
dialogues of hip-hop culture. 
Idris:  If you wanna just explore the art itself, which is the mode of 
expression, the way people go about making songs, the craft part – you 
                                                
6 I am thinking here of Shusterman’s work.  Although I also mentioned Jeff Chang’s work above, it is more 
journalistic than academic.  In fact, Chang’s work is excellent and his writing is extremely compelling but I 
point out its journalistic nature here only to emphasize that my point has to do with serious treatment or 
lack thereof with regard to hip-hop in academia. 
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can just look at that part of it … there’s so much complexity to it [hip-hop] 
that you could look at it through a lot of different angles and through a lot 
of different lenses.  And me, personally, I feel like one of the angles that 
doesn’t get looked at enough and almost doesn’t have value enough is 
purely just the art part of it.  Like the choices people make, the approach, 
the process … let’s look at that, let’s examine that. 
In fact, it is precisely the aim of this chapter to examine “that” with Idris’s help 
and with the insights of the other artists in this study. 
 
In Defense of Pop Art Aesthetics 
 In Pragmatist Aesthetics, Richard Shusterman leads up to a chapter examining 
hip-hop aesthetics in a chapter that answers criticisms of popular art more broadly.7  This 
is a natural precursor to defending the legitimacy of hip-hop as an aesthetic location and 
an eventual inquiry into hip-hop aesthetics.  Thus, I begin with a review of Shusterman’s 
rebuttals to arguments against the appropriateness of applying aesthetic inquiry to 
popular art.  My own arguments will stem from Shusterman’s but depart from them in 
subtle ways.   
 Shusterman mentions that defenses of popular art aesthetics are usually difficult 
to find since, 
most pop culture enthusiasts don’t consider the intellectual critique either 
relevant or powerful enough to be worthy of response.  They see no need to 
defend their taste against the claims of alienated “uptight” intellectuals, just as 
they see no need to justify it by anything more than the satisfaction it gives to 
them and so many others.8  
 
                                                
7 Shusterman, “The Form and the Funk,” in Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art, 169-200. 
8 Ibid, 170. 
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Clearly Shusterman, whose interest in popular art is personal as well as academic, does 
not find himself in the same camp as those who feel no need to justify their appreciation 
of popular culture since he has dedicated a chapter of his book to defending pop art’s 
legitimacy against highbrow academic criticisms.  In another passage he claims that the 
“most urgent reason for defending popular art is that it provides us (even us intellectuals) 
with too much aesthetic satisfaction to accept its wholesale denunciation as debased, 
dehumanizing, and aesthetically illegitimate.”9  This argument might be taken to suggest 
that as intellectuals who favor popular art and culture, we defend its legitimacy in order 
to convince ourselves that our attraction to it is appropriate or to somehow legitimize our 
appetite for it.  In fact, later in this passage Shusterman likens criticism of popular art to a 
kind of Platonic ascetic renunciation of the sensual attraction of the aesthetic.10 
 My own reasons for articulating a defense for the aesthetic treatment of popular 
art/culture are slightly different than Shusterman’s.  The most urgent reason I have to 
defend aesthetics of pop art for the purposes of inquiry into the self-aesthetic relation in 
hip-hop culture is obviously to support the legitimacy of such a study.  In addition to that, 
defending popular art as an appropriate location of aesthetic inquiry also brings critique 
to bear on the marginalization of hip-hop culture discussed above.  Again, truncated 
mainstream discourse about hip-hop not only does damage wielded through 
marginalization and disconnection but it also closes doors to fruitful cultural 
examinations.  Legitimizing aesthetic treatment of popular art can be a force for opening 
doors of inquiry.  These reasons alone might not necessitate direct responses to specific 
highbrow criticisms of popular art but I track Shusterman’s responses to these criticisms 
                                                
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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below because academic study of popular culture (like hip-hop culture in particular) is a 
location rife with insight of value for philosophers, ethnographers, social science 
researchers (in general, all participants in reconstructive science), and educators.  I do not 
consider my personal draw to popular culture as a pursuit that necessarily needs academic 
defense.  Like those that Shusterman mentions in the passage quoted above, I do not feel 
the need to justify my enjoyment of popular art in the wake of criticisms against its 
legitimacy.  But it does seem that providing responses to the criticisms might be a place 
to begin a positive project of carving out academic space for the serious study of popular 
art and culture.  The criticisms leveled against pop art can be a kind of springboard for 
articulating academic notions of popular art aesthetics not in a posture of defense but 
toward a positive program. 
 Before responding directly to the indictments of popular culture, Shusterman 
discusses the difficulties of defending pop art against its intellectual critics.  I will not 
take up the difficulties he articulates here save one regarding the very use of the term 
“aesthetic.”  Shusterman notes that it has been an intellectual tendency to reserve the term 
itself exclusively for high art “as if the very notion of a popular aesthetic were almost a 
contradiction in terms.”11  Without question, the term “aesthetic” has historically been 
applied solely to high culture in academic pursuits (although there are signs that this is 
beginning to change as noted above).  It is this kind of exclusivity that demands those 
who consider popular culture to be an appropriate location of serious inquiry to claim the 
term “aesthetic” not in a defensive manner, but in such a way that highlights the 
sophistication of (some) forms of popular art.  Shusterman reminds us that “aesthetic” is 
                                                
11 Ibid, 172. 
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a word that has already undergone some application to areas other than high culture and 
that “traditional aesthetic predicates such as ‘grace,’ ‘elegance,’ ‘unity,’ and ‘style’ are 
regularly applied to the products of popular art with no apparent equivocation.”12  Not 
only that, but of course there is plenty of precedent for the transference of a word or 
phrase from one cultural domain to another.  In fact, this is precisely what happens when 
what originated in hip-hop or street vernacular finds its way into the mainstream 
American lexicon with such current standards as “chill out” and “keep it real.”  I 
highlight this particular “difficulty” that Shusterman mentions because it seems to be an 
appropriate place to begin the real work of establishing a positive statement about pop 
culture aesthetics, that is, by claiming the term. 
 In Shusterman’s discussion of criticisms leveled at pop art, he takes up the four 
groupings of charges that were organized by Herbert Gans.13  The first group of 
arguments has to do with the commercial nature of popular art that is mass-produced for 
profit and aimed at passive consumers.  Of course, this is ostensibly a socio-cultural 
critique of pop art, but Shusterman uncovers it for what it really is when he notes that the 
charge certainly cannot be about making profits since high art does so as well.  Instead, it 
seems the real criticism is about the mass production of popular art that ends up 
“sacrificing rigorous aesthetic aims of personal artistic expression to sell out to mass 
taste.”14  This reveals that the actual argument has to do with creativity and originality. 
                                                
12 Ibid. 
13 Herbert J. Gans, Popular Culture and High Culture : An Analysis and Evaluation of Taste, Rev. & 
updated ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1999). 
14 Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics : Living Beauty, Rethinking Art. 
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 Gans’s second grouping of criticisms discussed by Shusterman are organized by 
the concern for pop art’s “negative effects on high culture.”15  Again, Shusterman sees 
another aesthetic criticism parading as a socio-cultural one.  Gans, quoted in Shusterman, 
interprets the charge to mean “that popular culture borrows content from high culture 
with the consequence of debasing it; and that, by offering economic incentives, popular 
culture is able to lure away potential high culture creators, thus impairing the quality of 
high art.”16 
 The third group of charges against pop culture concerns the deleterious effects on 
its audience.  There are three specific criticisms that fall under this umbrella.  First, since 
popular culture produces only spurious gratification, it is emotionally damaging.  Second, 
it is intellectually damaging because of its escapist content that prohibits its audience 
from dealing with reality.  Third, it becomes culturally destructive as it diminishes the 
ability of people to engage in high culture.17 
 The last of Gans’s groupings of criticisms is the pernicious effects of pop culture 
on society, broadly.  This group includes claims such as that popular culture promotes 
totalitarianism through the creation of a passive audience.18  All of these groupings of 
critiques, though Gans claims that they are socio-cultural in nature, Shusterman notes that 
upon further examination, they are, at bottom, aesthetic critiques.   
 For this reason Shusterman couches his defense of popular art/culture 
aesthetically.  He asserts six arguments in his defense, though I will take up only the four 
                                                
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid, 175. 
18 Ibid. 
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that are of most importance for the discussion of hip-hop aesthetics.19  He begins by 
claiming that the most fundamental complaint with regard to pop culture seems to be that 
it does not promote real aesthetic satisfaction.  Of course, highbrow critics of pop art 
cannot deny the fact that it creates pleasurable sensations for its audiences since one only 
has to think of the scene of a popular music concert in which the audience constantly 
moves with excitement and delight for hours.  So, the critics, according to Shusterman 
have to denounce this response to pop art as unreal in the sense that it is “spurious and 
fraudulent” as opposed to the pleasure invoked by high art which is “genuine.”20  These 
assertions might seem extreme, especially to those readers who sympathize with the 
notion of pop culture aesthetics, but Shusterman shows how they have gained traction in 
academic discourse on aesthetics through the ideas of Theodor Adorno, Clement 
Greenberg, Bernard Rosenberg, and Ernest van den Haag.  Moreover, these ideas about 
genuineness move beyond the claim that the experiences provided by popular art are not 
aesthetically genuine, but Shusterman shows how the critics mentioned above actually 
claim that the experiences are not genuine at all. 
In short, the claim of spuriousness, a strategy of imperious intellectualist 
presumption, implies that the cultural elite not only has the power to determine, 
against popular judgement, the limits of aesthetic legitimacy, but also the power 
to legislate, against empirical evidence, what can be called real experience or 
pleasure.  Yet, how can such a radical claim be substantiated?  It in fact, never 
is, but instead is sustained by the authority of its proponents and the virtual 
absence of opposition.21 
 
As mentioned earlier, the lack of response is understandable and likely due to the 
fact that would-be defenders of pop art do not feel compelled to defend the satisfaction it 
                                                
19 Shusterman actually makes reference to hip-hop in one of his defenses and I discuss it here.  With regard 
to the four Shusterman arguments that will be discussed here, I will summarize them and augment them 
with ideas of specific concern for hip-hop culture where appropriate. 
20 Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics : Living Beauty, Rethinking Art. 
21 Ibid. 
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provides them to the likes of the critics mentioned above.  But Shusterman takes up the 
argument and examines the idea of the supposed spuriousness of the pop culture 
experience.  In attempting to make sense of this criticism, he first considers that the 
critics are charging that the pleasure is not real because it is not deeply felt.  Of course, 
this does not help ease the ridiculousness of the charge.  Shusterman counters with rock 
music’s ability to be obviously deeply absorbing, but hip-hop seems to provide an even 
greater counterargument since it is a form of pop art that actually thematizes realness and 
genuine feeling with some of its most treasured mantras, “keepin’ it real” and “are you 
with me?” or “do you feel me?”  Shusterman next wonders if the charge of spuriousness 
means, for those who have leveled it, that the experiences provided by pop art are 
fleeting.  He then quickly disposes of this argument logically by asserting that, “it is 
simply false to conclude the unreality of something from its ephemerality.”22  He adds 
that high art does not seem to be immune from providing experiences of fleeting 
pleasure.  While Shusterman’s arguments are appropriate and I align myself with them 
for any general defense of the legitimacy of popular art, my own response in the specific 
context of defending a particular popular art form, hip-hop, is to claim that, in fact, it 
does not simply provide fleeting pleasure.  Hip-hop culture with its variety of artistic 
iterations (which are traditionally classified as “MCing,” “breakin’,” “DJing,” and 
“taggin’” or “graff-taggin,’” although these “elements” as they are designated have 
arguably expanded since hip-hop’s early days) has, on many of its members, an 
absorbing effect.  The phrase (usually attributed to KRS-ONE), “I am hip-hop” and its 
massive proliferation within the culture gives witness to this.  Also, the way in which hip-
                                                
22 Ibid, 179. 
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hop has become such a powerful lived text for many of its proponents, especially 
exemplified by the powerfully prophetic influence of Tupac Shakur on a generation, 
strongly suggests that hip-hop, as a popular art form, is not relegated to dispensing 
merely fleeting moments of satisfaction and pleasure.23  
Shusterman next takes on the charge that popular culture provides no aesthetic 
challenge or requires no active response.  “In contrast to high art, whose appreciation 
demands aesthetic effort and thus stimulates aesthetic activity and resultant satisfaction, 
popular art both induces and requires a lifeless and unrewarding passivity.”24  He goes on 
to cite Adorno and Horkheimer who made a related claim that popular art demands no 
“independent thinking” from its audience.  Shusterman’s answer is first to suggest that a 
lack of intellectual response does not render pop art aesthetically illegitimate since there 
are other kinds of responses (he privileges the somatic) that are equally appropriate 
reasons to take popular culture aesthetics seriously.  Later, Shusterman quotes Adorno 
again and Allan Bloom in order to note “their anti-somatic animus.”25  Again, 
Shusterman’s response is helpful for defending hip-hop as a popular art form because 
somatic responses are certainly at the center of hip-hop aesthetics and this will be 
discussed below.  However, underneath this “anti-somatic” posture of high culture 
criticism of pop culture lies a connection to what has been referred to above as moral 
panic.  That is to say, the emphasis on sensuality and vigorous physical responses to a 
popular art form is part and parcel of what is threatening to the cultural gatekeepers and 
                                                
23 See, for instance, Greg Dimitriadis, Performing Identity/Performing Culture : Hip Hop as Text, 
Pedagogy, and Lived Practice, Intersections in Communications and Culture ; Vol. 1 (New York: P. Lang, 
2001). 
24 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction : A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1984), Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics : Living Beauty, Rethinking Art.  
25 Ibid, 186. 
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their stranglehold on defining legitimate art as that which evokes more “refined” 
responses.  Shusterman introduces the term “funky” and its African etymology to discuss 
somatic responses to art.  It comes from the Ki-Kongo and literally means, “positive 
sweat.”26  Although Shusterman does not make the point, it can be argued that the 
denigration of somatic responses to popular art are influenced by a Western bias, a 
Eurocentric posture, and perhaps even an anti-African position on aesthetic value.  This 
kind of bias is related to the moral panic that hip-hop has produced because even in 
mainstream journalistic culture, to say nothing of the staunch defenders or high art over 
and against pop art, there exists a bias against non-Western aesthetic notions.  The 
necessity for moral panic is created when non-Western aesthetics are perceived as 
infringing upon Western conceptions of art. 
The third response of Shusterman’s that I take up here stems from the previous 
one.  That is, the answer to the criticism that popular art’s superficiality results in a 
failure to engage intellectually.  There are two ways in which Shusterman interprets this 
charge against pop art and the first is “that popular art cannot deal with the deep realities 
and real problems of life, and therefore strives to distract us with an escapist dream world 
of pseudo-problems and easy, clichéd solutions.”27  To this Shusterman holds up the fact 
that rock music historically has been a music of protest and continues to organize itself 
around human rights projects.  As a continuation to this response, I argue that this 
particular criticism of popular culture once again provides a platform for an introductory 
discussion of hip-hop aesthetics as it is another charge that hip-hop culture, in fact, 
defies.  That is, hip-hop, from its inception and at various turns (here I am specifically 
                                                
26 Ibid, 184. 
27 Ibid, 185. 
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thinking of the advent of “gangsta rap”) has thematized “real” experience and “real” 
problems that are largely ignored by mainstream media and certainly by high culture.  In 
fact, hip-hop implicitly makes the charge that participation and consumption of high 
culture is indeed the escapist route if one considers the kind of flight from ghetto realities 
and postindustrial urban depression and all the harsh realities that go along with the 
Black/Brown urban experience to be a form of escapism.  These are American realities 
that are not usually addressed in high culture and, in fact, the denigration of pop art, 
specifically hip-hop and especially gangsta rap, can be viewed as an unwillingness to 
look these realities in their face and instead flee to the opera house or symphony hall 
where the human condition is dealt with in much more abstract and less disturbing ways.    
  Shusterman continues by noting an offshoot of this argument, that popular 
culture’s artifacts must necessarily be tailored to the comprehension of a larger audience 
than that of high culture.  “But this, for van den Haag and other culture snobs, means 
tailoring them too small to encompass any real issues or significant experience.”28  Of 
course, we know that this “wide audience” does not include van den Haag and others who 
dismiss pop art because they, by and large, do not understand its codes and we know, for 
example, that rock music has always communicated on some coded level as Shusterman 
notes.  But hip-hop, I argue, has a much deeper connection to coded language than rock 
and therefore is exemplary in combating the “wide audience” argument.  It could be 
argued that van den Haag’s notion of the smaller, more select audience of high culture 
actually applies to hip-hop.  Hip-hop’s lexicon only reaches a “wider audience” when it is 
so appropriated by mainstream journalists and dominant culture conversation. 
                                                
28 Ibid, 186. 
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The second part of this particular response of Shusterman’s deals with the charge 
that pop art produces such unsophisticated products that it fails to be mentally 
stimulating.  He answers this criticism by claiming that it is predicated on a 
“homogenizing prejudice” that treats all popular culture as identical.  He further argues 
that “critics typically fail to recognize the multilayered, multivocal, and nuanced 
meanings of popular art because they are ‘turned off’ from the outset and unwilling to 
give these works the sympathetic attention needed to tease out such complexities.”29  
Indeed, part of the failure to recognize the sophistication in pop art has to do with 
unwillingness to understand it on its own terms.  It is important to point out, as 
Shusterman does, that there is plenty of superficial pop art that should be treated as such.  
However, to hold up only the one-dimensional pop art creations and claim that the entire 
genre lacks sophistication is an indication of unwillingness to search for and understand 
pop culture’s more complex products.  What Shusterman does not address is the very 
nature of the term “sophisticated” which is often defined by the high culture gatekeepers 
themselves and carries a prodigious Western bias as mentioned above.  One example of 
such a bias is that for “culture snobs,” as Shusterman calls them, repetition is an 
indication of lack of sophistication, especially the kind of hyper-repetition of rhythms one 
finds in rap music.  But repetition is not necessarily an indicator of lack of sophistication 
according to other sets of aesthetic sensibilities, namely non-Western ones.   
The final Shusterman response I take up here is one that counters the argument 
that pop culture is unoriginal, monotonous and is “necessarily so because of its motives 
                                                
29 Ibid, 188. 
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and methods of production.”30  Shusterman elucidates this charge as asserting that 
creativity is stifled by technological production, that massive collaboration in pop art 
does damage to original expression, and that individual self-expression cannot be 
compatible with the goal of entertaining larger audiences.  To these charges Shusterman 
argues that high art also employs some amount of standardization (“The sonnet’s length 
is just as rigidly standard as the TV sitcom’s, and neither limit precludes creativity”).31  
As for technology, it has assisted in the creation of new forms of popular art that 
demonstrate its creative power.  Technology is central to hip-hop aesthetics in particular 
as will be discussed below.  Additionally, artistic collaboration and group production 
themselves do not frustrate creativity, rather, popular art is subject to the kind of 
commodification and corporatization that can frustrate creativity.  However, this is not a 
fault endemic to popular art itself, but rather an external pressure to be managed and, if 
possible, eliminated.  In fact, the tension between commodified and non-commodified 
pop art was in the beginning and continues to be a prominent theme in hip-hop culture.  
An argument could be made that this tension produced the so-called underground hip-hop 
scene.  The situation is complicated because even while underground artists are by and 
large committed to standards of keepin’ it real that commercial artists are sometimes 
accused of having violated (read: sold out), many underground artists try to make money 
for their art as a way to survive, rendering some level of compromise understandable.  In 
the end, though, underground hip-hop artists are more likely to adhere to an orientation 
that is in opposition to hyper-commodification and commercialization, and these themes 
are often explicitly found in their work. 
                                                
30 Ibid, 189. 
31 Ibid. 
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It should be clear that my own defense of popular culture as an appropriate 
location for aesthetic inquiry is not as much of a defense against particular arguments as 
it is a way of using Shusterman’s responses to criticisms as a jumping off point for 
articulating a positive conception of the foundations of popular art and hip-hop in 
particular.  Hip-hop aesthetics does involve the evocation of deeply felt, lasting responses 
that range from the highly somatic to the more intellectual.  Hip-hop does deal with deep 
realities, forgotten realities, those realities that are too difficult or dangerous for other art 
forms to take up and treat seriously.  Hip-hop does borrow, as all art forms do and hip-
hop makes novel use of technology to create new ideas and new sounds. 
 
Pragmatist Aesthetics:  Dewey and Art 
 Pragmatist aesthetics is Shusterman’s project of recapturing Dewey’s aesthetics 
and re-establishing his ideas (with some revision) in the wake of analytic philosophy’s 
domination of aesthetics when Dewey’s aesthetic theory waned.  Shusterman makes clear 
that Dewey’s rethinking of art was accompanied by a rethinking of the role of philosophy 
itself.  In this way, Shusterman reads Dewey as Cornel West does.  For West, philosophy 
means something different after Dewey (even though West claims that Dewey’s project 
did not reach complete fruition) and by extension it is fair to say that “aesthetics” means 
something different after Art as Experience (1934) even if the change was not recognized 
by analytic philosophers. 
 Shusterman defines “pragmatist aesthetics” largely through reference to Art as 
Experience, and I begin the task of describing “prophetic pragmatist aesthetics” with 
Shusterman’s explanation of “pragmatist aesthetics.”  After getting clear about that, I 
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inject West’s prophetism into the project before discussing and amending Shusterman’s 
categories for hip-hop aesthetics. 
 Deweyan aesthetics is summed up by Shusterman as “somatic naturalism.”32  By 
this he means that the aesthetic is rooted in natural needs and activities of human beings, 
and this for Shusterman is the first of several ways in which Dewey’s aesthetic theory is 
in opposition to analytic philosophy.  The following quotations from Dewey are 
instructive.  First, Dewey claims that his goal is, “recovering the continuity of esthetic 
experience with normal processes of living,”33 and later he instructs that,  
Even a crude experience, if authentically an experience, is more fit to give a clue 
to the intrinsic nature of esthetic experience than is an object already set apart 
from any other mode of experience. Following this clue we can discover how 
the work of art develops and accentuates what is characteristically valuable in 
things of everyday enjoyment. The art product will then be seen to issue from 
the latter … 34 
 
Analytic aesthetics, on the contrary, stands in complete opposition to the naturalization of 
art.  Shusterman quotes analytic philosophers who take this position, but for our purposes 
this opposition will suffice. 
 Another contrast between analytic aesthetics and Deweyan aesthetics is the 
“Kantian notion of disinterestedness.”35  By this Shusterman refers to a two-pronged 
analytic argument that claims that beauty is solely an intrinsic value and not connected to 
function and that art is in fact defined by its non-instrumentality.  Pragmatist aesthetics 
stands in staunch opposition to these notions.  Dewey thought that functionality and 
intrinsic value were not at all mutually exclusive and that serving human needs gave art 
its value.  He is worth quoting at length here. 
                                                
32 Ibid, 6. 
33 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York,: Minton, 1934). 
34 Ibid, 16, 17. 
35 Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics : Living Beauty, Rethinking Art. 
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 But there is no final term in appreciation of a work of art. It carries on and is, 
therefore, instrumental as well as final. Those who deny this fact confine the 
significance of "instrumental" to the process of contributing to some narrow, if 
not base, office of efficacy. When the fact is not given a name, they 
acknowledge it. Santayana speaks of being "carried by contemplation of nature 
to a vivid faith in the ideal." This statement applies to art as to nature, and it 
indicates an instrumental function exercised by a work of art. We are carried to a 
refreshed attitude toward the circumstances and exigencies of ordinary 
experience. The work, in the sense of working, of an object of art does not cease 
when the direct act of perception stops. It continues to operate in indirect 
channels. Indeed, persons who draw back at the mention of "instrumental" in 
connection with art often glorify art for precisely the enduring serenity, 
refreshment, or re-education of vision that are induced by it.36 
 
 Another contrast Shusterman notes is that unlike analytic philosophers who 
considered science the ideal model for human achievement, Dewey believed in “the 
cultural primacy and philosophical centrality of art and the aesthetic.”37 Dewey thought 
that philosophers had much to learn from examining aesthetic experience.38   
 …while the theory of esthetics put forth by a philosopher is incidentally a test 
of the capacity of its author to have the experience that is the subject-matter of 
his analysis, it is also much more than that. It is a test of the capacity of the 
system he puts forth to grasp the nature of experience itself. There is no test that 
so surely reveals the one-sidedness of a philosophy as its treatment of art and 
esthetic experience.39 
  
 Dewey also parted company with analytic aesthetic theory in his insistence on 
continuity that led him to challenge traditional binary notions that had long held sway in 
the study of aesthetics.  Among those binaries challenged by Dewey are “the fine versus 
the applied or practical arts, the high versus the popular arts, the spatial arts versus the 
temporal arts, the aesthetic in contrast both to the cognitive and to the practical.”40  The 
challenging of these binaries naturally brought Dewey to combat more fundamental 
                                                
36 Dewey, Art as Experience. 
37 Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics : Living Beauty, Rethinking Art. 
38 Dewey, Art as Experience, 278. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics : Living Beauty, Rethinking Art. 
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dualisms that inform ideas about aesthetics such as mind/body, material/ideal, 
thought/feeling, self/world, subject/object, means/ends.41 
 The final two distinctions between pragmatist and analytic aesthetics are perhaps 
most important to the development of “prophetic pragmatist” aesthetics.  Dewey strongly 
opposed the sequestration of art that he famously called “the museum conception of art” 
and claimed that this conception was all too prevalent. 
 Many a person who protests against the museum conception of art, still shares 
the fallacy from which that conception springs. For the popular notion comes 
from a separation of art from the objects and scenes of ordinary experience that 
many theorists and critics pride themselves upon holding and even elaborating.42 
 
 Finally, while Dewey did acknowledge the importance of art’s products, he 
certainly privileged aesthetic process.  Shusterman reminds us that this emphasis on 
process was another way for Dewey to attack the prevailing museum concept of art.43  
The privileging of process over product holds great significance for a study of hip-hop 
aesthetics and is another reason why pragmatism is an appropriate place to start thinking 
about hip-hop as an art form.  The importance of this notion intensifies when the locus of 
inquiry is the self-aesthetic relation in hip-hop, a phrase that tacitly claims a prioritization 
of process over product.  Not only that, but examining hip-hop aesthetics with an 
emphasis on process is another way to dispute claims about hip-hop culture’s damaging 
effects and its illegitimacy as an art form.  The kind of discourse that produces moral 
panic with regard to hip-hop is also the kind that stems from only a cursory examination 
of its products.  The response to these products is often shortsighted and reactionary to be 
sure, and the particular products that come under scrutiny are usually selected for 
                                                
41 Ibid. 
42 Dewey, Art as Experience, 12. 
43 Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art, 26. 
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particular political or ideological reasons.  That is to say, to examine hip-hop aesthetics as 
process, one in which artists and audiences are involved in aesthetic experience, 
necessarily means to look beyond products that contain content that is offensive to some 
and to take the aesthetic experience seriously.  Again, the point is that pragmatist 
aesthetics is a philosophical vehicle that can bring this kind of pressure to bear on the 
reactionary critics who seek to vilify hip-hop culture. 
 
Down with Dewey 
 What exactly does Shusterman mean when he makes this claim that hip-hop 
artists are “down with Dewey”?44  He means in general that the ways in which Dewey’s 
aesthetic notions depart from analytic philosophy’s aesthetic theory point directly toward 
the aesthetic sensibilities found in hip-hop.  That is to say, hip-hoppers employ a 
pragmatist aesthetic.  It means hip-hop is informed by the attack on traditional dualisms 
like art/science, emotion/cognition, form/content, pleasure/truth.  Hip-hop also aligns 
itself with Dewey’s arguments against the traditional identification of art with its material 
objects that produces the “museum conception of art.”  Perhaps most important, it means 
that hip-hop aesthetics are “down with” the notion that high art does not have a monopoly 
on aesthetic experience and that aesthetic process is privileged over product. 
 As noted briefly at the end of chapter one, Shusterman has created four categories 
for hip-hop as a means to discuss its place in pragmatist aesthetics.  They are, 
“appropriative sampling,” “cutting and temporality,” “technology and mass-media 
                                                
44 Ibid, 212. 
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culture,” and “autonomy and distance.”45  The first category, sampling, Shusterman 
connects with the way jazz actually produced new compositions by transforming standard 
popular melodies.  Likewise, hip-hop “borrows” from not only other musical genres but 
also takes sounds from a host of unlikely sources a good portion of which are nonmusical 
sampled sounds.46  The difference however, between hip-hop and jazz in terms of 
appropriative sampling, is that jazz borrowed abstract musical patterns and manipulated 
them in various ways whereas hip-hop actually lifts complete and literal sonic units and 
uses technology to fit the particular sound or phrase into the rap for which it has been 
sampled.  This could include manipulating the pitch of the original or perhaps slowing 
down or speeding it up to match the beat.   Also, in a move that clarifies its place under 
the umbrella of pragmatist aesthetics, hip-hop challenges notions of originality and 
creativity that have long been fetishized in traditional aesthetic theory by making claims 
that borrowing and creativity are not at all incompatible.  In pragmatist aesthetic theory, it 
is acknowledged that all art forms, high and popular have always borrowed one tradition 
from the other.  Hip-hop actually makes this notion explicit.  
 Shusterman’s next category of “cutting and temporality” serves to challenge 
traditional ideas about artistic unity and integrity.  Hip-hop certainly emphasizes the 
continuation of the artistic process.  The remix is exemplary and some rap songs 
eventually have a litany of remixes in which the same rap is treated by a host of different 
producers and artists as if picking up and adding to the rhyme in a cipher.  Of course, 
there is a staggering amount of collaboration in hip-hop that also speaks to the challenges 
hip-hop gives to notions of artistic integrity.  Implicitly, this illustrates the Deweyan 
                                                
45 Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics : Living Beauty, Rethinking Art. 
46 “Sampling” refers to the process of electronically capturing any sound that can then be manipulated 
(usually by a keyboard or synthesizer) and assigned any pitch or rate of decay, etc. 
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emphasis on process over product.  As mentioned in chapter one, this point is also 
illustrated by hip-hop’s propensity toward an open concept of artistic ownership.  Idris 
Goodwin speaks to this idea in an interview conversation about hip-hop aesthetics. 
Idris:  … the level of collaboration is far more common in hip-hop [than 
other popular forms of music] … the freeness of it … there’s not as much 
a regard for what’s legal, I mean, who owns a sound? 
 Shusterman’s third category of “technology and media culture” asserts that hip-
hop is simultaneously dependent upon and appropriated by technology and media.  Kool 
Herc’s education in sound systems in the creation myth of hip-hop is an indication that 
even before rap music became hyper-commodified, this was an animating feature of the 
culture.  Of course technology is also the force that has reified the hip-hop aesthetic and 
commercialized it in ways that have watered it down, some say.  As a result, this tension 
has produced a rather vigorous internal conversation in hip-hop that has been referenced 
a few times in this study.  There are plenty of romanticized notions of particular moments 
in hip-hop or its origins or that characterize underground hip-hop as the culture’s purest 
form.  But as mentioned in chapter one, there is a prevailing sentiment in hip-hop circles 
that an underground artist is simply another name for an artist without a record contract.  
Reaching many people with their music is certainly a goal of all hip-hop artists, even 
those in the underground and the Internet has been especially beneficial in this way.  The 
phenomenon myspace.com that has been mentioned earlier is utilized by each of the 
artists in this study.  It is a way for them to disseminate news, photos, and most 
importantly samples of their music without cost and with relatively little maintenance.  
Shusterman characterizes the relationship between hip-hop and technology as 
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“postmodern,” and the postmodern challenges to modern artistic conventions are 
prefigured by Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics. 
 Shusterman’s last category of autonomy is another iteration of hip-hop’s attack on 
the kind of compartmentalization found in modern notions of separate cultural spheres 
and the autonomy of the aesthetic.  As mentioned in chapter one, hip-hop culture contains 
a litany of artists who challenge this notion in their lives and art.  KRS-ONE is such an 
example, but the artists in this study also embody this category.  Idris Goodwin is a hip-
hop artist as well as a playwright and the co-founder of an urban theater company.  Dove, 
Idris, and Melek are all educators and have performed numerous workshops for 
teenagers.  Melek has had much experience educating as he has also done residencies at 
various colleges.  Additionally, throughout this study I am claiming that all three “do” 
philosophy through their artistic processes. 
As mentioned in chapter one, Shusterman’s categories and aesthetic treatment of 
hip-hop is perhaps the most thorough and fair treatment the culture has received from 
within the academy.  I have only summarized his categories because I accept them he 
articulates them, and I wish to focus on the addition of an aesthetic category for hip-hop 
before expanding his project into “prophetic pragmatist aesthetics.” 
 
Kinetic Consumption:  An Addition to Shusterman’s Categories 
I mentioned in chapter one that I would like to expand Shusterman’s categories 
and add “kinetic consumption.”47  I use the term “consumption” broadly to refer to both 
the way the artist takes in the aesthetic process she is involved in or the participation of 
                                                
47 I am tempted to call this “kineticism” but this term has other implications in art theory. 
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the audience witnessing a performance.  I also use the term ‘consumption” to mean that 
hip-hop aesthetics both demands that its art be consumed kinetically and also that hip-hop 
is consumed by constant energy and motion.   
Hip-hop is meant to be felt and not just seen and/or heard.  I have discussed the 
idea that hip-hop is animated by the mantras, “do you feel me?” and “are you with me?” 
and these questions are related to connection.  The connection the performer is interested 
in having with the audience is layered.  First and foremost, however, the performer is 
expecting kinetic participation from the audience and in hip-hop performances, the 
audience actually understands and accepts this as a kind of expectation.  When the 
audience feels the performer or the performance this way, any number of physical 
responses ensue, most of them rhythmic and repetitive.  Sometimes the kinetic response 
is vocal.   
Kinetic consumption is related to what Shusterman refers to as a “somatic” 
response.  However, this term is differentiated from any kind of mental response, 
although Shusterman is quick to point out that somatic responses and intellectual 
responses are not mutually exclusive.  But, kinetic consumption can actually include 
mental responses as in the energy of the cipher, and here I turn from kinetic consumption 
in the audience to the experience of the artist involved in the aesthetic process.  The 
cipher is typically an artistic space that melds energy of mind and body.  That is to say, 
there is intellectual engagement in a cipher as the rhymes are passed around the circle and 
the play of words takes over, but that mental energy demands bodily energy as well.  
Ciphers are not typically places in which participants sit or stand still.  Motion dominates 
these artistic spaces but it is not all physical motion.  The mental/physical energy/motion 
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manifests itself not only in the cipher but in other artistic processes as well.  Kinetic 
consumption means that hip-hop is driven by constant motion.  Artists and performers as 
well as audiences are usually in constant physical motion, but freestylers are also in 
constant mental motion and the culture itself cannot stand still, metaphorically speaking.  
Idris Goodwin addressed this motion and energy in hip-hop in an interview. 
Idris:  It’s about kinetic energy.  It’s about motion, freshness, and 
newness.  It’s about invention … it’s just electric, the energy … it’s all 
about right now, where you at right now … new shit, slang comin’ out all 
the time ... there’s a disregard for common ideas or what’s commonplace 
… It’s just about excitement, about being kinetic, being alive … before 
people can break down all your words, they gotta feel you first.  They 
gotta feel you before they hear you. 
As an additional aesthetic category to add to Shusterman’s “appropriative sampling,” 
“cutting and temporality,” “technology and mass-media culture,” and “autonomy and 
distance,” kinetic consumption also provides another pragmatist argument against 
passive, museum conceptions of art and the mind/body dualism. 
 
Prophetic Pragmatist Aesthetics 
 Cornel West’s “prophetic pragmatism” is self-reported to be largely a political 
project.  It does not deal much in aesthetics and West makes only one mention of 
Dewey’s Art as Experience in his genealogy of pragmatism.48  However, there are two 
basic reasons that make it possible to expand Shusterman’s “pragmatist aesthetics” into 
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“prophetic pragmatist aesthetics.”  First, there is some amount of evidence that 
Shusterman and West read Dewey similarly, at least in the broad sense that both claim 
Dewey to have challenged traditional notions of philosophy.  West approaches this idea 
in a general sense while Shusterman places it squarely in aesthetic theory.  From this 
starting point, it seems possible to merge the two projects without damaging either 
because of their general point of connection with regard to Dewey.49  Also, the 
prophetism in West’s pragmatism seems to have potential for broader application than 
strictly political projects.  West even suggests this himself when he claimed in an 
interview with George Yancy in 1988 that philosophy is only one of several disciplines 
that has a connection to the prophetic, and he wondered aloud if art might possibly have 
the strongest connection.50  In developing prophetic pragmatist aesthetics I am also 
claiming that, although there could be other applications for it, it is most congruent with 
hip-hop aesthetics.  Additionally, although hip-hop aesthetics could be viewed through 
the lens of pragmatist aesthetics, my development of prophetic pragmatist aesthetics 
suggests that it is an even more appropriate way to approach aesthetic ideas in hip-hop.  
 So what, then, does the prophetic add to pragmatist aesthetics?  One theme has 
already been discussed at length in chapter three.  Parrhesia, or plain, frank speech is an 
animating feature of prophetic pragmatist aesthetics.  In addition to being a political idea, 
parrhesia is an aesthetic sensibility (and in the spirit of Deweyan continuity, prophetic 
pragmatist aesthetics asserts the connection of art and politics) in hip-hop and therefore it 
                                                
49 In my own brief personal communication with both Cornel West and Richard Shusterman, they each 
expressed admiration for the other’s work although neither has responded to the other.  Notably, in a brief 
conversation in 2004 Cornel West told me that he found Shusterman’s work in pragmatism to be 
“indispensable.”  This is another factor in my feeling comfortable combining the two projects. 
50 Cornel West, “On My Intellectual Vocation,” in Cornel West, The Cornel West Reader, 1st ed. (New 
York, NY: Basic Civitas Books, 1999).26. 
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is central to prophetic pragmatist aesthetics.  It relates to the hip-hop mantra, keepin’ it 
real, that all three artists in this study take seriously.  Their art is animated by this 
aesthetic notion in different ways with Dove Rock’s unapologetic feminist raps that are 
often performed in front of almost exclusively male audiences; with Melek Yonin’s 
politically and socially trenchant poems that level unabashed critiques at not only Mel 
Gibson and his controversial film, but also his own city, his own people, his own family; 
with Idris Goodwin’s courageous, though comical, criticisms of the pretentious set of 
critics that, like the “cultural snobs” mentioned above simply do not “get it.” 
 A second element that prophetic pragmatist aesthetics adds to pragmatist 
aesthetics is an emphasis on a sense of the tragic.  For Cornel West, this is an 
indispensable notion for philosophy as he insists on the idea that tragedy is bound up in 
the human condition.  He is fond of reminding audiences to whom he is speaking that the 
Latin for “human” is humando, literally, “burying.”  In chapter one it was noted that 
West’s sense of the tragic is characterized by the Niebuhrian “strenuous mood” that lives 
within the tension between romanticism and pessimism and at the same time commits 
itself unwaveringly to human agency.  So, the tragic sense is a way of striking a balance 
between unwarranted theodicy and debilitating pessimism.  But what about the sense of 
the tragic as an aesthetic notion?  Perhaps no other figure in the history of hip-hop has 
embodied the prophetic pragmatist tragic sense through aesthetics than Tupac Shakur.  
His body of work shows glimpses of an attempt to navigate between theodicy and 
hopelessness; and even in the days of his full embrace of “thug life” he managed to carve 
out a space for social and political criticism.  He never stopped viewing the world 
through the eyes of its victims and this is a salient component of prophetic pragmatism.  
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In a poem titled “The Rose that Grew from Concrete,” Tupac’s ideas are congruent with 
prophetic pragmatism’s sense of the tragic in that human agency is the primary animating 
force.  The rose grew from concrete “proving nature’s laws wrong.”  Here the hope of the 
victim trumps the hopelessness of “nature’s laws.”51  Another stirring example of 
Tupac’s sense of the tragic is found in his rap, “I Wonder if Heaven Got a Ghetto” where 
he asserts, “I see no changes, all I see is racist faces/Misplaced hate makes disgrace to 
races/We under I wonder what it take to make this one better place/let's erase the wait 
state.”52 Here we have much more tempering of utopian impulses than in “The Rose that 
Grew from Concrete,” but the language is clearly not hopeless.  Even while Tupac has 
reached a point of questioning the worth of life itself, he holds onto a belief in human 
agency.  He still contemplates what it might take to move out of the “wait state” which 
suggests that human activity will be the impetus for moving beyond it into the “one better 
place.”   
 Tupac’s sense of the tragic was robust and congruent with prophetic pragmatism’s 
tragic sense.  Additionally, for some of the artists in this study, the tragic sense informs 
their aesthetic sensibilities.  Dove Rock’s work on Sylvia Plath Easybake Oven ostensibly 
favors pessimism but even as dark imagery dominates her raps, she still tacitly employs a 
sense of agency.  Her work suggests that patriarchy and misogyny can be ameliorated 
through human agency.  She also implicitly affirms agency in her songs that offer 
political criticism since there would be no reason to write such songs if it were not 
possible to change the political climate through human action.53 
                                                
51 Tupac Shakur, The Rose That Grew from Concrete (London: Quartet, 2000). 
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53 At a local show I once heard Dove explicitly working out the very tension that the prophetic pragmatist 
notion of the tragic deals with on stage when introducing a song about “revolution” and she paused to 
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 Melek Yonin’s aesthetic sense is also informed by a prophetic pragmatist sense of 
the tragic.  The way he artistically navigates the tension between theodicy and pessimism 
has already been suggested in earlier chapters, but one of his poems especially 
exemplifies the sense of the tragic.  In, “love letter to Chi,” Melek offers a bittersweet 
anthem to his hometown and in so doing is neither willing to overlook harsh realities nor 
is he able to become completely pessimistic.  He professes, 
i have loved you since i first stood  
at your North Shore borders patroled  
with suburban whispers of disimagination 
 
i gazed longingly 
at the transit tunnels you bore 
like river channels, tentacles 
reaching into lily white  
flight pad picket fences 
where jews sold themselves 
for the price of a nose job 
 
i fell in love with you 
on school field trips 
head out bus window 
staring at invisible neighborhood lines 
that decree where the world’s refugees will sleep 
 
i see them scattered thru Wicker Park 
Little Village and Pilsen 
spanish knotted in their tongues 
generations of families 
the orkin man in trying to genocide … 
 
i mean the cubs deserve a pennant like your black metropolis 
deserves paycheck and payback and institutions built in their name 
run by the children 
whose fathers you murdered while sleeping in their own beds 
whose food you poisoned during a luncheon meeting at city hall 
who you shot for trying to organize tortilla workers 
for swimming on your beaches 
or playing in your Marquette Parks 
                                                                                                                                            
admit that she was having internal conflict about the efficacy of the idea but then still performed the song 
with passion and conviction. 
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i love you despite your cook county holding cells 
the glass precipice of your juvenile detention centers 
glaring violet, red sunsets over the domes of the kidnapped 
 
i love you despite your insistence on tracking and standardized tests 
despite your area 21 plan 
fuck you for lincoln park and university village 
 
i love  you because i know a Haymarket riot eats at your innards …54 
 
 This robust tragic sense of Melek’s is clear in the lines of the poem, but as hip-
hop is about feeling the performer, the real sense of this part of prophetic pragmatist 
aesthetics is infused in the performance of this piece.  I have seen Melek perform it a 
handful of times, and the most powerful was at a book release party.  He performed the 
poem to an audience of about 75 people jammed into a loft condominium in the city.  
Most of the people in the room were Chicago residents, including, of course, the author 
and performer of the poem.  The sense of the tragic was prodigiously palpable in that 
moment. 
 The last addition the prophetic makes to pragmatist aesthetics is what West refers 
to as an alignment with “the wretched of the earth” that he finds in W.E.B. DuBois.55  I 
prefer to characterize this idea as a connection with and concern for “everyday people.”  
This is a vague notion, yet it can be made a bit clearer through an examination of the 
aesthetic sensibilities of the participants of the study.  First, if we consider Melek Yonin’s 
ideas about “the story in front of your nose” and the “infinite amount of miracles” within 
a five mile radius of where you are, we can see that the hip-hop aesthetic sense leads to 
an examination and elucidation of the stories of people that we see everyday on the way 
                                                
54 Kevin Coval, Slingshots:  A Hip-Hop Poetica (Channahon, IL: EM Press, 2005). 
55 West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism. 
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to work, on the train, at the bus stop, and so on as opposed to the “plastic dreams” that are 
displayed on television. 
Melek:  Why do we tell stories?  Why is hip-hop so powerful?  I think it’s 
because it’s not the stories of, you know, these dull, deadened stories of 
Friends or Seinfeld.  It’s the stories of real people in our neighborhoods 
that we know and that we see.  It’s our stories and we connect to them, we 
are awakened or enlivened by them because they speak to who we are.  
And normally, the television, the radio doesn’t.  It speaks to, like, our 
plastic dreams but it doesn’t speak to who we actually are in our lives, in 
our bodies.  It speaks to plastic bodies, literally, Botoxed, salined, 
siliconed bodies.  It doesn’t speak to our bodies. 
This is an aesthetic connection with “everyday people” that resonates with the ideas of 
both Sly Stone and W.E.B. DuBois (and Cornel West).  Each one of the artists in this 
study has this prophetic pragmatist aesthetic sense of aligning themselves artistically with 
“everyday people.”  Dove Rock mentioned in an interview that she has been involved in 
teaching hip-hop workshops using the very idea of bringing the poetic imagination to the 
stories of real people, the stories “in front of your nose.”  Idris Goodwin also tells such 
stories in his work, not only through rap music, but also his playwriting reflects this 
prophetic pragmatist aesthetic sensibility.   
 Although they have different manifestations for each artist in the study, the 
additional components of parrhesia, a prophetic sense of the tragic, and alignment with 
“everyday people” that turn pragmatist aesthetics into prophetic pragmatist aesthetics are 
evident in the hip-hop artists of this study.  What is true of the parrhesia that was 
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discussed in chapter three applies to the prophetic sense of the tragic and alignment with 
“everyday people” as well, that is, that they are lived aesthetic sensibilities.  In fact, this is 
part of why they are characterized as “prophetic pragmatist” because they embody 
Deweyan unity combined with West’s notion of paying mind to lives being lived, “on the 
ground.”  For these hip-hop artists, the lines between living everyday and engaging in a 
particular aesthetic sense in music and poetry are blurred. 
 
Conclusions/Remixes 
 Whether one is convinced of the “Creation Myth” in hip-hop lore or not, there is 
no denying that hip-hop grew out of what Cornel West refers to as the “underside” or the 
“nightside of American life.”  Hip-hop is the voice of those who demanded one.  It is 
about marginalized, oppressed, and forgotten experiences.  Melek Yonin told me that he 
once heard Cornel West say that hip-hop is the articulation of latchkey kids.  Hip-hop 
certainly began with the Black and Brown urban experience, and this stands to reason 
since it is perhaps the most forgotten experience in modern America.  But forgotten 
experiences are lived every day in America in cities, in suburbs, and in rural areas.  
Forgotten experiences exist across the globe in various socioeconomic situations.  Hip-
hop aesthetics makes an attractive offer to those living on the “underside” or living 
forgotten experiences.  Tell your story.  Represent! who you are and where you come 
from.  Speak your piece.  Your voice matters.  Tell the stories of those around you.  Tell 
the story in front of your nose.  These are offers that have made hip-hop kids out of youth 
in America and around the globe. 
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 The artists in this study embody the idea that William James, Cornel West, and 
KRS-ONE share, that is, philosophy belongs in the streets.  Hip-hop artists practice 
philosophy (as West conceives of it) through their status as organic intellectuals and 
through their connection with prophetic pragmatist aesthetics.  They also provide deep 
and important philosophical insights about the self, its creation and maintenance, identity 
claims, desire for recognition, praxis theory, intersubjectivity, and spiritual experiences.  
Moreover, these insights come in aesthetically pleasing packages of repetitious funky 
beats and trenchant social criticism or satiristic “floods of quips and comments” and all 
forms in between.  And they are beautiful.  They are human. 
 
The Beat Goes On:  Summary, Limitations, and Further Research 
 In chapter one I discussed the relationship between hip-hop culture and 
philosophy.  That connection becomes most visible when philosophy is treated as it is by 
Cornel West, that is to say, when it is grounded in American pragmatism’s 
antifoundationalism, when it takes seriously the Emersonian evasion of epistemology-
centered philosophy, and when it concludes that after John Dewey to be a philosopher is 
to engage in cultural production and criticism.  Broadly speaking, hip-hop culture from 
the “creation myth” to Kanye West has interacted with these themes from pragmatism but 
the connection between pragmatism and hip-hop is especially underscored when 
Shusterman’s conception of Deweyan aesthetics and West’s prophetism are considered.  
While it is not possible to apply a single set of tenets to or monolithically describe the 
prodigious entity that is hip-hop culture, it is appropriate to say that prophetic pragmatism 
and pragmatist aesthetics are fruitful underpinnings to employ in examining the culture.  
 224
What this study illustrates is that certain iterations of hip-hop culture do indeed connect 
in meaningful ways with philosophia, and prophetic pragmatism in particular.  This is 
evident in the emergent body of scholarship on hip-hop culture but that scholarship has 
focused too much on hip-hop products and not enough on the artistic process.  It has too 
often taken as its subjects artists who have attained commercial success and who are 
recognized media figures.  For this reason I have applied the connection between 
philosophy and hip-hop to critical qualitative research of so-called underground artists.  
This resulted in a variety of philosophical insights including notions of prophetic voice, 
organic intellectualism, praxis theory, identity and spirituality, and aesthetic theory. 
 Certainly there are limitations to such a focused ethnographic account that tries to 
make sense of something as large and elusive as hip-hop culture.  Though I traveled in a 
circle of influential and notable artists in Chicago through my interactions with my 
subjects Melek, Dove, and Idris, I became aware that there were other underground 
circles, and in a city the size of Chicago it stands to reason that more than one community 
of underground artists exists.  And while the subjects of this study certainly talked in 
terms of being representative of Chicago hip-hop and even repeatedly situated themselves 
squarely within a larger hip-hop culture, it still must be acknowledged that these are three 
artists in a particular underground community in Chicago and what we have learned from 
their corpora, their lives, their artistic processes may not be representative of the entire 
community of hip-hop artists.   
 Therefore, there is a need to continue to explore the connection between 
philosophy and hip-hop with other artists in other places.  As noted above, there is little 
scholarship that focuses both on hip-hop process and the way such process is lived, “on 
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the ground” with so-called underground artists.  In that respect, this study is just a 
beginning.  Not only should further study examine underground hip-hop circles in other 
places, but should also consider doing so with other age groups since this study dealt with 
three adults (read=over 21) and there are plenty of places teeming with youth 
underground hip-hop communities that could be explored. 
 Further study is also implicated through the discussion of Richard Shusterman’s 
pragmatist aesthetics, its relationship to hip-hop, and my attempt to expand Shusterman’s 
project to include the prophetic, thereby turning it into “prophetic pragmatist aesthetics.”  
This expansion, set in the context of the artistry of hip-hop, could be expanded into a 
fruitful new aesthetic theory that brings hip-hop aesthetic sensibilities together with 
Deweyan metaphysics (as Shusterman does) and adds the prophetic component from 
West’s neopragmatism.  This is precisely what I have begun to do here but much more 
work could be done to fully develop an aesthetic theory in this direction. 
 More work should also be done with the insights the artists in this study provided 
with regard to spirituality.  What we know from this study is that the underground artists 
studied here are conversant with notions of spirituality found in the work of Carspecken, 
Habermas, Caputo, and Theunissen.  This conversation could be expanded in further 
study as the spiritual dimension continues to gain more currency in the academy broadly 
and in hip-hop studies specifically.  Artists could provide more of this conversation 
between hip-hoppers and philosophers and theologians (Caputo works precisely at this 
intersection of philosophy and theology) and hip-hop culture generally can further inform 
ideas about spirituality. 
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 In the preface I mentioned that writing about hip-hop was necessary for me 
because of my felt connection to Black aesthetics and my experience specifically with 
Black musical forms.  My work going forward will continue to be informed by the spirit 
and the soul of Black aesthetics as I plan to continue to pursue notions of spirituality and 
the insight from hip-hop culture in this regard is indispensable.  I recently watched the 
latest episode in the new season of “Russell Simmons Presents Def Poetry” (Idris 
Goodwin actually performed one of his trademark equally comic and incisive pieces on 
this episode) and the raw, frank words, the vulnerability, the organic intellectualism, the 
aesthetic skill all jumped out at me like they have so many times before.  But even more 
than that, I was reminded again of the love, the humanness, the spirituality with which 
this particular hip-hop scene is laced.  And I felt something like my schoolboy self 
hearing Martin Luther King, Jr. for the first time.  
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